Combined Digest 2008 ed. (through 7 A.S.R.3d)

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AMERICAN SAMOA

DIGEST

2008 Edition

Covering Opinions

From Divisions of the

High Court of

American Samoa

as Reported in the

American Samoa Reports

(through 7 A.S.R.3d)

Published by the High Court of American Samoa

Pago Pago, American Samoa 96799

Edited by Sean Coletti, Michael Weaver, Thad Brady & Julia A.H. Harty

Law Clerks

Preface

In 1900, the Samoan Islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u were ceded to the United States, and the Territory of American Samoa came into being. The High Court of American Samoa was established in that year and since then has been the court of highest jurisdiction in the Territory, and the only court which regularly writes opinions. The Court’s first published decision appears at 1 A.S.R. 15.

In 1977, the first volume of the American Samoa Reports, covering decisions from 1900-1938 was published. This was followed in quick succession by the publication of Volumes 2, 3 and 4 of the Reports, which include decisions of the High Court through 1975.

In 1983, the Court began publication of American Samoa Reports, second edition. Since then, thirty-one volumes of A.S.R.2d have been published, coverning decisions from 1978-1997.

In 2006, Volume 1 of the third edition of the American Samoa Reports was published. This volume begins where 31 A.S.R.2d left off, with court decisions beginning in 1997 through the present.

Each of these published decisions are printed with headnotes coverning the legal points made by the decisions. The 2008 American Samoa Digest categorizes all of the headnotes in the decisions published in American Samoa Reports, American Samoa Reports, second edition, and published cases for the American Samoa Reports, third edition. Each headnote is placed in one or more of 29 different topics. Each major topic is broken down into subtopics, each of which is further broken down to more narrowly pinpoint the law in the headnote. The Digest is best used by locating a headnote one is interested in, referring to the American Samoa Reports appearing at the end of the headnote, and comparing the wording of the headnote in the Digest with the wording of the headnotes at the beginning of the case to determine where the Court discusses the legal point of interest in the case.

Digest Topics

Administrative Law 28

Admiralty 41

Agency and Principal 56

American Samoa Government 60

Bankruptcy 86

Civil Procedure 88

Constitutional Law 188

Contracts 209

Corporation and Partnership 237

Criminal Law 246

Criminal Procedure 255

Elections 317

Employment Law 324

Environmental Law 332

Evidence 333

Family Law 347

Immigration 365

Insurance 370

International Law 381

Legal Profession 384

Matai Title Disputes 393

Real Property 422

Religion 509

Samoan Customs 510

Secured Transactions 517

Taxation 527

Torts 535

Wills, Trusts & Estates 569

Worker’s Compensation 578

The Judiciary

Listed below are the names and dates of service of the Justices of the High Court of American Samoa during the period covered by this volume of the Digest. The list commences with the first true, permanent justices, and does not include the early justices, who were primarily officers of the United States Navy, pressed into temporary service as justices.

