In deciding whether questions asked a witness by members of a legislative committee were relevant to the committee’s charter, a court should impose no stricter standard than it would impose on itself in a similar case. Senate Select Investigating Committee v. Horning, 3 A.S.R.2d 14.

Only in extraordinary circumstances will a court compel the testimony of the chief executive of the jurisdiction in which the court sits. Fa’atiliga v. Lutali (Mem.), 3 A.S.R.2d 124.

Where evidence indicated that decision to terminate probationary employee was made by appropriate executive official with governor’s approval rather than by advisory board, court would not question the decision. A.S.C.A. §§ 7.0102, 7.0206, 7.0211. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Judiciary must not substitute its own judgment for that of executive branch on what is in “the best interest of the government.” A.S.C.A. § 7.0211. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Where court had ordered that prisoner not be allowed to leave correctional facility without permission of the court except for emergency medical treatment, prison officials had no authority to allow prisoner to appear in court for post conviction motions without requesting permission of court. American Samoa Gov’t v. Masaniai, 5 A.S.R.2d 152

While the judiciary cannot ordinarily employ writ of habeas corpus to review prison management or the conditions of a prisoner’s otherwise lawful confinement, exceptional prison circumstances rising to the level of constitutional deprivations are within the court’s jurisdiction. American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 6 A.S.R.2d 32.

Territorial government is bound by court orders in proceedings to which it is a party and should not issue legal opinions that counsel disobedience to such orders. American Samoa Gov’t v. Satele, 7 A.S.R.2d 154.

Where statute provided for appeal to board of registration from a denial of voter registration by election officer, and for judicial review of an adverse decision of the board of registration, court would not issue writ of mandamus to election officer ordering him to register prospective voter who had not yet appealed to board of registration. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0224, 6.0230. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d 81.

First amendment prohibits court from assuming jurisdiction to review church electoral processes or other disputes concerning church policy and church administration. U.S. Const. amend. 1. Ofa v. Tongan Wesleyan Church, 8 A.S.R.2d 110.

Statute explicitly recognizing power of Chief Justice to make exceptions to rules is clearly not inconsistent with constitutional provision for judicial independence. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.0501. American Samoa Gov’t v. Tile, 8 A.S.R.2d 120.

Reasonable legislative regulation of judicial procedure does not necessarily conflict with judicial independence. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. III § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.0501. American Samoa Gov’t v. Tile, 8 A.S.R.2d 120.

Court could grant review by mandamus of chief election officer’s determination that petitioner was ineligible to run for elective office, where statutory scheme was silent as to appeals procedure and circumstances appeared to render any alternative review procedures inadequate. T.C.R.C.P. Rules 87, 88. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.

Court would not compel chief election officer to find the petitioner a bona fide resident where petitioner was not on the current voter registration lists, was not present in the territory during the period at issue, refused to supply additional information requested by the chief election officer, and was identified as a registered voter in another jurisdiction during the period at issue. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.

Where the identity of a church’s governing body is a matter of substantial controversy, civil courts are not to make the inquiry into religious law and usage that would be essential to the resolution of the controversy, but instead should attempt to apply “neutral principles of law.” Tele`a v. Savea, 11 A.S.R.2d 110.

Where territorial government had confined and sought judicial commitment of a person whose psychiatric condition could not be adequately treated within the territory, but had refused to refer him for treatment outside the territory because of the relatively short duration of his presence in the territory, court would order immediate referral for treatment; the respondent had a right to treatment not because of his residential status but because of the government’s decision to take him into its custody and to confine him pending recovery or remission. American Samoa Gov’t v. Tofiga, 14 A.S.R.2d 30.

Even if a statute creates unintended hardships, the responsibility to rewrite a statute belongs to the Legislature and not the High Court. Nelson & Robertson Pty., Ltd. v. Diocese of Pago Pago, 21 A.S.R.2d 6.

Although a failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not absolutely preclude judicial action, such action is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, including the exception for violations of statutory or constitutional rights. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 50.

To file suit regarding disciplinary matters, a public employee need not await a final agency decision only if a preliminary agency decision clearly and unambiguously violates a statutory or constitutional right of the employee or if the prescribed administrative process is clearly inadequate to prevent irreparable injury. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 50.

Though the Immigration Board’s documents are confidential by statute, this statute may not be used to deny constitutionally guaranteed due-process rights, nor does it prohibit the Court from ordering the Attorney General to produce these records when needed. U.S. Constitution Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2; A.S.C.A. § 41.0307. Farapo v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 136.

A court’s mandate is to decide controversies between adverse parties and their respective viewpoints, not to decide which policies, public or otherwise, are best; such policy decisions properly belong to other branches of government. Lutali v. Foster, 24 A.S.R.2d 53.

In light of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, a court will not inquire into the wisdom of public policy but will sustain a challenged action as long as it does not violate the Constitution. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.

The requirement that a statute must have a rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.

The Revised Constitution of American Samoa requires that the land alienation laws be changed by specific political procedures, and not by judicial fiat. Rev. Const. Amer. Samoa, Art. I, § 3. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.

§ 2 Justiciable Case or Controversy

§ 2(1) —Standing

Where plaintiffs were two banks, one of which had lent money and the other of which had guaranteed the loan, at least one plaintiff clearly had standing to sue and the addition of another plaintiff who may or may not have had standing did not necessitate reversal of the trial court’s decision that defendants were liable to one or the other of the plaintiffs. Pritchard v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 8 A.S.R.2d 157.

Neither administrative agency nor court may dispense with requirements designed to ensure that case admits of judicial resolution: that there be a genuine dispute between the claimant and the agency on at least one specific and identifiable question of law and fact. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

A person who does not own the land for which a land-use permit was denied has no standing to raise the question as to whether special enabling legislation was necessary to allow the Governor to promulgate the coastal zone management regulations affecting the rights of private property owners. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

To establish standing to enforce environmental laws, (1) a party must show that he has suffered an injury-in-fact, and (2) the alleged injury must arguably be within the statute’s zone of interests. Le Vaomatua v. American Samoa Government, 23 A.S.R.2d 11.

Although an organization may represent members who are injured, a mere “interest in a problem” is insufficient to establish standing. Le Vaomatua v. American Samoa Government, 23 A.S.R.2d 11.

A court may refuse to determine the merits of a claim on the ground that, even though the claim may be correct, the litigant advancing it is not entitled to its judicial determination. Standing concerns the party, and not the issue to be adjudicated. Jennings v. Thompson, 25 A.S.R.2d 77.

The doctrine of standing is derived from the “case or controversy” requirement in Article III of the United States Constitution. This limitation imposed by a standing requirement is based on the separation of powers which underlies the federal government. Because the government and constitution of American Samoa are based on the U.S. model, those principles generally apply to the judiciary of this territory. Multitauaopele v. Togafau, 26 A.S.R.2d 52.

To establish standing, a party must demonstrate (1) “injury in fact,” meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, meaning that the injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant,” and has not resulted “from the independent action of some third party not before the court; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, meaning that the “prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling” is not “too speculative.” Multitauaopele v. Togafau, 26 A.S.R.2d 52.

The test for standing is whether or not the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

It is well established that it is not enough to qualify, for standing purposes, merely as a taxpayer. A party must establish that the alleged conduct would result in a tax increase or cause other irreparable injury. This injury must be different than that endured by the citizenry en masse. Additionally, there must be a logical nexus between the alleged wrongful behavior and the harm suffered. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

A party has no standing to sue without an injury-in-fact, or a direct stake in the controversy. Plaintiff must have a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in the suit. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 167.

The mere fact that a person has standing to bring an action does not mean that they have a property interest at stake. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.

The requirements for standing are that the plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact, that the injury be fairly traceable to the challenged action, and that the injury be fairly redressable by a favorable decision. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.

A plaintiff possesses standing to sue if he is able to show: (1) an injury to a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) an injury that is causally related to the defendant’s challenged conduct, and not resulting from independent action by some third party not before the court; and (3) the prospect of achieving redress for the injury from a favorable decision that is not too speculative. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 88 (Trial Div. 1997).

Chairman of Immigration Board possessed capacity to sue where suit brought on his own behalf and where suit sought to prevent executive branch officials from usurping his powers. Chairman was real party in interest and did not need separate, statutory authority to sue. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 88 (Trial Div. 1997).

