CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

 

 

§          1          Rules of Criminal Procedure

§          2          Criminal Complaints, Indictments and Bills of Information

§          3          Pleas

§          4          Trials

                        4(1)     Pre-Trial Matters

                        4(2)     Competence to Stand Trial

                        4(3)     Bifurcated Proceedings

                        4(4)     Discovery

                        4(5)     Speedy Trial

                        4(6)     Severance and Joinder

                        4(7)     Trial by Jury

                        4(8)     Right to a Public Trial

                        4(9)     Witnesses

                        4(10)   Juveniles

                        4(11)   Self Incrimination

                        4(12)   Mistrial

§          5          Punishment

                        5(1)     General Provisions

                        5(2)     Constitutional Restrictions

                        5(3)     Deportation

                        5(4)     Probation

                        5(5)     Parole

                        5(6)     Parole Revocation

                        5(7)     Conditions upon Release

§          6          Collateral Estoppel

§          7          Post-Verdict Motions

                        7(1)     Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

                        7(2)     Motion for New Trial

                        7(3)     Motion to Vacate Sentence

                        7(4)     Motion to Reduce Sentence

                        7(5)     Appeal by Defendant

                        7(6)     Appeal by Government

                        7(7)     Habeas Corpus & Conditions of Confinement

                        7(8)     Miscellaneous Motions

§          8          Constitutional Protections

8(1)      Due Process

8(2)      Equal Protection

§          9          Interrogation and Miranda

                        9(1)     Voluntary Statement

                        9(2)     Custody

                        9(3)       Interrogation

                        9(4)     Waiver

                        9(5)     Invoking Miranda Rights

                        9(6)     Exclusion of Fruit of Poisonous Tree

§          10        Searches & Seizures

                        10(1)    Searches in General

                        10(2)    Search Warrants

                        10(3)    Warrantless Searches

                        10(4)    Plain View

                        10(5)    Arrests

                        10(6)    Terry Stops

                        10(7)    Traffic Stops

                        10(8)    Application of Exclusionary Rule

§          11        Counsel

                        11(1)    General Provisions

                        11(2)    Right to Counsel

                        11(3)   Effective Assistance of Counsel

§          12        Witness Identifications

§          13        Double Jeopardy

§          14        Cruel and Unusual Punishment

 

 

 

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§          1          Rules of Criminal Procedure

 

Fact there is no indictment by grand jury nor jury trial in American Samoa does not deprive High Court of jurisdiction over criminal matters arising herein.  American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

 

At time United States assumed control of American Samoa, treaty was in effect that applied laws of any nation signing treaty which judge considered appropriate for criminal offenses, and customs of Samoa were applied with respect to natives.  American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

 

Conviction may stand even though no person actually witnessed crime.  American Samoa v. Sale, 2 A.S.R. 635.

 

Clerk of Court has no authority to excuse person from standing trial for criminal offense.  Government v. Si’u, 3 A.S.R. 479.

 

Court acquires personal jurisdiction in criminal case if defendant is personally served with summons while in American Samoa.  Government v. Tobu Boeki, K.K., 4 A.S.R. 843.

 

Court acquires personal jurisdiction in criminal case against foreign corporation if it has local registered agent or is “doing business” in American Samoa.  Government v. Tobu Boeki, K.K., 4 A.S.R. 843.

 

Unlike federal rules of criminal procedure promulgated under the authority of Congress and binding on federal courts to the same extent as statutes, territorial rules are made by the Court itself, so that a time limit provided by territorial rule is not as obviously jurisdictional as a similar limit provided by federal rule.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 3.1002(c).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tile, 8 A.S.R.2d 120.

 

Court will not interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unless it is shown that such discretion was unconstitutionally vested in the prosecutor or that it has been abused or exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

 

Order issued in open court is binding from the moment it is announced, whether or not it is ever reduced to writing.  American Samoa Government v. Laumoli, 12 A.S.R.2d 111.