Harry P. Wood, Chief Justice, 1921-1937

Arthur A. Morrow, Chief Justice, 1937-1966

V.G. Roel, Associate Justice, 1963-1966

Joseph W. Goss, Associate Justice, 1966-1970

H. Edward Hydon, Chief Justice, 1966-1968

Donald C. Crothers, Chief Justice, 1968-1972

Leslie N. Jochimsen, Associate Justice, 1971-1975

Chief Justice, 1975-1976

William J. McKnight, III, Chief Justice, 1972-1975

K. William O’Connor, Associate Justice, 1976-1977

Chief Justice, 1977-1978

Richard I. Miyamoto, Associate Justice, 1976-1978

Chief Justice, 1978-1981

Robert Gardner, Chief Justice, 1981-1986

Thomas Murphy, Associate Justice, 1980-1987

Grover Joseph Rees, III, Chief Justice, 1986-1988

Associate Justice, 1988-1991

F. Michael Kruse, Associate Justice, 1987-1988

Chief Justice, 1988-present

Lyle L. Richmond, Associate Justice, 1991-present

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents

3 Separation of Administrative and other Powers

4 Powers & Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officer & Agents

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Due Process

4(3) —Rules and Regulations

4(4) —Agency Interpretation of Rules & Regulations

4(5) —Hearings and Adjudications

5 Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

5(1) —Finality and Exhaustion

5(2) —Procedure

5(3) —Scope of Review

5(4) —Disposition

5(5) —Limitations on Review

ADMIRALTY

§ 1 Jurisdiction and Procedure

2 In Personam and In Rem Actions

3 Preferred Ship Mortgages & Maritime Liens

4 Maritime Contracts

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Leases

4(3) —Employment Contracts

4(4) —Carriage of Goods by Sea

5 Maritime Torts

5(1) —General Principles

5(2) —Negligence

5(3) —Unseaworthiness

5(4) —Maintenance & Cure

5(5) —Limits on Liability

5(6) —Damages

5(6) —Compensation & Recovery

AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL

§ 1 Agency Relationship

1(1) —General Principles

1(2) —Creation

1(3) —Existence

1(4) —Termination

2 Authority of Agent

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —Express Authority

2(3) —Implied Authority

2(4) —Apparent Authority

3 Rights, Duties, and Liabilities

3(1) —Between Principal and Agent

3(2) —Between Principal and Third Person

3(3) —Between Principal and Independent Contractor

3(4) —Between Agent and Third Person

4 Powers of Attorney

AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT

§ 1 The Federal Government, Constitution, & Laws of American Samoa

1(1) —General Principles

1(2) —Territorial Status

1(3) —Applicable Laws

1(4) —Treaties

2 Separation of Powers

3 The Legislature

3(1) —Power and Authority

3(1)(a) —Generally

3(1)(b) —Law-making Powers

3(1)(c) —Duty to Protect Land & Customs

3(1)(d) —Appropriation of Funds

3(1)(e) —Internal Procedural Powers

3(2) —Committees

3(3) —Legislation

4 The Executive

4(1) —The Governor

4(2) —Power and Authority

4(3) —Agencies

4(4) —Administrative Procedures Act

5 The Judiciary

5(1) — Power and Authority

5(2) —Administration of Court

5(3) —Disqualification – Recusal

5(4) —Precedence and Stare Decisis

5(5) —Supervision of Proceedings and Litigation

5(6) —Supervision of Judgments and Settlements

5(7) —Contempt

5(8) —Statutory Construction

6 Sovereign Rights

7 Public Records

8 Government Employees

BANKRUPTCY

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Stay of Proceedings

CIVIL PROCEDURE

§ 1 Jurisdiction

1(1) —General Provisions

1(2) —Personal Jurisdiction

1(3) —Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1(4) —Issues Related to Federal Jurisdiction