Chairman of Immigration Board was able to show standing to sue for declaratory relief where he claimed that defendants had usurped his powers by issuing amnesty to more than 2,000 previously undocumented aliens. Plaintiff’s injury was concrete, particularized, actual, related to the defendants’ challenged conduct and could be redressed by a favorable court ruling. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 88 (Trial Div. 1997).

To determine whether a given individual or organization has standing to seek judicial review of a final administrative decision, the petitioner must demonstrate that he, she or it has (a) suffered an “injury in fact” and (b) is arguably within the statute’s “zone of interests.” McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

In order to satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement for purposes of standing, a plaintiff need only be able to identify an injury and demonstrate that he or she is actually among the injured. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

Where petition alleged that variance would result in drain on water supply and constitute threat to pedestrian traffic, such allegations were sufficient to satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement for standing purposes. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

Although it would be helpful to have a determination as to whether a tenancy in the entirety issue applies to the territory, under A.S.C.A. § 43.1101 the court must have a true case or controversy before it in order to issue a declaratory judgment. Fiame v. Fiame, 4 A.S.R.3d 95 (Trial Div. 2000).

For there to be a case or controversy amenable to a decision on the merits, it must be relatively certain that coercive litigation will eventually ensue between the same parties if a declaratory judgment is refused. Fiame v. Fiame, 4 A.S.R.3d 95 (Trial Div. 2000).

The Court has an obligation to ensure that the parties have standing, even if they are willing to stipulate to such. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

The three requirements that a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to establish standing are: (1) an injury in fact (2) caused by the subject of the suit (3) that can be redressed by the Court. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

While legislators possess standing to challenge an executive action that nullifies an opportunity to vote, they do not possess standing to challenge the executive’s failure to obey a statute. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

With regard to standing, an action may be brought by one who possesses a grievance shared by many persons so long as it is not common to the public as a whole. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

Where individual had lost substantial sums to poker machines, allowed to operate in violation of the law, he had standing to bring suit. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

The court will rule on the constitutionality of a criminal statute if: (1) the issue is fit for judicial consideration, and (2) withholding of consideration will cause substantial hardship to the parties. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Tuilagi, 7 A.S.R.3d 61 (Trial Div. 2003).

In evaluating standing, a court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party. If needed, a court may also look beyond the pleadings themselves. Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

The principles of standing articulated by the Federal courts generally apply to the judiciary of this territory. Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

To show standing, a party must demonstrate that it has suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “concrete and particularized.” Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

A claim simply alleging that two individuals, one a member of the legislature, broke the law is insufficient to create standing in a civil suit brought by a concerned citizen, even if the citizen is another legislative member, where the citizen has failed to show an injury in fact. Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

Citizens have no common law right to bring qui tam actions, but must be granted the right through legislation. Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

The Legislature of American Samoa has not granted citizens a right to bring qui tam actions by statute. Agaoleatu v. McMoore, 7 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 2003).

It is well-established that in order to demonstrate standing, one must show: (1) injury in fact, by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and has not resulted from the independent action of some third party not before the court; and ( 3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that the prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling is not too speculative. These elements are the irreducible minimum required by the Constitution. Kneubuhl v. Ala’i, 7 A.S.R.3d 272 (Land & Titles Div. 2003).

In litigation involving a trust, beneficiaries have standing to protect their rights and interests. Kneubuhl v. Ala’i, 7 A.S.R.3d 272 (Land & Titles Div. 2003).

§ 2(2) —Ripeness

Any constitutional attack on a particular punishment is normally not ripe for review before the punishment has been given. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Tuilagi, 7 A.S.R.3d 61 (Trial Div. 2003).

Where prisoner moved for writ of habeas corpus in a criminal case, court properly considered only the term of imprisonment under which he was currently serving, not additional terms which he was to serve in the future and which were consecutive to his present one. Siaumau v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 2003).

Where prisoner alleged that plea agreement entered was not one he had agreed to and that instead of pleading guilty to Counts I and VI, he had been forced to plea to counts I, II, and V, court would not address the illegality of his punishment under counts II and V as prisoner had not yet begun serving those sentences. Siaumau v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 2(3) —Mootness

Claims for money damages are seldom moot and are subject to judicial resolution, even if other issues in a lawsuit are moot. Samoana Fellowship, Inc. v. American Samoa Power Authority, 24 A.S.R.2d 71.

A case becomes moot when the issues are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

There is an exception to the mootness rule where the case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review”. In non-class actions, this exception is limited to cases where (1) a defendant terminates the challenged action before the issue is fully litigated, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation the plaintiff would be subject to the same actions in the future. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

For purpose of the exception to the mootness rule “reasonable expectation” must go beyond a theoretical possibility of repetition to the same plaintiff. However, the case is not rendered moot simply by the fact that the defendant has, at the moment, ceased the behavior at issue. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

A controversy still smolders when the defendant has voluntarily, but not necessarily permanently, ceased to engage in the allegedly wrongful conduct. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

The Court cannot hear cases that are moot, or where the issues to be determined are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

An exception to mootness doctrine lies where the acts at issue are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

If the reviewing court can afford prospective relief, the controversy is not moot. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

The “capable of repetition, but evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine is limited to cases where (1) the challenged action was too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

Under the “capable of repetition, but evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine, there must be a reasonable expectation that harm will again come to the same plaintiff, not merely a theoretical possibility of future harm. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

§ 2(4) —Political Questions

Senate is sole judge of member’s qualifications for seat, and thus issue is non-justiciable “political question.” A.S. Const. Art. II, § 3, § 22. Tuitasi v. Lualemaga, 4 A.S.R. 798.

Senate is sole judge of which candidate for seat got most votes, and this issue is thus non-justiciable “political question.” A.S. Const. Art. II, § 22. Tuitasi v. Lualemaga, 4 A.S.R. 798.

Political question doctrine bars judicial consideration of an issue where there has been a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of power to decide the issue to a coordinate branch of government. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.

Provision of territorial constitution that the legislature shall judge elections of its members presumes that an election has been held, and therefore does not define the factual question whether the required election ever occurred give rise to as a political question preventing judicial intervention. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II § 22. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.

The ability of the House or Senate to maintain a suit against the executive branch is, in the proper circumstances, beyond question. Senate v. Lutali, 26 A.S.R.2d 125.

To determine whether a case is justiciable, two determinations must be made: First, the court must decide whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution; Second, the court must determine whether the structure of the government renders the issue presented a ‘political question’—that is, a question which is not justiciable in the High Court because of the separation of powers. Fa`amausili v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 259 (Trial Div. 2002).

There is no jurisdictional bar to claims that suspension of a Fono representative for his statements: (1) was an unconstitutional restrain on free speech; (2) was an unconstitutional taking of a property interest; and (3) is null. Muavaefa’atasi v. House of Representatives, 7 A.S.R.3d 117 (Trial Div. 2003).

Normally, the courts must refrain from prying into matters that admit of legislative adjudication rather than judicial resolution, such as disputes dealing solely with internal legislative rules or functions. Muavaefa’atasi v. House of Representatives, 7 A.S.R.3d 117 (Trial Div. 2003).

The court has an obligation, however, to review governmental actions or laws that conflict with, or-are limited by, constitutional provisions. Muavaefa’atasi v. House of Representatives, 7 A.S.R.3d 117 (Trial Div. 2003).

The court can review the scope of the Legislature’s punishment because other constitutional limitations cannot be disregarded. Muavaefa’atasi v. House of Representatives, 7 A.S.R.3d 117 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 2(5) —Advisory Opinions

Where a case is constructed by acquiescing parties with identical interests in order to obtain an advisory opinion, and where the parties could have resolved the issue without the involvement of the Court, such declaratory relief cannot be granted absent the requirement that there be a true case or controversy, regardless of how useful a disposition on the merits would be. Fiame v. Fiame, 4 A.S.R.3d 95 (Trial Div. 2000).

The “case or controversy” limitation contained in the statute conferring jurisdiction upon the High Court prevents the Court from issuing advisory opinions. Muavaefa`atasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.3d 184 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 3 Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation

SEE AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT § 1 – THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION, & LAWS OF AMERICAN SAMOA

SEE SAMOAN CUSTOMS § 1 – IMPACT ON AMERICAN SAMOA LAWS

§ 3(1) —General Provisions

Contemporaneous construction by officers upon whom is imposed a duty to enforce statute is entitled to great weight in interpretation of ambiguous positions of statute, particularly where there is constant uniform practice for long period of time. Government v. Bird, 2 A.S.R. 102.