 

Because the High Court’s rules were promulgated solely on its own authority, they must give way to territorial statutes defining the court’s jurisdiction, unless the statutes themselves are unconstitutional.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

 

In the interest of judicial economy, we place the burden on defendants to give the court sufficient reason to continue trial.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

Judicial economy and legitimate public interests favor a joinder of all offenses against the accused.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

 

Whether joinder of offenses or defendants is appropriate is determined on a case by case basis.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

 

A.S.C.A. § 46.0501 does not make 18 U.S.C.S. § 3144 applicable to the Territory.  A.S.C.A. § 46.0501 brings our criminal procedure into conformance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, not with every rule of criminal procedure applicable in the federal courts.  The term “Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure” refers specifically to the 68 rules, which go by that title.  18 U.S.C.S. § 3144, while a rule of criminal procedure applicable to federal courts, is not part of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.   In Re Proceedings to Compel Attendance of May Fitiausi, 29 A.S.R.2d 71.

 

Criminal procedure in the High Court must conform as nearly as practical to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  The High Court will consider interpretations of the federal rules by federal courts to be highly persuasive in the interpretation of the local rules, which mirror the federal rules.   American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

 

A change of venue for a criminal prosecution is not available under the Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  A.S.G. v. Fruean, 31 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

There is no other venue available for ASG’s felony prosecutions other than the High Court of American Samoa.    A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

 

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§          2          Criminal Complaints, Indictments and Bills of Information

 

Provisions of Article V and VI of amendments to Constitution of United States relating to right to be tried on indictment returned by grand jury and jury of peers do not apply to American Samoa because form of government was established to suit conditions of locality, and justice cannot be administered according to form in United States.  American Samoa v. Willis, 1 A.S.R. 635.

 

Cases in other jurisdictions taking an extremely narrow view of the power of courts to construe indictments, motivated by a vestigial regard for the technical rules of common law pleading or by concern for the separation of powers between grand juries and prosecutors, are not helpful in determining the validity of a criminal information in a territory that does not have grand juries and in which pleadings are to be construed in order to do justice.  Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

 

The sufficiency of a criminal information is to be judged by whether it states the essential facts of the alleged crime in a way that gives the defendant fair notice of what he is being charged with.  Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

 

Language in an information alleging that defendant “fired a shotgun toward certain people” implicitly charged that defendant intended the probable results of such an act.  Rule 7, Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

 

Where a criminal information was otherwise sufficient to charge intentional second degree murder, and where throughout the proceedings the prosecution had obviously been attempting to prove that defendant had acted intentionally and there had been no objection from defense counsel, the inclusion of the word “recklessly” in a part of the information separate from the description of the alleged conduct was mere surplusage rather than an essential limiting term in the information.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

 

Where prosecution explicitly and unequivocally argued that the defendant should be found guilty of intentional second-degree murder, and defense counsel responded by contesting the charge on the merits rather than by asserting its inconsistency with the information, defense counsel had waived any variance between the information and a conviction of intentional second degree murder or any lesser-included offense.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauasosi, 3 A.S.R.2d 66.

 

No criminal information can be filed in the High Court without a prior judicial determination that probable cause exists to believe the defendant committed the crime with which he is charged.  T.C.R.C.P. 5.1.  Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

 

Criminal charge using statutory language is permissible providing the statute sets forth fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, all the elements needed to comprise the offense intended to be punished.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 7(c).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

 

Though a bill of information must plainly, concisely, and definitely state in writing the essential facts constituting the offense charged, it need not set forth facts and evidentiary details needed to establish each element of the charged offense.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 7(c).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

 

Bill of information charging sodomy without specifying which of the various sexual acts constituting an element of the offense was alleged, sufficiently informed defendant of the nature of the charges to enable him to prepare his defense and did not subject him to double jeopardy since he could refer to the entire record of the preliminary examination, not just the bill of information, when claiming double jeopardy from a subsequent prosecution.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

 

A bill of information using the language of the criminal statute is sufficient as long as the statute sets forth all of the elements constituting the offence.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Luki, 21 A.S.R.2d 84.