1(5) —Bankruptcy

1(6) —Admiralty

1(7) —Right of Action

1(8) —Cause of Action

1(9) —Rules of Civil Procedure Generally

1(10) —Affidavits

2 Service of Process

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —By Publication

2(3) —By Posting

2(4) —Under the JIFSA

3 Pleadings

3(1) —General Provisions

3(2) —Liberal Construction

3(3) —Amending Pleadings

3(4) —Rule 11 Sanctions

4 Pretrial Motions

4(1) —Motion to Dismiss

4(1)(a) —General Provisions

4(1)(b) —Failure to State a Claim – 12(b)(6) Motion

4(1)(c) —Court’s Discretion

4(1)(d) —Compared to Summary Judgment Motion

4(1)(e) —Time for Filing Motion

4(2) —Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

4(2)(a) —Generally

4(2)(b) —Compared to Summary Judgment Motion

4(3) —Motion for More Definite Statement

4(4) —Motion to Strike

4(4)(a) —Generally

4(4)(b) —Relation to Controversy

4(4)(c) —Unduly Prejudicial

4(5) —Dismissal of Actions

4(5)(a) —Generally

4(5)(b) —Voluntary Dismissal by Plaintiff

4(5)(c) —Voluntary Dismissal by Court

4(5)(d) — Failure to Prosecute

4(5)(e) —Time for Filing Motion

4(5)(f) —Costs of Previously Dismissed Action

4(6) —Continuances

5 Parties & Claims

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —Joinder

5(3) —Class Actions

5(4) —Substitution of Parties

5(5) —Interpleader

5(6) —Intervention

5(7) —Consolidation

5(8) —Counterclaims

5(9) —Cross-claims

5(10) —Third Party Practice

5(11) —Bifurcated Proceedings

6 Discovery

6(1) —General Provisions

6(2) —Depositions

6(3) —Interrogatories

6(4) —Productions of Documents & Things

6(5) —Physical and Mental Examinations

6(6) —Requests for Admission

6(7) —Protective Orders

6(8) —Sanctions

7 Summary Judgment

7(1) —Standard

7(2) —Opposition to Motion

7(3) —Compared to 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

7(4) —Compared to Motion for Default Judgment

7(5) —Compared to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

7(6) —Within Court’s Discretion

7(7) —By Affidavit

7(8) —Notice and Hearing

7(9) —Summary Judgment Denied

7(10) —Summary Judgment Granted

7(11) —Appropriate Issues for Summary Judgment

7(12) —Standard of Review

7(13) —Grounds for Appeal

8 Injunctions

8(1) —General Provisions

8(2) —Preliminary Injunctions

8(3) —Injunctions Granted

8(4) —Injunctions Denied

8(5) —Substantial Likelihood of Success

8(6) —Irreparable Injury

8(7) —Permanent Injunctions

8(8) —Compared to Stay Pending Appeal

9 Equitable Remedies

9(1) —General Provisions

9(2) —Estoppel, Unclean Hands

9(3) —Laches

9(4) —Tolling

9(5) ¾Subrogation

9(6) ¾Constructive Trusts

10 Judgments

10(1) ¾Enforcement of Judgments

10(2) ¾Validity of Judgments

10(3) ¾Orders in Aid of Judgment

10(4) ¾Declaratory Judgments

10(5) ¾Default Judgments

10(6) ¾Interlocutory & Collateral Orders

10(7) ¾Res Judicata & Collateral Estoppel

10(8) ¾Merger

11 Post Judgment Motions & Appeals

11(1) —Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration

11(1)(a) —General Provisions

11(1)(b) —Time for Filing

11(1)(c) —Particularity Requirement

11(1)(d) —Grounds for New Trial or Reconsideration

11(2) —Relief from Judgment or Order – Rule 60 Motion

11(3) —Stay of Proceedings

11(3)(a) —General Provisions

11(3)(b) —Likelihood of Appellate Success

11(3)(c) —Irreparable Harm/Balance of Equities

11(3)(d) —Public Interest

11(4) —Appellate Jurisdiction

11(5) —Petition for Rehearing

11(6) —Appellate Procedures

11(6)(a) —Generally

11(6)(b) —Notice of Appeal

11(6)(c) —Appellate Briefs

11(6)(d) —Appellate Motions

11(6)(e) —Failure to Raise Issue Below

11(6)(f) —Transcripts

11(7) —Costs of Appeal

11(8) —Findings of Law – De Novo Review

11(9) —Findings of Fact – Clearly Erroneous

11(10) —Credibility of Evidence and Witnesses

11(11) —Administrative Agency Decisions

11(12) —Abuse of Discretion

11(13) —Harmless and Reversible Error

12 Conflict of Laws

12(1) —Law of the Forum

12(2) —Foreign Courts and Judgments

13 Writs

13(1) —General Provisions

13(2) —Procedural Details

13(3) —Elements

13(3)(a) —Generally

13(3)(b) —Plaintiff’s Specific Legal Right

13(3)(c) —Defendant’s Indisputable Duty

13(3)(d) —Other Avenues of Relief Exhausted

14 Garnishment

15 Alternative Dispute Resolution

15(1) —Mediation

15(2) —Voluntary Arbitration

15(3) —Compulsory Arbitration

15(4) —Condemnation Proceedings

15(5) —Appeal of Arbitrator’s Decision

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 1 Judicial Review

2 Justiciable Case or Controversy

2(1) —Standing

2(2) —Ripeness

2(3) —Mootness

2(4) —Political Questions

2(5) —Advisory Opinions

3 Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation

3(1) —General Provisions

3(2) —Legislative Intent

3(3) —Statutory Construction

3(4) —Conflict of Laws

4 Separation of Powers

5 Full Faith and Credit

6 Due Process

7 Individual Rights

7(1) —Generally

7(2) —Equal Protection

7(3) —Freedom of Speech, Press, and Religion

7(4) —Takings and Just Compensation

7(5) —Cruel and Unusual Punishment

7(6) —Discrimination

8 Contracts

9 Habeas Corpus

CONTRACTS

§ 1 Contract Formation

1(1) —Meeting of the Minds

1(2) —Consideration

1(3) —Offer and Acceptance

1(4) —Requirement of a Writing: The Statute of Frauds

1(5) —Quasi Contract

1(6) —Conditions Precedent and Subsequent

2 Responsibilities and Authority of Parties Forming a Contract

2(1) —Authority

2(2) —Requirement of Capacity

2(3) —Duties of Parties

2(4) —Third Party Beneficiaries

2(5) —Assignment of Rights

2(6) —Delegation of Duties

2(7) —Fiduciary Duties

2(8) —Warranties

3 Unenforceability

3(1) —Public Policy

3(2) —Fraud

3(3) —Unfairness and Unconscionability

3(4) —Mistake and Impossibility

3(5) —Misrepresentation

3(6) —Illegality

3(7) —Impossibility

3(8) —Impracticability

3(9) —Frustration of Purpose

3(10) —Voidable Contracts

3(11) —Void Contracts

3(12) —Undue Influence

4 Contract Modification

4(1) —General Principles

4(2) —Oral Modification

4(3) —Written Modification

4(4) —Ratification

4(5) —Novation

4(6) —Mutual Rescission

4(7) —Waiver

4(8) —Repudiation

4(9) —Cancellation

4(10) —Acquiescence

5 Contract Interpretation

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —The Uniform Commercial Code

5(3) —The Parole Evidence Rule

5(4) —Plain Meaning Rule

5(5) —Ambiguous Terms

5(6) —Custom & Usage

5(7) —Additional Terms

5(8) —Different Terms

5(9) —CIF Contract Terms

5(10) —Choice of Law Provisions

6 Performance and Breach

6(1) —Breach Generally

6(2) —Material Breach

6(3) —Substantial Performance

6(4) —Partial Performance

6(5) —Divisible Contracts

6(6) —Anticipatory Repudiation

6(7) —Accord & Satisfaction

6(8) —Duty to Mitigate

7 Remedies

7(1) —Statute of Limitations

7(2) —Specific Performance and Injunctions

7(3) —General Measure of Damages

7(4) —Quantum Meruit

7(5) —Liquidated Damages

7(6) —Exemplary Damages

7(7) —Reformation

7(8) —Promissory Estoppel

7(9) —Punitive Damages

7(10) —Attorney Fees

8 Types of Contracts

8(1) —Oral Agreements

8(2) —Bailment Contracts

8(3) —Consignment Contracts

8(4) —Written Contracts

CORPORATION AND PARTNERSHIP

§ 1 Formation of Corporations

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Distinct Corporate Name

1(3) —Who May Incorporate

1(4) —Fees Required for Incorporation

1(5) —Organizational Meeting

2 Preincorporation Transactions

3 Limited Liability & the Corporate Entity

3(1) —Generally

3(2) —Piercing the Corporate Veil

4 Corporate Financial Structure

4(1) —Generally

4(2) —Books & Accounts

4(3) —Shares

4(4) —Dividends

5 Corporate Management Structure

5(1) —Generally

5(2) —Incorporators

5(3) —Shareholders

5(4) —Officers & Directors

5(5) —Duties of Management

5(6) —Business Judgment Rule

5(7) —Management Compensation

5(8) —Shareholders Meetings

5(9) —Board Meetings

5(10) —Election/Voting Procedures

5(11) —Dissenters & Their Rights

5(12) —Corporate Counsel

6 Types of Corporations

6(1) ¾Generally

6(2) ¾Closely Held Corporation

6(3) ¾Public Corporation

6(4) ¾Foreign Corporations

6(5) ¾Eleemosynary Corporations

6(6) ¾Cooperative Corporations

7 Corporate Powers & Prohibitions

7(1) ¾General Provisions

7(2) ¾Powers

7(3) ¾Transfers of Land

7(4) ¾Prohibitions

8 The Corporation & Litigation

8(1) ¾Generally

8(2) ¾Shareholder Suits

8(3) ¾Third Party Suits

9 Organic Changes: Amendments, Mergers and Dissolution

9(1) —General Provisions

9(2) —Amending Formative Documents

9(3) —Merger

9(4) —Dissolution of the Corporation

10 Partnerships

10(1) —General Provisions

10(2) —Formation

10(3) —Service on a Partnership

10(4) —Dissolution of Partnership

10(5) —Liability for Partnership Debts

CRIMINAL LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Liability

2(1) —Mens Rea (Intent)