Courts of Samoa recognize that common law may not in all respects be suitable to conditions of islands, but will follow so much of common law of England as is suitable and not inconsistent with other laws. (CAS 1) Magalei v. Tago, 3 A.S.R. 185.

When Supreme Court has not had occasion to reconsider a precedent for almost a century, almost all applications of precedent have been overruled by statute, and Supreme Court has overruled similar precedents in closely related or analogous areas, lower court may conclude that the precedent no longer represents the law that would be applied by Supreme Court. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.

Unless Samoan court has ruled otherwise, High Court should ordinarily follow Restatement of the Law in construing common law. Tung v. Ah Sam, 4 A.S.R. 764.

Existing laws not inconsistent with the Constitution of 1960 continued in force when Constitution was ratified. (Const., Art. V, Sec. 2) Haleck v. Lee, 4 A.S.R. 519.

Revised Constitution of 1967 does not provide for continuance of existing laws and approval of new legislation on judicial matters by Secretary of Interior. Fanene v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 957.

Where promulgators of territorial constitution omitted equal protection clause, it would be inappropriate for judicial branch to construe some other constitutional provision to include an unwritten equal protection clause more demanding than the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

While the UCC does not of its own force apply in American Samoa, some rules embodied in widely adopted uniform codes which restate generally accepted principles of law may apply. Pacific Reliant Industries, Inc. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 16 A.S.R.2d 57.

In construing the common law, the High Court ordinarily follows the Restatement of Law. Etimani v. Samoa Packing Co., 19 A.S.R.2d 1.

A case is not overruled by a later case when they differ in findings of fact or issues raised and not in interpretation of law. Reid v. Puailoa, 23 A.S.R. 2d 101.

A court exercising judicial review starts with the presumption that a statute is valid and will construe a statute so as to avoid finding it unconstitutional. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.

It is appropriate for the courts of American Samoa to give effect to Samoan customs and traditions. Courts should not abolish, by judicial fiat, Samoan traditions which have endured for generations in Samoan institutions and are recognized by formal legal institutions. Mulitauaopele v. Mulitauaopele, 25 A.S.R.2d 43.

Samoan custom is defined by an evolutionary process, not by the judicial process. Mulitauaopele v. Mulitauaopele, 25 A.S.R.2d 43.

A constitutionally authorized rule of procedure loses its procedural character when it determines the status of substantive legal rights. Lutu v. Ale, 28 A.S.R.2d 43.

The Revised Constitution of American Samoa envisions vigorous constitutional and statutory protection for Samoan ownership of land. Craddick Dev. Inc. v. Craddick, 28 A.S.R.2d 117.

Constitutional statutory authority is always paramount to administrative rule authority. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 134 (Trial Div. 1997).

The term “infamous crime” is contained in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which requires an indictment to hold a person “to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime.” Because of the close nexus between the United States and American Samoa Constitutions, the federal definition of “infamous crime” is the intended definition of “infamous crime” in Art. I, § 6 of the Revised Constitution. American Samoa Gov’t v. Samana, 1 A.S.R.3d 166 (Trial Div. 1997).

The federal Constitution applies in American Samoa only insofar as its tenets restate those fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights that are the basis of all free government. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3(2) —Legislative Intent

Object of interpretation of legislation is to ascertain true meaning and will of law making body. Government v. Bird, 2 A.S.R. 102.

Resort to preamble to statute in construing enacting portion explains ambiguities by relating them to general scope and meaning of statute. Bottling Corporation of Samoa v. Lee, 4. A.S.R. 499.

When court is considering the application of judge-made rules rather than legislation or a constitution, it has the duty to consider whether changed circumstances warrant modification of such rules. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.

Although a federal statute does not apply to proceedings in the High Court of American Samoa, its passage by Congress should be taken into account in determining whether changed current circumstances warrant the application of rules announced in nineteenth-century precedents. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.

Legislative inaction in the face of judicial statutory construction strongly suggests agreement with, or at least acquiescence in, the judicial interpretation of those laws. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

When the legislature re-enacts a statute or adopts amendments to it “without a suggestion of disagreement” with a prior judicial construction, a very strong presumption exists that the legislature has adopted the prior construction. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The requirement that a statute must have a rational basis is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.

Whether a statute operates retrospectively or prospectively only is one of legislative intent. American Samoa Gov’t v. Estate of Fuimaono Tuinanau, 28 A.S.R.2d 187.

In construing statutes, it is assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. American Samoa Gov’t v. Alo, 2 A.S.R.3d 91 (Trial Div. 1998).

§ 3(3) —Statutory Construction

Statute provides in construing A.S.C. that words are to be understood in their ordinary sense unless defined or explained otherwise. 1 A.S.C. § 304. Letuli v. Government, 4 A.S.R. 830.

In construing to give effect to Legislative intention, court may construe “or” as meaning “and” or “and” as “or.” Bottling Corporation of Samoa v. Lee, 4 A.S.R. 499.

Term “along” as used in ordinance means “within reasonable distance of.” Lago v. Mageo, 4 A.S.R. 287.

“Along high-water mark of Harbor of Pago Pago” means within reasonable distance from high-water mark.” Lago v. Mageo, 4 A.S.R. 287.

Since courts favor constitutionality of statutes, courts will construe Industrial Incentive Act as not giving Governor power to grant partial exemption in which case it is constitutional. Bottling Corporation of Samoa v. Lee, 4 A.S.R. 499.

Similarly worded constitutional and statutory provisions may be construed differently in different jurisdictions, especially where they have been adopted and applied in different circumstances. Tuika Tuika v. Governor of American Samoa, 4 A.S.R.2d 85.

Conflict between constitutional provisions are ordinarily resolved in favor of the more recently enacted. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 160.

Territorial court is not bound to interpret local rules in strict conformity with federal courts’ interpretations of parallel federal rules. Wray v. Wray, 5 A.S.R.2d 34.

Where territorial statutes differed in language and structure from federal statutes on same subject matter, territorial court should not disregard clear language of territorial statutes on the basis of judicial decisions construing federal statutes. Lutu v. American Samoa Government, 7 A.S.R.2d 61.

Territorial statute vesting discretion in attorney general to proceed against certain minors as adults was not constitutionally defective due to alleged inconsistency with general purpose of juvenile justice statute to accord special treatment to minors, since both the general rules of statutory construction and the specific language of another statutory provision indicated that the exception was deliberate and purposeful. A.S.C.A. §§ 45.0103(9)(B)(I), 45.0115(c)(2)(a). American Samoa Gov’t v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

Terms of air carriage contract which were inconsistent with Warsaw Convention were void, because the contract itself so provided and also because treaty obligations are the supreme law of the land and therefore supersede private contracts. U.S. Const. art. VI. American Samoa Gov’t ex rel. Langford v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 10 A.S.R.2d 1.

Provision of territorial constitution that county council elect senators in accordance with Samoan custom does not include power to delegate the decision completely to a subdivision of the county, since this would allow a new custom, habit, or practice to repeal explicit and unambiguous constitutional provisions. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II § 4. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.

Cumulative effect of two territorial constitutional provisions, one requiring election of senators by county councils and the other providing that each senator shall hold office for four years, is to require that an election be held once every four years by the county council as it is then constituted; since the membership of the county council changes over time, no one particular council can be permitted to lock senatorial selection into the future by selecting any number of senators to serve during subsequent terms. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. II §§ 4, 6. Mauga v. Lutu, 10 A.S.R.2d 115.

There is a rational basis for a legislative distinction between (1) people who drive under the influence and then drive with a suspended license; and (2) those who commit other sorts of conduct punishable by suspension and then drive with a suspended license; therefore, a statute embodying such a distinction did not deny equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Macomber v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 29.

In a situation where the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) controls but is silent or ambiguous concerning a particular issue, analogous UCC provisions that are consistent with the UCP may apply. Pacific Reliant Industries, Inc. v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 16 A.S.R.2d 57.

Statute which sets different limitation periods for actions based on written and unwritten contracts, but does not define either term, is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process, since parties can rely on case law and other legal authority to determine the meaning of these terms. Pene v. Bank of Hawaii, 17 A.S.R.2d 168.