 

Intended to give a criminal defendant adequate notice of the charge against him, a bill of information is made with sufficient specificity if it fully and unambiguously sets forth the elements constituting the offense.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 15.

 

A bill of particulars is not required as long as a defendant has enough information to adequately prepare a defense, avoid surprise at trial, and protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense; as such, a defendant is required to look at all of the government’s sources and not simply the information formally charging him with the crime.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

A bill of particulars is not required as long as a defendant has enough information to adequately prepare a defense, avoid surprise at trial, and protect him against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense; as such, a defendant is required to look at all of the government’s sources and not simply the information formally charging him with the crime.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

 

Even if an arrest was illegal, a bill of information setting forth criminal charges is not necessarily void.  U.S. Const. Amend. IV.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

 

The district court is authorized to issue process, and an arrest warrant is a form of process.  A.S.C.A. § 3.0304, T.C.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

 

The district court is authorized to issue process, and an arrest warrant is a form of process.  A.S.C.A. § 3.0304, T.C.R.Cr.P. 4(c)(1).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tagaloa, 24 A.S.R.2d 37.

 

Even if an arrest was illegal, a bill of information setting forth criminal charges is not necessarily void.  U.S. Const. Amend. IV.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tagaloa, 24 A.S.R.2d 37.

 

A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires, pursuant to T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 7(f).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

 

The bill of particulars, an ancient aid to pleading and procedure, has survived in the federal rules of procedure for criminal cases, but not for civil cases.  It provides a basis upon which the defense  can formulate strategy when the charges, though legally sufficient, are vaguely stated.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

 

The criteria for sufficiency of a bill of particulars is whether the defendant has been fully informed of the charges well in advance of trial, and has been afforded ample opportunity to prepare his defense.  To be fully informed of the charges means that the bill of particulars sufficiently apprises the defendant of the theory of the charge against him, and of the general character of the evidence sustaining the charge.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

 

All evidence tending to show guilt is broadly prejudicial, but does not preclude joinder of similar charges under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

An information may generally be amended in form or substance at any time prior to verdict as long as the substantial rights of a defendant are not prejudiced.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8. American Samoa Gov’t v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

An amendment to an information will be allowed as long as the defendant is well apprised.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

T.C.R.Cr.P. 5(a) and A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b) serve different purposes, and are not inconsistent.  Rule 5(a) is meant to apply when a person is arrested and it is contemplated that he will be charged with a crime.  Section 46.0807(b), on the other hand, contemplates the situation where a person is arrested and needs to be held for some period of time for his own safety or to protect the public safety, but will not be charged with a crime.   American Samoa Gov’t v. Lolesio, 30 A.S.R.2d 24.

 

A prisoner already in custody who is merely returned to custody following an escape does not possess the liberty interest protected by T.C.R.Cr.P. 5.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

 

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§          3          Pleas

 

When criminal defendant has agreed to plead guilty in exchange for agreement by prosecutor to request a particular sentence, court must specifically warn defendant that prosecutor’s recommendation is not binding on the court and that he will have no right to withdraw his guilty plea if the court imposes a harsher sentence.  Rule 11(e)(2), Trial Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Uiliata v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.2d 102.

 

To satisfy rule requiring court to find a factual basis for accepting a guilty plea, the sentencing judge must develop a record of that basis, for example by having the accused describe his criminal conduct, or by asking the defendant whether he understands the charges against him and whether he committed the acts charged in the indictment.  T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(f).  Suisala v. Moaali’itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15. 

Judicial assessment of factual basis for accepting a guilty plea may be made at any time prior to judgment and sentencing and may be based on any evidence sufficiently articulated in the record.  T.C.R.Cr.P. Rule 11(f).  Suisala v. Moaali’itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15.