2(2) —Actus Reus

2(3) —Causation

3 Defenses

3(1) —Generally

3(2) —Insanity

3(3) —Provocation

3(4) —Self-Defense

3(5) —Justification

4 Specific Crimes

4(1) —Inchoate Offenses

4(2) —Offenses Against the Person

4(3) —Sexual Offenses

4(4) —Prostitution

4(5) —Offenses Against the Family

4(6) —Abortion

4(7) —Robbery, Arson, Burglary and Related Offenses

4(8) —Stealing and Related Offenses

4(9) —Weapons

4(10) —Gambling

4(11) —Pornography and Related Offenses

4(12) —Offenses Against Public Order

4(13) —Offenses Against the Administration of Justice

4(14) —Offenses Affecting Government

4(15) —Traffic Offenses

4(16) —Drug Offenses

4(17) —Miscellaneous Offenses

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 1 Rules of Criminal Procedure

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Jurisdiction

1(3) —Prosecutorial Discretion

2 Criminal Complaints, Indictments and Bills of Information

2(1) —Generally

2(2) —Indictments

2(3) —Amending Information

2(4) —Sufficiency of Information

2(5) —Arguments Inconsistent with Information

2(6) —Bill of Particulars

2(7) —Probable Cause Determination

2(8) —Multiplicitous Charging

2(9) —Pro Se Pleadings

3 Pleas

3(1) —Generally

3(2) —Court’s Duties

3(3) —Sufficient Factual Basis

3(4) —Voluntarily Made

3(5) —Interpretation of Plea Agreements

3(6) —Breach of Plea Agreements

3(7) —Withdrawal of Pleas

4 Parties & Procedure

4(1) —Bifurcated Proceedings

4(2) —Severance of Charges or Defendants

4(3) —Joinder of Offenses

4(4) —Joinder of Defendants

5 Pre-Trial Matters

5(1) —Generally

5(2) —Initial Appearance

5(3) —Continuances

5(4) —Competence to Stand Trial

5(5) —Motions to Suppress Evidence

5(6) —Pre-Trial Conferences

5(7) —Notice of Alibi

5(8) —Defense Based on Mental Condition

5(9) —Notice of Intent to Use Evidence

5(10) —Release from Custody

5(11) —Discovery Generally

5(12) —Depositions

5(13) —Disclosure of Information & Witnesses

5(14) —Witness Identifications

5(15) —Subpoena of Witnesses

5(16) —Juveniles

5(17) —Collateral Estoppel

5(18) —Failure to Prosecute

5(19) —Immunity from Prosecution

5(20) —Change of Venue

6 Trial

6(1) —Bifurcated Proceedings

6(2) —Due Process of Law

6(3) —Equal Protection

6(4) —Double Jeopardy

6(5) —Self Incrimination

6(6) —Right to a Speedy Trial

6(7) —Trial by Jury

6(8) —Right to a Public Trial

6(9) —Opening and Closing Arguments

6(10) —Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

6(11) —Mistrial

6(12) —Jury Instructions

6(13) —Sufficiency of the Evidence

6(14) —Record of Proceedings

7 Punishment and Sentencing

7(1) —General Provisions

7(2) —Cruel & Unusual Punishment

7(3) —Constitutional Restrictions on Prisons

7(4) —Deportation

7(5) —Probation

7(5)(a) —Generally

7(5)(b) —Terms of Probation

7(5)(c) —Conditions of Probation

7(6) —Parole

7(7) —Parole Revocation

7(8) —Conditions upon Release

7(9) —Work Release

8 Post-Verdict Motions

8(1) — Motion for New Trial

8(2) —Motion for Arrest of Judgment

8(3) —Motion to Vacate Sentence

8(4) —Motion to Correct or Reduce Sentence

8(5) —Stays of Proceedings

8(6) —Habeas Corpus & Conditions of Confinement

8(7) —Miscellaneous Motions

9 Appeals

9(1) —Generally

9(2) —Power of Appellate Court

9(3) —Time for Appeal

9(4) —Appellate Jurisdiction

9(5) —Good Faith

9(6) —Right to Appeal

9(7) —Appellate Standards of Review

10 Interrogation and Miranda

10(1) —Generally

10(2) —Custody

10(3) —Interrogation

10(4) —Waiver of Rights

10(5) — Invoking Miranda Rights

10(6) —Evidence Obtained in Violation of Miranda

11 Searches & Seizures

11(1) —Generally

11(2) —Privacy Expectations

11(3) —Probable Cause for Search Warrant

11(4) —Execution of Search Warrant

11(5) —Knock and Announce Rule

11(6) —Warrantless Searches

11(7) —Terry Stops

11(8) —Vehicle and Inventory Searches

11(9) —Border and Custom Searches

11(10) —Consensual Searches

11(11) —Search Incident to Arrest

11(12) —Plain View Doctrine

11(13) —Open Fields Doctrine & Curtilage

11(14) —Application of Exclusionary Rule

11(15) —Arrests

11(16) —Detention of Foreign Nationals

12 Counsel

12(1) —General Provisions

12(2) —Right to Counsel

12(3) —Effective Assistance of Counsel

12(4) —Prosecutorial Misconduct

13 Extradition

13(1) —General Provisions

13(2) —Extradition Proceedings

13(3) —of Witneses

13(4) —Evidence

ELECTIONS