The High Court may interpret territorial statutes differently than federal courts’ interpretations of similar, but not identical, federal statutes, but this does not imply that territorial law supersedes federal law. Alamoana Recipe Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 24 A.S.R.2d 156.

Statutory provision requiring election ties to be decided by lot is not inconsistent with the Revised Constitution of American Samoa. A.S.C.A. § 6.0901. In re the Election for Representative from District No. 3, 27 A.S.R.2d 28.

The Legislature of American Samoa has not condemned a class of people by passing A.S.C.A. § 27.1001(i), which defines “foreign” as meaning “any place beyond the limits of American Samoa.” A.S.C.A. § 27.1001(i) simply defines the term “foreign” for purposes of applying the customs regulations set forth in A.S.C.A. §§ 27.1001-27.1031. A.S.G. v. Pu`aa, 31 A.S.R.2d 73.

Statutory interpretation requires that two statutes be read harmoniously where possible. American Samoa Gov’t v. Alo, 2 A.S.R.3d 91 (Trial Div. 1998).

In deciding on whether statutes are non-contradictory, the court must focus on their plain meaning. American Samoa Gov’t v. Alo, 2 A.S.R.3d 91 (Trial Div. 1998).

A statute should be interpreted according to its plain meaning, avoiding any construction that would render a provision to be meaningless or nugatory. Isaia v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2002).

When the legislature speaks in the form of a properly adopted statute, courts must attempt to provide a rational interpretation. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

It is an elementary canon of statutory construction that a law is not to be construed so that its provisions are mere surplusage. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

Each provision of a statute is to be given full effect. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

To determine whether a statute presents an unconstitutional amendment by reference, courts apply a two pronged test: (1) is the amendment such a complete act so that the scope of the rights or duties created or affected by the legislation can be determined without referring to any other statute or enactment; (2) is whether “a straightforward determination of the scope of rights or duties under the existing statutes be rendered erroneous by the new enactment.” Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

An amendment is not incomplete or unintelligible merely because executing its provisions requires resort to other statutes. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

A.S.C.A. § Section 17 does not require the re-enactment and publication of an entire statute when the amendment affects only one subsection. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

In all statutory construction cases, the court begins with the language of the statute and the inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

The court cannot substitute its policy judgments for that of the legislature. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

The court is bound by the clear words of the statute and cannot speculate as to what the legislators might have overlooked. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

A statute is not absurd because it is an exception to other statutes. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

A statute is not irrational simply because it changes the prevailing practice. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

Courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, the court’s duty is to adopt the latter. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

Courts are not to lightly assume that the legislature intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden it. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

Constitutional issues should not be needlessly confronted. Stowers v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.3d 16 (App. Div. 2003).

§ 3(4) —Conflict of Laws

SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12 – CONFLICT OF LAWS

In cases of otherwise irreconcilable conflict between statutes the later statute governs the earlier, since the new law is deemed to have implicitly amended conflicting prior laws. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.

Apparent conflicts between statutes can often be reconciled by application of the rule that the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.

In cases of apparent conflict between two statutes, specific and later statute prevails over more general and earlier statute. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.2203, 46.2206. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Government, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

Insofar as T.C.R.Cr.P. 35 purports to extend or abolish the mandatory deadline for alleging errors of law in a criminal sentence, it is in direct conflict with the statute; as such, the statute must prevail over the judge-made rule. A.S.C.A. § 43.2402(a). T.C.R.Cr.P. 35. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Because the High Court’s rules were promulgated solely on its own authority, they must give way to territorial statutes defining the court’s jurisdiction, unless the statutes themselves are unconstitutional. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

There is no need for application of the rule of lenity, where two statutes that overlap do not possess internal conflict or ambiguity. American Samoa Government v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 29.

When a claimed conflict between two statutes is not relevant and not at issue, the court will decline comment. A.S.C.A. § 32.0619(a)(f). National Pacific Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the American Samoa Government’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 22 A.S.R.2d 15.

Territorial laws which are inconsistent with applicable U.S. laws violate the territorial constitution, which in turn was promulgated under the authority of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. II, § 1(a), Art. V, § 11. Alamoana Recipe Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 24 A.S.R.2d 156.

Where a conflict exists between statute and any customary privilege, the statute governs. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.

Custom in conflict with law must give way. A.S.C.A. § 1.0202. In Re the Matai Title Iu, 25 A.S.R.2d 127.

Laws which do not comply with the Constitution will be found to have no application. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 29 A.S.R.2d 116.

§ 4 Separation of Powers

SEE AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT § 2 – SEPARATION OF POWERS

The federal Constitution and the constitutions of various states limit executive appointments by vesting the power of confirmation in the legislature, but A.S.C.A. § 4.0112 is a statutory attempt to vest such power in the legislature. House of Representatives of American Samoa v. Sunia, 3 A.S.R.3d 123 (Trial Div. 1999).

The Revised Constitution of American Samoa contemplates a government patterned after the federal tripartite system and, accordingly, the well-established principle of separation of powers applies. House of Representatives of American Samoa v. Sunia, 3 A.S.R.3d 123 (Trial Div. 1999).

Confirmation of appointments made by the Governor is not an inherent legislative power; it is a specific attribute of the executive power of appointment which, in most cases, is constitutionally delegated to the legislative branch. House of Representatives of American Samoa v. Sunia, 3 A.S.R.3d 123 (Trial Div. 1999).

The Legislature may not usurp the power of confirmation, and as the Revised Constitution of American Samoa makes no provision for legislative confirmation of gubernatorial appointments to the office of Secretary of Samoan Affairs, that power is attached to the executive power of appointment and is vested solely in the Governor. House of Representatives of American Samoa v. Sunia, 3 A.S.R.3d 123 (Trial Div. 1999).

Because A.S.C.A. § 4.0112, on its face and without constitutional authorization, offers the Legislature, by its confirmation provisions, a critical means of severely limiting the executive power of appointment, it is unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to the Secretary of Samoan Affairs. House of Representatives of American Samoa v. Sunia, 3 A.S.R.3d 123 (Trial Div. 1999).

The Legislature of American Samoa, under the principle of separation of powers, has wide discretion in implementing its internal procedures as to employment and termination of employment. Velega v. Legislature of American Samoa, 4 A.S.R.3d 145 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 5 Full Faith and Credit

A judgment of a court of the United States is entitled to full faith and credit in American Samoa. Evening Star v. Sonoma Mission, 2 A.S.R.2d 12 (App. Div. 1984).

Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act applies only to foreign judgments entitled to “full faith and credit” in American Samoa, but the Act does not define such judgments. A.S.C.A. § 43.1702. In re Petition of Puailoa, 13 A.S.R.2d 22.

The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act was designed to give a foreign judgment creditor the same right to enforce his judgment in American Samoa that he would have in the State or Territory in which he obtained the judgment. A.S.C.A. § 43.1701 et seq. Huff v. Huff, 15 A.S.R.2d 83.

Although the California family court which granted divorce judgment retained jurisdiction to enforce the judgment and the parties to that judgment could move to enforce it in that California court, High Court was not precluded from enforcing the judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act where both parties currently resided in American Samoa. A.S.C.A. § 43.1701 et seq. Huff v. Huff, 15 A.S.R.2d 83.

Where enforcement of California judgment is sought in American Samoa, party against whom enforcement is sought is entitled to the same process here that he would receive in California. A.S.C.A. § 43.1701 et seq. Huff v. Huff, 15 A.S.R.2d 83.

The High Court of American Samoa is empowered to enforce a judgment of any United States court or other court entitled to full faith and credit in American Samoa under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1701‑09. DeStael v. Strasburg, 25 A.S.R.2d 96.

Full faith and credit requires that a forum should respect an earlier judgment to the extent that issues presented therein received a res judicata determination. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. In re A Minor Child, 28 A.S.R.2d 33.

Under the full faith and credit clause, a forum state has as much leeway to modify or depart from a foreign judgment, as does the state in which it was rendered. U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. In re A Minor Child, 28 A.S.R.2d 33.

Full faith and credit requires this court to respect the res judicata effect of an earlier judgment in deciding the same issues presented in an action currently litigated. Hong v. Chung Yong # 21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197 (Trial Div. 2001).