 

Difference between defendant’s testimony and prosecution evidence did not preclude court from finding sufficient factual basis for accepting guilty plea when aggregation of evidence fully justified acceptance of plea.  Suisala v. Moaali’itele, 6 A.S.R.2d 15. 

 

Court will not interfere with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion unless it is shown that such discretion was unconstitutionally vested in the prosecutor or that it has been abused or exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

 

If a defendant wishes to limit the scope of his civil liability without unreservedly admitting his guilt, he can seek to enter a plea of nolo contendere, although the government or the Court might reject such a plea bargain, or the Court might accept the plea and impose the maximum legal sentence.  Galea`i v. Atofau, 16 A.S.R.2d 76.

 

The government acts improperly when it introduces evidence of defendant’s pleas of nolo contendere in previous criminal proceedings.  T.C.R.Ev. 410.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

A plea of nolo contendere is recognized as having no effect beyond the action in which it is entered and no evidentiary value as an admission of guilt.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

Normally, the relevance of a witness’ testimony is decided by the trial judge after the witness has been sworn and objections have been made.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoni, 27 A.S.R.2d 123.

 

A nolo contendere plea is provided for the purpose of facilitating compromise in the plea bargaining process by allowing the accused to avoid an admission of guilt and the attendant evidentiary impact of that admission in potential future proceedings.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

Where prosecutors have improperly introduced evidence of defendant’s pleas of nolo contendere in previous criminal proceedings, court will not grant a mistrial, but will strike and disregard the evidence.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

The High Court generally rejects plea agreements under T.C.R.Cr. P. 11 (e)(1)(C) that remove the court’s discretion in sentencing except in very rare occasions where the interests of justice were found to be better served by their acceptance.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Masaniai, 28 A.S.R.2d 7.

 

A plea agreement that does not state a disposition allowable under applicable law is invalid.  The Territory’s criminal law has been codified, so the fact that a disposition is not disallowed does not make it available to the sentencing court.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3102-3104.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Nofoagatotoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 20.

 

There is only one exception to the general requirement that the court must deal with criminal offenders as proscribed in Chapter 19 of the Criminal Justice Act (A.S.C.A. § 46.1901 et seq.).  This exception provides for the option of deferred proceedings, upon a plea of guilt or finding of guilt, in the context of a possession of a controlled substance charge, under Title 13.  A.S.C.A. § 13.1024.  There is no parallel provision for deferred proceedings in the context of assault related prosecutions. American Samoa Gov’t v. Nofoagatotoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 20.

 

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§          4          Trial

 

§4(1)   Pre-Trial Matters

 

While pre‑trial motions in criminal matters should ordinarily be heard in a timely manner, an inflexible policy in this regard is inappropriate.  Each situation must be individually considered.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tali, 25 A.S.R.2d 21.

 

From the face of the statute, the court does not appear to have discretion in ordering forfeiture of bail if a condition of the bond is violated.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 46(e)(1).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Togialeoli, 30 A.S.R.2d 130. 

 

Failure to appear for trial and violating travel restrictions are ample justification for forfeiture of a bond.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Togialeoli, 30 A.S.R.2d 130.

 

There is not undue prejudice to a criminal defendant so great as to deny a defendant a fair and impartial trial when newspaper accounts of an assault and the victim’s death were largely exculpatory and the government has stipulated that the defendants did not cause the victim’s death.  A.S.G. v. Fruean, 31 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

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§4(2)   Competence to Stand Trial

 

The Court may order a mentally incompetent defendant to be confined for a maximum of 120 days; within 120 days a hearing shall be held to determine whether the defendant has become competent to stand trial and, if not, whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency within one year or the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime charged.  A.S.C.A. § 46.1305  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 16 A.S.R.2d 44.

 

The Court may order a mental examination of a defendant.  A.S.C.A. § 46.1303.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 16 A.S.R.2d 44.

 

A defendant will be found incompetent to stand trial if he does not have a sufficient and present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 18 A.S.R.2d 42.