§ 1 General Provisions

1(1) —Election Commissioner

2 Registration

2(1) —Generally

2(2) —Appeals

3 Issues – Candidates

3(1) —Nomination of Candidates

3(2) —Challenging of Candidates

3(3) —Certification of Winning Candidate

3(4) —Appeal to High Court

5 Voting Procedures

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Illiterate & Disabled

6 Election Contests

5(1) —Tie Vote

5(2) —Contests for Cause – Generally

5(3) —Contests for Cause – Filing Complaint

6 Elections Offenses

7 Senate Elections

7(1) —Election Procedures

7(2) —Appeal to High Court

EMPLOYMENT LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Hiring And Firing

2(1) — “At Will” Employment

2(2) —Just Cause Termination

2(3) —Wrongful Termination

3 Independent Contractors

4 Government Employees

5 National Labor Relations Board

6 Wages

7 Workmen’s Compensation

8 Fair Labor Standards Act

8(1) —Generally

8(2) —Right of Action

8(3) —Applicability of the FLSA

8(4) —“Opting In” Under the FLSA

8(5) —Rights Provided

8(5)(a) —Generally

8(5)(b) —Rate of Pay

8(5)(c) —Relating to Involvement in Suit

8(6) —Remedies Under the FLSA

9 Remedies

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Standing & Jurisdictional Requirements

3 Coasts & Waters

3(1) ¾General Provisions

3(2) ¾Water Quality

3(3) ¾Coastal Rules & Regulations

EVIDENCE

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Judicial Notice

3 Presumptions

3(1) ¾General Civil Actions

3(2) ¾Land & Titles Division

3(3) —Matai

3(4) ¾Criminal Cases

3(5) ¾Extradition Proceedings

4 Relevance

4(1) ¾General Definition

4(2) ¾Admissibility

4(3) ¾Exclusion of Relevant Evidence

4(4) ¾Inadmissible Character Evidence

4(5) ¾Methods of Proving Character

4(6) ¾Habit; Routine Practice

4(7) ¾Subsequent Remedial Measures

4(8) ¾Compromise and Offers to Compromise

4(9) ¾Payment of Expenses

4(10) ¾Pleas, Plea Discussions

4(11) ¾Liability Insurance

4(12) ¾Victim Behavior in Rape Cases

5 Privileges

5(1) ¾Generally

5(2) ¾Marital Communications

5(3) ¾Lawyer-Client Communications

5(4) ¾Physician-Patient Relationship

5(5) ¾Governmental Secrets

6 Witnesses

6(1) ¾General Rule of Competency

6(2) ¾Credibility and Impeachment

6(3) ¾Form of Direct Examination

6(4) ¾Cross Examination

6(5) ¾Written Document to Refresh Memory

6(6) ¾Prior Statements of Witnesses

6(7) ¾Exclusion of Witnesses

6(8) ¾Witness Fees

7 Opinions and Expert Testimony

7(1) ¾Generally

7(2) ¾Opinions by Lay Witnesses

7(3) ¾Expert Testimony

7(4) ¾Bases of Expert Testimony

8 Hearsay

8(1) ¾General Rule

8(2) ¾Exceptions When Declarant Available

8(2)(a) —General Provisions

8(2)(b) —Present Sense Impression

8(2)(c) —Excited Utterance

8(2)(d) —Then Existing Condition

8(2)(e) —Statements for Medical Purposes

8(2)(f) —Past Recollection Recorded

8(2)(g) —Records of Regularly Conducted Activity

8(2)(h) —Public Records & Reports

8(2)(i) —Vital Statistic Records

8(2)(j) —Religious Organization Records

8(2)(k) —Marriage & Baptismal Certificates

8(2)(l) —Family Records

8(2)(m) —Records Affecting an Interest in Property

8(2)(n) —Ancient Documents

8(2)(o) —Market Reports & Compilations

8(2)(p) —Learned Treatises

8(2)(q) —Reputation of Family History

8(2)(r) —Reputation of Boundaries

8(2)(s) —Reputation of Character

8(2)(t) —Judgment of Prior Conviction

8(2)(u) —Judgment as to History

8(3) ¾Exceptions When Declarant Unavailable

8(3)(a) —General Provisions

8(3)(b) —Former Testimony

8(3)(c) —Dying Declaration

8(3)(d) —Statement Against Interest

8(3)(e) —Statement of Personal, Family History

8(4) ¾Hearsay Within Hearsay

9 Authentication and Identification

9(1) ¾General Rule

9(2) ¾Self-Authentication

10 Contents of Writings, Recordings & Photographs

10(1) ¾Generally

10(2) ¾ Best Evidence Rule

10(3) ¾ Duplicates

10(4) ¾Other Evidence of Lost, Unobtainable, or Other Documents

10(5) ¾Public Records

10(6) ¾Summaries

10(7) ¾Admission of Party

FAMILY LAW

§ 1 Marriage

1(1) —Validity

1(2) —Annulment

2 Divorce

2(1) ¾Grounds

2(2) ¾Property Distribution

2(3) ¾Child Custody

2(3)(a) —General Provisions

2(3)(b) —Jurisdiction

2(3)(c) —Considerations in Awarding Custody

2(4) —Child Support

2(5) ¾Service of Process

2(6) ¾Residency Requirement

3 Children & Minors

3(1) ¾General Provisions

3(2) —Involuntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights – Termination