Where earlier, final judgment determined that vessel owners’ association was legal entity with vested ownership interest in vessels, and where plaintiffs in instant action and association were parties in the prior action, association was estopped from relitigating same issues in instant action. Hong v. Chung Yong # 21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 6 Due Process

SEE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4(1) – DUE PROCESS

SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8(1) – DUE PROCESS

Government of American Samoa is limited by American Samoa Bill of Rights which includes due process clause. Government v. Soliai, 2 A.S.R. 600.

People of American Samoa are protected by due process clause in Fifth Amendment to Constitution of United States, and in particular that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Government v. Soliai, 2 A.S.R. 600.

Constitutional right to due process of law is not denied when a court which has repeatedly accommodated counsel’s unusual requests and overlooked procedural irregularities finally ceases to do so and dismisses the action. Monte Kaho v. Ron Pritchard Ground Services, Inc., 4 A.S.R.2d 40.

Fact that jurors who speak only Samoan must receive jury instructions through translator does not violate constitutional right to due process; need for translation is inevitable in bilingual territory where many witnesses and jurors speak one language but not the other. 46 A.S.C.A. § 46.1504. American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 4 A.S.R.2d 110.

A government employee with no contractual or statutory right to continued employment may be fired for any reason or even “for no reason whatever” without a denial of due process; only exception is that employee cannot be terminated for a reason that itself violates some constitutional right, such as free speech or equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Although the due process clause of the federal constitution, which implicitly forbids racial discrimination by the federal government, binds the territories in at least some of its applications, it does not necessarily bind the territories in the same ways and to the same extent as in the continental United States. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Complaint alleging “wrongful imprisonment in violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights” sufficiently raises constitutional claim despite failure to cite specific provisions. A.S.C.A. § 43.1207 Tevaseu v. American Samoa Government, 5 A.S.R.2d 10.

Police may initiate prosecution for traffic offense by issuing ordinary traffic citation and summons even well after all parties have left the scene of the offense, and due process does not require usual procedural protection of full criminal prosecution. A.S.C.A. §§ 22.0802, 22.0803. American Samoa Gov’t v. Ofa, 6 A.S.R.2d 1.

Garnishee bank that had elected not to retain counsel and whose employee attended garnishment hearing but did not request to testify could not argue in collateral attack on resulting judgment that it had been denied an opportunity to be heard. Amerika Samoa Bank v. Haleck, 6 A.S.R.2d 54.

Argument that license was “revoked” without procedural due process was unfounded where evidence shows license was never granted. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

In order to have a cognizable claim for deprivation of procedural due process, one must first possess a “liberty” or “property” interest in the government action complained of. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Procedural due process requirements are not fixed, but vary with circumstances and particular demands of the case; however, some sort of notice and hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Notice and hearing afforded to satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

To satisfy requirement of procedural due process, opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, but need not always be granted prior to the initial deprivation of property. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Ordinarily, due process is satisfied by proceedings less than a full evidentiary hearing prior to adverse administrative action, and the sufficiency of such proceedings is to be determined in light of 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and 3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would impose. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Procedural due process is satisfied by piecemeal proceedings wherein parties were advised of the required showing, the proofs were considered promptly by the regulating agency, parties were advised of the agency’s findings of insufficiency, parties submitted further proofs which agency considered and again advised parties that such proof was insufficient but did not issue a denial and remained open to further submission of proofs. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are not triggered until adverse administrative action constituting a “final” deprivation of property has taken place. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Recurring and intentionally dilatory tactics by agency may constitute “final” action sufficient to trigger due process requirements of notice and hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

The expected benefit of a license which issues subject to articulated standards of qualification is a property interest giving rise to due process protection, although not to the full range of pre-deprivation procedural protections applicable to entitlements that are less contingent than the expectation of a license. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Because in most cases licensing will be a straightforward process, quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing in all licensing proceedings would needlessly increase government expenditures and such hearings are required only where the proposed action on a license application will be final. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2., A.S.C.A. § 31.1508. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Court did not deprive attorney of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, either by injury to his reputation or otherwise, where (1) attorney had represented judgment debtor; (2) attorney also represented other members of judgment debtor’s family; (3) after judgment, the judgment debtor and her family had agreed to changes in the record ownership of property formerly recorded as property of the judgment debtor, had arranged for the sale of the property, and had removed themselves from the territorial jurisdiction of the court; (4) attorney had in his possession the proceeds of the sale, which judgment creditor alleged to be the property of the debtor but which debtor and other family members claimed to be the property of other family members; (5) court had held the funds to be the property of the judgment debtor and subject to seizure by the judgment creditor; and (6) court ordered the funds to be deposited in the registry of the court pending further proceedings. In re Guardianship of Tedrow, 7 A.S.R.2d 72.

Court that ordered defendant released from mental institution, to which he had been committed after being found not guilty of first degree murder by reason of insanity, did not act unconstitutionally in imposing conditions (1) that he reside with his wife in Los Angeles unless granted permission by the court to reside elsewhere; (2) that he refrain from use of alcohol; and (3) that he consult with a physician periodically. American Samoa Gov’t v. Satele, 7 A.S.R.2d 154.

Court order for confinement of prisoner, after his trial and conviction for attempted rape, was issued pursuant to due process of law and could be enforced without further judicial proceedings. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.

Due process of law was not denied to a convict who had been released from detention in violation of court order and who was subsequently re-arrested, where (1) convict’s lawyer was notified immediately of his re-arrest and did not request a hearing, (2) a hearing was held as soon as the convict’s new lawyer requested one; (3) the scope and period of confinement after re-arrest did not exceed that imposed by the original court order, which had itself been issued pursuant to due process of law. Atuatasi v. Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53.

That some people may misconstrue an otherwise clear judgment and sentence, and even that a clerical employee of the parole board did misconstrue it, does not render the judgment and sentence so vague and ambiguous as to deprive the person convicted of due process of law. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

Reincarceration of an inadvertently released prisoner denies due process of law only where, under all the circumstances of the case, reincarceration would contravene fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

Reincarceration of an inadvertently released prisoner did not deny due process of law where the release was due to a ministerial mistake and where, having been released for only twenty-eight days prior to his rearrest, the prisoner had not been so thoroughly reintegrated into society that his rearrest would contravene fundamental principles of liberty and justice. Atuatasi v. American Samoa Gov’t, 9 A.S.R.2d 67.

In the absence of statute creating right to certification hearing to determine whether to prosecute minor as a juvenile or an adult, the minor has no due process right to such a hearing. American Samoa Gov’t v. Julio, 9 A.S.R.2d 128.

Provision of territorial constitution prohibiting deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law prohibits prosecution from suppressing any evidence favorable to an accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2. American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d 14.

General request by defense counsel for any evidence in the possession of the prosecution that might tend to exculpate the defendant was within the scope of rule prohibiting suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I § 2. American Samoa Gov’t v. Talamoa, 10 A.S.R.2d 14.

There is no general constitutional right of indigent persons to litigate free of charge. Pene v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 61.

Denial of access to legal proceedings to those unable to pay the costs of such proceedings is a denial of due process of law only in cases where litigants seek to extricate themselves from family relationships imposed on them by the government. Pene v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 61.

Litigants who demanded costs of litigation, compensatory and punitive damages on account of mental distress said to have been caused by a brief disconnection of their electricity, and an injunction against future disconnections, and whose electricity had been disconnected after they had stopped paying their electric bill in retaliation for conduct of the electric company in an unrelated land dispute, had no constitutional right to a free trial transcript for use on appeal. Pene v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 61.

Appellants who claimed they could not afford to pay for a trial transcript had already been afforded due process of law by a trial on the merits, a written opinion by the trial judge on the merits of their claims, a hearing on their motion to reconsider, and another written opinion on that motion. Pene v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 61.

The right of a family member to use communal land is a proprietary right within the due process clause of the territorial constitution. Rev’d Const. of Am. Samoa I § 2. Lutu v. Taesaliali`i, 11 A.S.R.2d 80.

The heart of due process in parole revocation cases is a concern for basic fairness—the non-arbitrary treatment of a probationer or parolee by the state. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

Requirements of due process in parole revocation proceedings include the parolee’s right to hear the evidence against him, to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing such confrontation. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lam Yuen, 11 A.S.R.2d 118.

While “practice of law” is a general term, it is sufficiently definite that its employment in a criminal statute satisfies the demands of due process. A.S.C.A. § 31.0104. Pene v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 43.