 

Although tests to assess general intelligence, capability of abstract thought, and presence of mental disorders had not been specifically “validated” for Samoans or Pacific Islanders as a group, there was little risk that such tests would give false results when applied to a Samoan defendant in determining his competency to stand trial.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 18 A.S.R.2d 42.

 

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§4(3)   Bifurcated Proceedings

 

The bifurcated-proceedings statute divides the inquiry into whether the defendant “committed the criminal act charged” and whether he was “insane at the time of the commission of the criminal act.”  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

In a bifurcated criminal trial, the jury is not exposed to evidence of the defendant’s mental capacity until the jury makes an independent finding as to whether the defendant committed the act charged.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

Although a defense of diminished mental capacity is arguably comprehended within the “guilt” phase of a bifurcated trial, the interests in a fair trial and an orderly proceeding may be better served by reserving all evidence of mental disease or defect for the “insanity” phase because a jury is likely to view the evidence as being highly probative of issues other than the criminal defendant’s mental state, and a limiting instruction would likely be ineffective.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

During the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the court limited the evidence to whether the defendant is or would be guilty, assuming the absence of any mental disease or defect such as would render him incapable of understanding the difference between right and wrong, incapable of conforming his conduct to such a standard, or otherwise incapable of having any requisite mental element of the crimes charged or of any lesser-included offenses.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

During the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, though necessarily concerned with the defendant’s thoughts relevant to the charged offenses, the court limited both parties from addressing such questions by expert testimony from psychiatrists or psychologists or by other evidence calculated to show that defendant did or not have a mental disease or defect.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

During the “guilt” phase of a bifurcated criminal trial, the government may not make any use of statements made by the defendant to the government’s expert witness or of any evidence discovered as a result of such statements that would not ultimately have been discovered had the statements not been made, unless the defendant put a fact at issue which could only be effectively addressed by the otherwise-inadmissible evidence and if required in the interest of justice.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

If the defendant is found guilty of one or more crimes in the first phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the trial will proceed to the second stage, during which the parties may present evidence on whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect which would either support an insanity defense or tend to negate the existence of any requisite mental elements of the crime or crimes.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

During the second phase of a bifurcated criminal trial involving the defense of diminished mental capacity, the government may use evidence obtained during its expert’s examination of the defendant or as a result of such evidence, including but not limited to statements made by the defendant to the expert.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302, 46.1304.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

Defense counsel’s motion for a bifurcated criminal trial constituted an implicit waiver of any objection to a procedure which, although clearly consistent with the legislative purpose of the bifurcated-trial statute, is not clearly authorized regarding a defense of diminished mental capacity.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

In a bifurcated criminal trial, the jury is not exposed to evidence of the defendant’s mental capacity until the jury makes an independent finding as to whether the defendant committed the act charged.  A.S.C.A. §§ 46.1301-46.1302.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Taylor, 19 A.S.R.2d 99.

 

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§4(4)   Discovery

 

Request that government investigate each of its prospective witnesses at criminal trial in order to ascertain whether any witness had a criminal record in another jurisdiction, and inform defense counsel of any such record, was beyond the scope of defendant’s right to discovery.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

 

Provision of territorial constitution prohibiting deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law prohibits prosecution from suppressing any evidence favorable to an accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

 

General request by defense counsel for any evidence in the possession of the prosecution that might tend to exculpate the defendant was within the scope of rule prohibiting suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d14.

 

When a defendant makes a request for discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information, the prosecutor’s responses are inadequate when the prosecutor does not make a diligent inquiry from all relevant branches of government, as he or she must answer for the government as a whole.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

 

In responding to a defendant’s request for discovery and disclosure of exculpatory information, the prosecutor must identify specifically by category the reason for which an item is not produced.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

 

Once the potential for an unfair trial has been cured, no Brady violation is possible, since Brady is premised on the right to a fair trial.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 46.