3(2)(a) —General Provisions

3(2)(b) —Protections for Parents

3(2)(c) —Best Interests of the Child

3(3) ¾Voluntary Relinquishment of Parental Rights – Adoption

3(3)(a) —General Provisions

3(3)(b) —Samoan Custom Adoptions

3(3)(c) —Protections for Parents

3(3)(d) —Best Interests of the Child

3(3)(e) —Legal Status After Adoption

3(4) —Guardianships

3(5) —Rights in Court

4 Legitimacy & Inheritance

5 Family Purpose Doctrine

6 Records

IMMIGRATION

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Immigration Board

3 Exclusion

4 Deportation

4(1) ¾General Provisions

4(2) ¾Procedures

4(3) ¾Grounds

4(4) ¾Stay of Order

5 Sponsors

INSURANCE

§ 1 Insurance Commissioner & General Insurer Requirements

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Commissioner’s Authority & Duties

1(3) —Certificates to Transact Insurance

1(4) —Statutory Deposits

1(5) —Orders of the Commissioner

1(6) —Withdrawal from American Samoa

1(7) —Agents & Brokers

1(8) —Bailees as Insurers

2 Policy as a Contract

2(1) —Generally

2(2) —Warranties

2(3) —Interpretation

2(4) —Modification

2(5) —Termination

2(6) —Cancellation

2(7) —Warranties

2(8) —Misrepresentation

2(9) —Applicable Law

3 Parties & Interests

3(1) —General Provisions

3(2) —Role & Authority of Agent

3(3) —Insured’s Duties

3(4) —Insurer’s Duties

3(4)(a) —Generally

3(4)(b) —Duty to Pay

3(4)(c) —Good Faith Attempt to Resolve Dispute

3(4)(d) —Duty to Act on Application

3(5) —Insurer’s Right of Subrogation

3(6) —Beneficiaries

3(7) —Insurable Interests

3(8) —Transfer of Insured Property

3(9) —Reinsurance

3(10) —Double Insurance

3(11) —Stacking Benefits

3(12) —Statutory Right to Sue

4 Coverage

4(1) —Policy Terms & Limitations

4(2) —Proof of Loss

4(3) —Measure of Recovery

4(4) —Exclusions & Exceptions

4(5) —Public Policy Prevent Recovery

5 Automobile Insurance

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —Liability

5(3) —Permission by Owner

5(4) —Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists

6 Liability Insurance

7 Property Insurance

INTERNATIONAL LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Comity

1(3) —Jurisdictional Immunities for Foreign States Act

2 Air Transportation

2(1) —Generally

2(2) —Applicability

2(3) —Baggage Claims

3 International Banking

4 Customs

4(1) —General Principles

4(2) —Applicable Law

4(3) —Searches & Seizures

LEGAL PROFESSION

§ 1 The Office of Attorney

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Public Service

1(3) —Special Role of Prosecutor

2 Scope of Representation

3 Duty to Client

3(1) —General Provisions

3(2) —Conflict of Interest

3(3) —Malpractice

3(4) —Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

4 Duty to Court

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Sanctions

4(3) —Contempt of Court

5 Compensation

5(1) —Compensation From Client

5(2) —Litigation Expenses

6 Practice of Law Without a License

MATAI TITLE DISPUTES

§ 1 Territorial Registrar Procedures

2 Procedural Rules

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —Exempt from Rules of Civil Procedure