Government violates due process when it seizes a taxpayer’s property for unpaid taxes without following the procedures mandated by the Internal Revenue Code for distraint and levy. Klauk v. American Samoa Gov’t, 13 A.S.R.2d 52.

Where government failed to issue a 90-day statutory notice of deficiency before seizing plaintiff’s property for unpaid taxes, it was enjoined from depriving plaintiff of his right to due process, either by continuing to deprive him of his rights under the Internal Revenue Code to challenge and contest income tax deficiencies or by withholding the property it had seized from plaintiff, until it complied with the applicable Code provisions pertaining to distraint and levy. Klauk v. American Samoa Gov’t, 13 A.S.R.2d 52.

To hold a trial only a few minutes after the filing of the answer, over the objection of a party or under equivalent circumstances would be fundamentally unfair. Diocese of Samoa Pago Pago v. KMST, Inc., 15 A.S.R.2d 20.

Government’s refusal to accept a surety bond in lieu of cash bail for an alien arrested for immigration offenses violated his constitutional rights, where government’s reason for refusal was its hope that his friends would put up the money it would otherwise cost the government to deport him. Rakhshan v. Immigration Board, 15 A.S.R.2d 29.

When the court finds that adequate grounds for discharge existed and requiring an employer to conduct a post-termination hearing would not change the result, due process has been satisfied. Palelei v. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., 15 A.S.R.2d 120.

To properly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, the long arm statute of the proposed forum must permit the exercise of jurisdiction under the particular facts of the case and such exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the demands of due process. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.

In order to subject a nonresident defendant to a judgment in personam, due process requires that he have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintaining the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.

Minimum contacts needed for due process require that a defendant must have performed some act by which he purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.

Minimum contacts required for due process insure that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts or because of the unilateral activity of another party or third person. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.

Minimum contacts required by due process to assert personal jurisdiction were not satisfied where defendant neither designed nor manufactured the machinery alleged to have injured plaintiff in American Samoa, but merely installed piping for the machinery according to third party plans when such machinery was previously installed in another location. Patau v. Rosendahl Corporation, 16 A.S.R.2d 96.

Destroying the court reporter’s shorthand notes in the twenty years between a final judgment and a party’s attempt to relitigate the case does not violate due process. Taulaga v. Patea, 17 A.S.R.2d 34.

In some cases, such as when an illegal sentence was pronounced on a defendant unrepresented by counsel or when the circumstances surrounding an error of law made it impossible for counsel to call it to the Court’s attention within ten days, a statutory ten-day limit might amount to an unconstitutional denial of liberty without due process of law. U.S. Const. Amends. V, XIV; Revised Const. of American Samoa art. I, § 2; A.S.C.A. § 46.2402(a). American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

That a criminal may be unable to determine the exact punishment and exceptions to punishment does not render criminal statutes unconstitutional; a person is only entitled to know the maximum punishment available. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

No constitutional right to rehabilitation at public expense exists, nor do statutes authorizing rehabilitation programs or early release give any particular criminal a constitutionally protected “liberty interest” in participating in them. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

No substantive due process right exists for not being deported. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The right to interstate travel is a substantive, virtually unqualified constitutional right, but international travel can be regulated within the limits of due process. U.S. Const. Amend. V. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

The freedom to travel is one of the freedoms a convicted criminal may lose; therefore, a requirement that a convict spend part or all of his probation outside the Territory does not unconstitutionally abridge any such right. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

Eyewitness identification evidence is unreliable and must be suppressed as violating due process if suggestive identification procedures have led to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. American Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

Though identification procedure whereby complainant identified defendant in a one-on-one confrontation at police station was impermissibly suggestive, under the totality of the circumstances it was not so unfair as to violate due process, since complainant identified defendant without police prompting or comment, had seen him shortly before the crime, and at the scene of the crime had described physical characteristics and clothing of her assailant which matched defendant and had pointed out a third party who not only had also seen defendant before the crime but then identified him to the police immediately afterwards. American Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R.2d 145.

Neither the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment gives a non-indigent defendant the right to a court-appointed and government-paid interpreter. Kim v. American Samoa Gov’t, 17 A.S.R.2d 193.

American Samoa Constitution guarantees a court-appointed interpreter only to an indigent defendant who will otherwise be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to communicate with his counsel. Kim v. American Samoa Government, 17 A.S.R.2d 193.

Court employment of Samoan-English interpreters, but not interpreters of other languages, is simply a practice which reflects the cultural and juridical history of American Samoa rather than a racially based classification. Kim v. American Samoa Government, 17 A.S.R.2d 193.

Statute providing that the High Court shall have interpreters deals with the method of appointing permanent court employees and does not require Court to find, employ, and compensate special ad hoc officers whenever a litigant demands an interpreter. Kim v. American Samoa Government, 17 A.S.R.2d 193.

The overlap of the statutes defining sodomy and deviate sexual assault does not violate a criminal defendant’s due process. A.S.C.A. §§ 46.3611, 46.3612. American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 29.

When the statutes in question clearly define the conduct proscribed and the punishment available under each, due process is satisfied. American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 29.

A “void” judgment, from which relief may be granted, is one in which a court lacked the power to enter the judgment, as when a court lacked jurisdiction over the parties or the subject matter, violated “due process of law,” or engaged in “a plain usurpation of power.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); T.C.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4). Reid v. Puailoa, 23 A.S.R.2d 101.

An alien in a deportation proceeding is entitled to cross-examine the government’s witnesses, and an improper curtailment of this right constitutes a violation of procedural due process. U.S. Constitution Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2; A.S.C.A. § 41.0205(7)(c); A.S.A.C. § 41.0807(a). Farapo v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 136.

The right of a family member to use land owned by a Samoan communal family is a property right protected by the territorial constitution’s due process clause. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2. Seventh Day Adventist Church of American Samoa v. Maneafaiga, 23 A.S.R.2d 150.

A non-capital criminal defendant is not constitutionally or procedurally entitled to a list of the prosecution’s prospective witnesses. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2; T.C.R.Cr.P. 16(a)(2). American Samoa Gov’t v. Wilson, 24 A.S.R.2d 26.

Although constraining government decisions which deprive an individual of some “property” or “liberty” interest, procedural due process does not prohibit the government’s taking of property but requires that a person have an opportunity to be heard before his property is finally taken. Mulitauaopele v. Maiava, 24 A.S.R.2d 134.

The unquestioned right of a family member to use communal land is a property right under the due process clause of either the U.S. or Samoan constitutions. A non‑family member, by definition, has no such right. Pen v. Lavata`i, 25 A.S.R.2d 164.

If, as a matter of trial strategy, counsel declines to cross-examine a witness or avoids asking certain questions, the defendant’s right to confront witnesses is not violated. Man v. American Samoa Gov’t, 29 A.S.R.2d 66.

As a matter of due process of law, the Land Commission must hold public hearings on proposed transfers of land, and give reasonable notice to interested parties. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.

A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b) is reasonable and does not violate a person’s due process rights. It is reasonable to believe that a person lawfully arrested may need to be held up to the full 24 hours without formal prosecution, because he is endangered or poses a threat to public safety, even if the district court sits before then. There is no point in bringing a person before the district court who will not be charged. Nor is there any logic in releasing a person prior to 24 hours when he is still legitimately held for safety reasons, simply because the district court has sat within a shorter time frame. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lolesio, 30 A.S.R.2d 27.

If an arrestee is held for longer than 24 hours without being brought before the district court and charged, and if he can show that police personnel never intended to prosecute him, he has remedies for a violation of his due process rights. Contempt proceedings might also be appropriate in this situation. A.S.C.A. § 46.0807(b). American Samoa Gov’t v. Lolesio, 30 A.S.R.2d 27.

A demonstration of actual prejudice is a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim arising from pre‑accusatory delay. The court must also consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. American Samoa Gov’t v. Logovi`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 143.

In considering the reasons for pre‑accusatory delay, broad leeway is given for prosecutorial discretion and legitimate investigative purposes. Conversely, a delay that is imposed for purely tactical reasons is probably violative of due process. American Samoa Gov’t v. Logovi`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 143.

When a pre‑accusatory delay is caused by prosecutorial neglect rather than by intentional tactical delay, the evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant must be compelling to sustain a dismissal based on due process. American Samoa Gov’t v. Logovi`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 143.