 

A non-capital criminal defendant is not constitutionally or procedurally entitled to a list of the prosecution’s prospective witnesses.  U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2; T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(2).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

Failure to disclose, or late disclosure of, evidence is prejudicial when the evidence would provide a significant chance of establishing a reasonable doubt that would not otherwise exist.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecution suppressed evidence that was favorable to the defense or exculpatory and was material.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish “materiality” in the constitutional sense.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

A defendant must show a “significant chance” that the evidence suppressed by the government would have produced reasonable doubt as to guilt.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

Identities of rebuttal witnesses are not freely discoverable.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 16.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Solaita, 27 A.S.R.2d 9.

 

T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2) implicitly allows a defendant to request that the government provide him with a list of the evidence it intends to use at trial for its case in chief.  However, Rule 12(d)(2) is not explicitly mandatory, except for a defendant’s discovery of items listed in T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a).  Nor is a sanction provided.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

 

The government should normally provide notice of its intention to use evidence at trial, either on its own initiative, see T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(1), or upon the request of defense counsel.  See T.C.R.Cr.P. 12(d)(2).  In appropriate cases, where the government has failed to comply with a defendant’s request, the court will compel compliance.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

 

Photographs are discoverable, as they do not explicitly nor implicitly fall under the confines of T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(2).  American Samoa Gov’t v. Isaia, 29 A.S.R.2d 224.

 

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§4(5)   Speedy Trial

 

In case of misdemeanors, prosecution must be commenced within six months after commission of crime or offense.  (CAS 807.)  Government v. Palafu, 3 A.S.R. 556.

 

There is no fixed formula for determining when the right to a speedy trial has been violated; each case must be determined on its own facts.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6.  Pene v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

 

Relevant factors in determining if right to speedy trial violated include the length of delay, the reasons for the delay, whether defendant demanded trial, and the prejudice to defendant resulting from delay.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6.  Pene v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

 

Defendant’s right to speedy trial was not violated, even though the delay was over a year and a prompt trial had been demanded, where the reasons for the delay were substantial, including the need to entertain and grant motions to quash many subpoenas inappropriately issued by defendant and also to conduct competency examinations; and where defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the delay, as he was not incarcerated and the documentary nature of the evidence minimized the danger of fading memories.  Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa, art. 1 § 6.  Pene v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

 

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§4(6)   Severance and Joinder

 

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court’s discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant’s specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Fealofa’i, 24 A.S.R.2d 10.

 

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court’s discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant’s specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 15.

 

In exercising their discretion as to granting separate trials, most courts refuse to grant a severance despite the anticipated exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Schuster, 24 A.S.R.2d 15.

 

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court’s discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant’s specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Tauai, 24 A.S.R.2d 23.

 

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court’s discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant’s spec  ific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

The decision to sever properly joined defendants is at the trial court’s discretion and should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a defendant’s specific trial right or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(b), 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

 

In exercising their discretion as to granting separate trials, most courts refuse to grant a severance despite the anticipated exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 14.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Meleisea, 24 A.S.R.2d 32.

 

All evidence tending to show guilt is broadly prejudicial, but does not preclude joinder of similar charges under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8.  T.C.R.Cr.P. 8.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Bryce, 27 A.S.R.2d 1.

 

The court will grant severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right to one of the defendants or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

T.C.R.Cr.P. 14 does not give one co-defendant the standing to raise the issue of prejudice due to joinder on behalf of his co-defendants.  If one co-defendant’s testimony might prejudice others, it is their decision whether or not to move for a severance.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Fairholt, 28 A.S.R.2d 26.

 

Judicial economy and legitimate public interests favor a joinder of all offenses against the accused.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

 

Whether joinder of offenses or defendants is appropriate is determined on a case by case basis.  American Samoa Gov’t v. Antonio, 28 A.S.R.2d 165.

 

Counts pertaining to the same defendant under T.C.R.Cr.P. 8(a) may be joined if they are of the same or similar character, even if the offenses are distinct and unrelated.  Rule 8(a) recognizes the