2(3) —Judges & Justices

2(4) —Family Meeting Requirement

2(5) —Counterclaims

2(6) —Retrials

2(7) —Stays of Proceedings

3 Appellate Review

4 Traditional Determination of Matai

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Split Titles

4(3) —Joint Title Holders

4(4) —Holding Two Titles

5 Initial Qualifications for Title

6 Statutory Qualifications for Title

6(1) —General Provisions

6(2) —Best Hereditary Right

6(3) —Clan Support

6(4) —Forcefulness, Character & Personality, Knowledge of Customs

6(5) —Value to Family, Village and County

7 Priority of Statutory Criteria

8 Determination of Prevailing Candidate

9 Enforcement of Matai Title Decisions

10 Removal of Matai

REAL PROPERTY

§ 1 Public Lands

1(1) —Generally

1(2) —Cession

1(3) —Eminent Domain

1(3)(a) —Generally

1(3)(b) —Notice and Hearing

1(3)(c) —Arbitrated Condemnation Proceedings

1(4) —Leases

2 Communal Lands

2(1) —Public Policy

2(2) —Evidence of Communal Ownership

2(3) —Role of Matai

2(4) —Assignment of Land to Family Members

2(4)(a) —Generally

2(4)(b) —Occupation, Cultivation & Use

2(4)(c) —Evictions & Revocation of Assignments

2(4)(d) —Registration Rights

2(4)(e) —Injunctions

2(4)(f) —Tautua (service) Obligation

2(5) —Separation-of-Structure Agreement

2(6) —Leases

2(7) —Conveyance

2(8) —Relinquishment of Land

2(9) —Mediation Requirement

3 Individually Owned Land

4 Evidence of Ownership

4(1) —Generally

4(2) —First Occupancy Claims

4(3) —Clearing and Planting

4(4) —Possession and Use

4(5) —Family Tradition and Reputation

4(6) —Records and Documents

4(7) —Hearsay

5 Adverse Possession

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —Elements

2(2)(a) —Generally

2(2)(b) —Actual Possession

2(2)(c) —Open & Notorious Possession

2(2)(d) —Exclusive Possession

2(2)(e) —Hostile Possession

2(2)(f) —Duration Requirement

2(2)(g) —Continuous & Uninterrupted Possession

5(3) —Tacking

6 Quieting Title

6(1) —Generally

6(2) —Burden of Proof

7 Alienation of Land

7(1) —Protective Policy

7(2) —Relation to Mortgages & Creditors

7(3) —Oral Conveyances

7(4) —Void Conveyances

7(5) —Dedication of Land

7(6) —Gifts

7(7) —Requirement of a Writing

8 Registration of Land

8(1) —General Provisions

8(2) —Land & Titles Division

8(3) —Statutory Requirements – Announcements and Notice

8(4) —Burden of Proof

8(5) —Survey and Description Requirements

8(6) —Objection to Registration

8(7) —Finality of Judgments

9 License to Use Land

9(1) —Generally

9(2) —Creation of License

9(3) —Rights Created by License

9(4) —Mortgages

9(5) —Termination

10 Easements

10(1) —General Provisions

10(2) —Prescriptive Easements

10(3) —Implied Easements

10(4) —Servitudes

11 Covenants

12 Encroachments & Encumbrances

13 Boundaries

13(1) —General Provisions

13(2) —Monuments & Markers

13(3) —Evidence

13(4) —Ambiguous Deeds

14 Property Torts

14(1) —Trespass

14(2) —Damages for Trespass

14(3) —Negligence

15 Equitable Claims

15(1) —Equitable Title

15(2) —Injunctions

15(3) —Good Faith Possessor

15(4) —Estoppel

15(5) —Constructive Trusts

16 Rights of Co-Owners

16(1) —Possession and Use of Common Estate

16(2) —Partition

17 Landlord-Tenant

17(1) —Generally

17(2) —Terms and Conditions of Lease

17(3) —Modification of Lease

17(4) —Assignment of Lease

17(5) —Responsibilities of Landlord

17(6) —Responsibilities of Tenant

17(7) —Rescission or Cancellation

17(8) —Eviction

17(9) —Authority to Lease

17(10) —Damages for Breach

17(11) —Tenants at Will

17(12) —Improvements

17(13) —Abandonment

17(14) —Fixtures

18 Zoning

18(1) —Zoning Variance

18(2) —Zoning Board

19 Riparian Rights

20 National Park of American Samoa

RELIGION

§ 1 Church Governance

2 Congregational Church

3 Constitutional Issues

4 Dedication of Land

SAMOAN CUSTOMS

§ 1 Impact on American Samoa Laws

2 Criminal Law

3 Family Law

3(1) —Family Membership

3(2) —Adoption

3(3) —Burial Grounds

4 Property Rights

5 Ceremonies

6 Samoan Language

7 Village Councils

8 Matai

8(1) —General Provisions

8(2) —General Pule or Authority

8(3) —Pule over Communal Land

8(4) —Family’s Obligation of Service

8(5) —Removal

9 Elections

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

§ 1 Common Law

1(1) —General Provisions

1(2) —Common Law Pledge

2 Security Interests & Priority of Claims

3 Election of Remedies Rule

4 Debtor Default

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Acceleration Clause

4(3) —Debtor Fraud

4(4) —Debtor Defenses

5 Repossession of Property

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —Creditor’s Retention of Repossessed Collateral