The unavailability of witnesses resulting from an extended delay is not enough by itself to demonstrate that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial. The defendant must show how the testimony of the missing witnesses would have been exculpatory. American Samoa Gov’t v. Logovi`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 143.

A claim of denial of due process, either procedural or substantive, cannot be sustained, absent proof of a deprivation of a ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of Article I, § 2 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa, or of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

Not every interest is protected by procedural due process guarantees. The claim must be derived from a statute or legal rule or through a mutually explicit understanding to be an enforceable right or entitlement. Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

Though courts have eschewed rigid definitions of “liberty” and “property” interests, we believe that an interest in continuing an at-will periodic tenancy is not a constitutionally protected “liberty” or “property” interest. An at-will tenant may have a subjective need or desire for the relationship to continue but not a legitimate expectation for it to continue. Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

Courts must examine the nature of the interest at stake to determine whether the party has merely a unilateral expectation of the interest or has a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement to the interest in deciding a party’s due process rights. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 45 (Trial Div. 1997).

Enforceable claims to an entitlement derive from a statute, legal rule, or through contractual arrangement. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 45 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where a discharged employee presents sufficient facts which, if proven at trial, could persuade a reasonable factfinder to find that he had a just cause termination clause in his employment contract, that his employer wrongfully terminated his employment without just cause, and that the employment was terminated in violation of the requirements of procedural and substantive due process the employer’s motion for summary judgment will be denied by the court. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 45 (Trial Div. 1997).

To assert a cause of action for deprivation of due process, a party must demonstrate that it has a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement to a “liberty” or “property” interest. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Procedural due process rights can attach to a contractual entitlement where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where employee’s contract provided for continued employment absent sufficient cause, employee was entitled to due process before he could be terminated. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

The practical requirements of procedural due process vary with the circumstances and particular demands of the case and usually require something less than a full evidentiary hearing. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

As long as the claimant has notice and an opportunity to be heard, the claimant has been afforded adequate procedural due process. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where employee was not given advance notice of the charges against him such that he could gather evidence and solicit witness testimony to present defense, such procedure did not substantially comport with the requirements of procedural due process. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Requirements of procedural due process are not fixed but vary with circumstances and particular requirements of case, minimally demanding notice and opportunity to be heard. Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 216 (Trial Div. 2002).

Under the Due Process Clause, a Senator has a constitutionally protected property interest in serving his term. Fa`amausili v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 259 (Trial Div. 2002).

Before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest, due process requires at a minimum notice of the grounds and opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fa`amausili v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 259 (Trial Div. 2002).

A family’s entitlement to communal land is a proprietary right within the due process clause of the territorial constitution. Fanene v. Fanene, 6 A.S.R.3d 333 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

§ 7 Individual Rights

§ 7(1) —Generally

Basic rights at the heart and soul of the American way of life, having an explicit or implicit constitutional foundation, are fundamental and are entitled to have laws impacting them strictly scrutinized. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

Neither a matai title nor the aspiration to attain the title is a property right, or any other constitutional right of fundamental importance. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 1.0403(b), which sets forth qualifications of eligibility to succeed to a matai title does not establish, or deal with, fundamental rights so as to be subject to strict scrutiny by a reviewing court. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

Under the rational basis test, a statute passes constitutional muster if it is rationally related to a legitimate territorial interest. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

§ 7(2) —Equal Protection

SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8(2) – EQUAL PROTECTION

Equal Protection guarantees forbid statute unnecessarily penalizing United States citizenship as between similarly situated taxpayers one of whom is a citizen and one of whom is a national even though they may both be American Samoans. Where the substitution of terms renders referential legislation ambiguous, court will not favor meaning that is inconsistent with constitutional rights. Naber v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.2d 109 (Trial Div. 1983).

A statute that punishes an act if performed by an employee of the Development Bank of American Samoa, but not if performed by an employee of a commercial bank, involves neither a fundamental right not a suspect classification, and does not deny equal protection of the laws. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. To’oto’o, 2 A.S.R.2d 61 (App. Div. 1985).

The rule that a state may classify persons for the purpose of legislation and pass laws applying such classifications operations to permit a legislative scheme classifying the officers and employees of the Development Bank of American Samoa differently from those of commercial banks in American Samoa. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. To’oto’o, 2 A.S.R.2d 61 (App. Div. 1985).

The encouragement of economic process in American Samoa is an acceptable, if not mandatory, interest of the American Samoa Government and the American Samoa Government can enact legislation furthering this interest by discouraging fiduciaries employed by the Development Bank of American Samoa from misappropriating “money, funds, credit or securities” belonging to the Bank. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. To’oto’o, 2 A.S.R.2d 61 (App. Div. 1985).

Personnel board’s recommendation not to employ plaintiff was not shown to have been motivated by constitutionally impermissible gender-based discrimination when it could have resulted from past experience applicable to employees of either sex and plaintiff failed to bring evidence suggesting otherwise. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Personnel board’s recommendation not to employ plaintiff was not shown to have been based on allegedly unconstitutional statutory Samoan hiring preference when evidence showed overwhelmingly that Board’s recommendation was a response to undue manipulation of hiring process by plaintiff’s husband. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Federal constitution would not prohibit American Samoan hiring preference, which is reasonably calculated to alleviate the difficulties that attend a government composed largely of officials with no knowledge of the local language and culture and who generally remain in the territory only temporarily. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

Plaintiffs were not denied equal protection when denied license as a hairdresser or cosmetician because they did not meet standard of experience set out by the legislature. U.S. Const. Amdt. 14, § 1. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Territorial constitution contains no equal protection clause. Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

Where territorial application of equal protection clause of federal constitution was not argued by either party, but both parties assumed that challenged territorial statute was unconstitutional if and only if it established a classification for which there was no rational basis, court would assume that the equal protection clause was applicable at least insofar as it required a rational basis for statutory classifications. U.S. Const. amend. 14. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

Statutory scheme under which the same act may be punished under either of two statutes, with prosecutor having discretion to choose under which statute to prosecute, does not violate equal protection clause of federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

Statutory scheme under which two statutes define two different crimes, but proof of extra element is required by statute prescribing higher penalty, does not violate equal protection clause of federal constitution. U.S. Const. amend. 14. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

Even under equal protection analysis more stringent than the rational basis test, statute punishing those who drove after their licenses had been suspended for driving under the influence did not create unconstitutional classification, since (1) statutory distinction was not incoherent or unclear; (2) court should not substitute its opinion for that of the legislature on relative culpability, need for deterrence, and other factors necessary to determine range of appropriate sentences for various offenses; (3) drunken driving does appear to present special problems that might suggest the need for special statutory treatment. U.S. Const. amend 14; A.S.C.A. § 22.0223. American Samoa Gov’t v. Macomber, 8 A.S.R.2d 182.

Extent to which the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies in the territory of American Samoa is unclear. U.S. Const. amdt. 14. Macomber v. American Samoa Gov’t, 12 A.S.R.2d 29.

The Revised Constitution of American Samoa, promulgated in 1967 under the authority of the Secretary of the Interior, contains no equal protection clause. American Samoa Gov’t v. Falefatu, 17 A.S.R.2d 114.

It is unclear to what extent equal protection applies in American Samoa, because the Revised Constitution of American Samoa contains no equal protection clause. American Samoa Gov’t v. Whitney, 20 A.S.R.2d 29.

The extent to which equal protection applies in the territory is unclear because the territorial constitution does not contain an equal‑protection clause. In Re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.

Eligibility to be a candidate for a matai title is not an incident of one’s nationality and therefore A.S.C.A. § 1.0403 does not abridge a constitutionally‑guaranteed privilege. In re Matai Title I`aulualo, 25 A.S.R.2d 155.

Equal protection does not prevent classifications which are reasonably related to the achievement of a legislative purpose. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.

Age groupings have been consistently upheld for regulatory objectives such as voting, jury selection, military service, and receiving Social Security and other benefits. In the context of matai title eligibility, the distinction between minority and majority is a logical differentiation. In Re Matai Title “Mulitauaopele”, 29 A.S.R.2d 169.

To prevail under the defense of selective prosecution, a defendant must show that his prosecution was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, and that others similarly situated have not been prosecuted. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

Selective prosecution claims are reviewed under ordinary equal protection standards. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

A claim for selective prosecution based on the publicity in a case is analyzed under the rational basis standard. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

Under the rational-basis test, the government need only show that its actions are rationally related to a legitimate state interest. American Samoa Gov’t v. Lafoga, 30 A.S.R.2d 110.

Claims of conspiracy to deprive someone of their constitutional rights are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), not 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

In order to properly state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a complaint must allege that the defendants did (1) conspire (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. It must then assert that one or more of the conspirators (3) did, or caused to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, whereby another was (4a) injured in his person or property or (4b) deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 7(3) —Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion

SEE RELIGION

Code prohibits enactment of law respecting establishment of religion or prohibiting free exercise thereof. Mulitauaopele v. Paleafei, 3 A.S.R. 93.

Law against prohibiting free exercise of religion refers to government and does not apply to individuals who object to use of their lands for church purposes. Mulitauaopele v. Paleafei, 3 A.S.R. 93.

Neither the rights to free speech and a free press nor a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a public trial preclude a court from excluding members of the public from the courtroom during the testimony of juvenile complaining witness in a rape case, where the court has determined after a public hearing that such exclusion is necessary to protect the witness’s psychological well-being or to prevent her from being harassed and intimidated. American Samoa Gov’t v. Masaniai, 4 A.S.R.2d 156.

Blanket imposition of religious programs on unconsenting inmate violates establishment and freedom of religion clauses of both federal and territorial constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. I; Rev’d Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § I. American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 6 A.S.R.2d 32.

Court must examine both the allegedly defamatory language and its context in determining whether it is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion, since language which taken alone might seem to be a statement of fact may be a statement of opinion when viewed in context. King v. Ala`ilima, 16 A.S.R.2d 6.

The power to govern a congregational church vests in the whole congregation, or in persons or entities which the majority of the congregation may select as the governing authority for general or particular purposes. U.S. Const. Amend. I; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 1. Lefiti v. Tauanu’u, 24 A.S.R.2d 68.

When the identity of the governing authority or authorities within a church is substantially at issue, civil courts must refrain from delving into ecclesiastical laws and practices that may be paramount to resolving the controversy. U.S. Const. Amend. I; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 1. Lefiti v. Tauanu’u, 24 A.S.R.2d 68.

Under A.S.C.A. § 43.5202(3), a communication published without malice is conditionally privileged when the publisher reasonably believes that the defamatory matter communicated affects a sufficiently important interest of the publisher and the recipient’s knowledge of this information serves to lawfully protect the publisher’s interest. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

The conditional privilege provided under A.S.C.A. § 43.5202(3) is lost if the publisher abuses the privilege. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

Article I, § 1 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa has the same free speech and press provisions as in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, under which there can be no liability without fault on the publisher of defamatory matter injurious to a private person. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

The posting of a check only to employees serves legitimate business purposes and is conditionally privileged under A.S.C.A. § 43.5202(3), and the immunity from liability continues when the check is publicly displayed unless the conditional privilege is lost through malicious abuse, and malice is present when a publisher either knows that the published matter is false and defamatory or acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

A business loses its conditional privilege as a publisher under A.S.C.A. § 43.5202(3) when it is not necessary to publicly post a check to convey to employees an off-island bank policy, and, without justification, fails to return the check to a hidden position and ignores the consequences of the public display; such actions manifest a reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the defamatory character of the publicly posted check. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

Where a publicly displayed check clearly imparts that the idea that the person had passed a bad check, a criminal act, the posted check is libelous while visible to the public, and is actionable per se without proof of actual damages under the common law applicable in situations involving private concerns of a defamed private person. Fou v. Talofa Video, 2 A.S.R.3d 152 (Trial Div. 1998).

The public peace disturbance statute, A.S.C.A. § 46.4501(a)(2), is not facially invalid for being overbroad—it narrowly tailors it’s required element of “intent to cause public annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk of it.” American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 3 A.S.R.3d 110 (Trial Div. 1999).

The public peace disturbance statute, A.S.C.A. § 46.4501(a) (2), does not apply to protest actions which are meant to express a viewpoint rather than to “cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm,” and by judicially limiting the application of the statute to non-protected speech, there are no residual overbreadth problems. American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 3 A.S.R.3d 110 (Trial Div. 1999).

The “unreasonable noise” provision of the public peace disturbance statute, A.S.C.A. § 46.4501(a) (2), is an objective standard set by community practices, and so is not invalid for being vague; mathematical precision is not required in defining levels of noise, and as a member of the community, the defendant should have been aware that shouting in a public restaurant was unreasonable noise for purposes of the statute. American Samoa Gov’t v. Agasiva, 3 A.S.R.3d 110 (Trial Div. 1999).

The standard that free speech is not absolute and may, in certain, narrow situations be regulated, also applies to speech in the legislative process. Muavaefa’atasi v. House of Representatives, 7 A.S.R.3d 117 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 7(4) —Takings and Just Compensation

SEE PROPERTY § 1(3) – EMINENT DOMAIN

Private property may not be taken by government for private purposes even though just compensation is paid; but may be taken for public use. Government v. Soliai, 2 A.S.R. 600.

A “taking” of property by ASG requires it to provide just compensation. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § 2. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

A land use regulation may effect a constitutional taking if it fails to “substantially advance legitimate state interests” or “denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § 2. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

Coastal zone regulations might effect a taking, and thus require compensation to the landowner, if they effectively prohibit any “economically viable” use of private property. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § 2. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

No “taking” occurs when government merely restrains property uses which are tantamount to public nuisances. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa art. I, § 2. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

No compensation is due for what would otherwise be a regulatory taking when the government merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 18 A.S.R.2d 14.

In condemning land for public uses to build a road, the United States also acquired the land between the road and the shoreline, including the accompanying littoral rights; these rights have been transferred to ASG. A.S.C.A. § 37.2050. Anderson v. Vaivao, 21 A.S.R.2d 95.

Requiring criminal counsel to serve without compensation is generally not an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. I, § 2. American Samoa Gov’t v. Wilson, 23 A.S.R.2d 159.

After-the-fact compensation for a land’s use is not an adequate substitute for obtaining permission or following applicable statutory procedures in order to use the land in the first place. Mamea v. American Samoa Power Authority, 26 A.S.R.2d 47 (Land & Titles 1994).

The American Samoa Government has the authority to alter or modify the public purpose of a condemnation in order to satisfy some other public use. American Samoa Gov’t v. Meredith, 28 A.S.R.2d 92.

§ 7(5) —Cruel and Unusual Punishment

SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5(2) – CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS

§ 7(6) —Discrimination

Restriction whereby native land may not be held by persons who have not fifty percent or greater Samoan blood is racial classification which must be afforded strict scrutiny in constitutional challenge. Preservation of Samoan lands for Samoans, as guaranteed by treaty and American Samoan constitution, is compelling interest justifying invidious discrimination. Notwithstanding that decision is based upon invalid statute, majority has taken judicial notice that racial classification survives strict scrutiny analysis despite the fact that government has neither alleged no presented evidence of a compelling interest. Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, 1 A.S.R.2d 10 (App. Div. 1980).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates an enforceable cause of action in American Samoa for claims of intentional racial discrimination. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not apply to claims based on sex discrimination. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

For actions under § 1981, a plaintiff must specifically plead “intentional discrimination on account of race,” otherwise known as “racial animus.” Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

Where complaint went beyond alleging of noncompliance with administrative regulations to state intentional racial discrimination, it did not belong at the administrative level. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

Where territorial statute discriminates against individuals based on their national origin, Court will apply strict scrutiny in reviewing it. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 1.0403(b) does not exclude individuals based on national origin. Kruse v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 6 A.S.R.3d 318 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

§ 8 Contracts

SEE CONTRACTS

Provision of federal constitution that “No state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts” is limitation upon power of state and not United States possession such as American Samoa. Haleck v. Tiumalu, 3 A.S.R. 380.

Federal courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over federal civil rights actions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but instead have concurrent jurisdiction. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 3.0208 clearly grants the High Court jurisdiction to hear claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies to United States Territories, including American Samoa. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 applies against both private and state actors. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects rights arising both under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 creates an enforceable cause of action in American Samoa for claims of intentional racial discrimination. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

42 U.S.C. § 1981 does not apply to claims based on sex discrimination. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

Claims of conspiracy to deprive someone of their constitutional rights are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), not 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 9 Habeas Corpus

SEE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7(7) – HABEAS CORPUS & CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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