6 Creditor Sale

7 Garnishment of Funds

8 Guaranty

9 Third Party Debtor

10 Letter of Credit Transactions

11 Mortgages

12 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits

13 Banking and Loans

13(1) —In General

13(2) —Suits Against Bank

13(3) —Student Loans

14 National Credit Union Administration Board

TAXATION

§ 1 Incorporation of Federal Tax Law

2 Procedural Issues

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —Statutes of Limitations

2(3) —Jurisdiction

2(4) —Taxpayer Interviews

3 Specific Taxes

3(1) —Estate Taxes

3(2) —Excise Taxes

3(3) —Gift Taxes

3(4) —Income Tax

3(5) —Property Taxes

3(6) —Taxation of Awards or Settlements

4 Collection

5 Refunds & Credits

5(1) —Refunds

5(2) —Credits

6 Power of Levy, Distraint & Tax Liens

7 Marital Deduction

8 Sovereign Immunity

8(1) —Prohibited Suits

8(2) —Permitted Suits

8(3) —Required Procedure

9 Taxpayer Offenses

9(1) — Failure to File

9(2) — Failure to Pay

9(3) — Taxpayer Omissions

9(4) —Reliance on Professional Advice

10 Deficiency Proceedings

10(1) —Notice Requirement

11 Industrial Incentive Act

11(1) —Tax Exemption Policy Generally

11(2) —Authority of Governor, Board

11(3) —Proof of Public Interest

11(4) —Constitutionality

TORTS

§ 1 Negligence

1(1) —Duty

1(2) —Breach

1(3) —Causation

1(4) —Negligence Per Se

1(5) —Res Ipsa Loquitur

2 Intentional Torts

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —Defamation

2(3) —Trespass

2(4) —Malicious Prosecution

2(5) —Conversion

2(6) —Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

3 Strict Liability

4 Nuisance

5 Attractive Nuisance

6 Liability for Animals

7 Malpractice

7(1) —General Provisions

7(2) —Legal Profession

7(3) —Architects

7(4) —Medical Profession

8 Vicarious Liability

8(1) —Vehicle Owners

8(2) —Family Purpose Doctrine

8(3) —Compulsory Insurance Act

8(4) —Employers

9 Common Carrier Liability

10 Government Tort Liability Act

10(1) —General Provisions

10(2) —Relation to Government Employee Suit

10(3) —Statute of Limitations

10(4) —Administrative Claim Requirement

11 Wrongful Death

12 Loss of Filial Consortium

13 Bailments

13(1) —Rights, Duties & Liabilities Between Bailor and Bailee

13(2) —Rights and Duties Between Bailor or Bailee & Third Person

13(3) —Conversion of Subject Matter

14 Comparative & Contributory Negligence

15 Joint and Several Liability

15(1) —General Provisions

15(2) —Effect of Release of One Tortfeasor

15(3) —Determining Liability

15(4) —Compensation by One Defendant

16 Indemnity

17 Subrogation

18 Damages

18(1) —General Provisions

18(2) —Pain and Suffering

18(3) —Medical Expenses

18(4) —Lost Wages and Profits

18(5) —Damages to Personal Property

18(6) —Mitigation of Damages

18(7) —Punitive, Exemplary, or Special Damages

18(8) —Interest

18(9) —Collateral Source Rule

18(10) —Effect of Preexisting Conditions

18(11) —Compensatory Damages

18(12) —Nominal Damages

18(13) —Restoration Cost Damages

18(14) —Treble Damages

18(15) —Attorney Fees

19 Statutes of Limitations

19(1) —General Provisions

19(2) —Accrual of Cause of Action

19(3) —Personal Injuries

19(4) —Minors and Insane Persons

20 Burden of Proof

21 Act of God

WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

§ 1 Execution

1(1) —General Provisions

1(2) —Lost Wills

2 Interpretation

3 Procedural Issues

4 Modification or Change

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Ademption

4(3) —Dependent Relative Revocation

5 Inheritance

5(1) —General Provisions

5(2) —Intestate Succession

5(3) —Adopted Children

5(4) —Marital Inheritance

6 Inter Vivos Conveyance or Gift

7 General Legacies and Devises

7(1) —General Provisions

7(2) —Conditions and Restrictions on Legacies and Devises

8 Individually-Owned Property

9 Administration

9(1) —General Provisions

9(2) —Letters of Administration

9(3) —Trustees & Beneficiaries

10 Taxation

11 Fiduciaries

11(1) —General Provisions

11(2) —Fiduciaries for Minors

11(3) —Related to Trusts

12 Small Estates

13 Future Interests & Rule Against Perpetuities

14 Wrongful Death

15 Power of Attorney

WORKER’S COMPENSATION

§ 1 Purpose and Origin

2 Commission Procedure

3 Injury

3(1) —Date of Injury

3(2) —Type of Injury

4 Compensation Award

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Wages

4(3) —Exclusive Remedy

5 Burden of Proof

6 Employer Liability

6(1) —General Provisions

6(2) —Employer Subrogation

6(3) —Settlement Agreements

6(4) —Release

7 Medical Care

8 Judicial Review

9 Beneficiaries

10 Costs in a Worker’s Compensation Proceeding

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

§ 1 General Provisions

2 Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents

3 Separation of Administrative and other Powers

4 Powers & Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers & Agents

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Due Process

4(3) —Rules and Regulations

4(4) —Agency Interpretation of Rules & Regulations

4(5) —Hearings and Adjudications

5 Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

5(1) —Finality and Exhaustion

5(2) —Procedure

5(3) —Scope of Review

5(4) —Disposition

5(5) —Limitations on Review

§ 1 General Provisions

Because the Governor has general supervision and control of all executive departments, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, personnel decisions are subject to his direction as long as his actions are in accordance with applicable territorial and federal laws and rules. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa Art. II, § 7; A.S.C.A. § 7.0110; A.S.A.C. §§ 4.0102, 4.0111(b). Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 14.

When the government makes rules to govern the conduct of its affairs, it must abide by those rules and act within its authority. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 14.

Constitutional statutory authority is always paramount to administrative rule authority. Vaella’a v. Sunia, 1 A.S.R.3d 134 (Trial Div. 1997).

The authority, powers, and duties of the Administrative Law Judge are administrative in nature and limited to legitimate Executive branch functions. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 2 Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents

SEE AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT § 4(3) – AGENCIES

An agency’s head may only reassign an employee involuntarily with the concurrence of the Director of Human Resources and with a finding that the reassignment be in the best interests of the government; failure to follow the regulatory standard is arbitrary and an error of law. A.S.C.A. § 4.1044(6); A.S.A.C. § 4.0804(b). Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.

If done within the scope and by the apparent authority of a de jure public officer, a de facto public officer’s acts are binding on third parties; it is as if the de facto public officer were legally selected, qualified and in possession of the office. Toilolo v. Poti, 24 A.S.R.2d 1.

Under A.S.C.A. §§ 12.0205 and 12.0206 the Legislature created the office of procurement and the position of chief procurement officer, and specified certain credentials for such officer, who is appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Legislature. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 10 (App. Div. 1998).

The Administrative Law Judge Act of 1998 transferred the final administrative agency hearing authority of the Personnel Advisory Board to the Administrative Law Judge. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 3 Separation of Administrative and other Powers

SEE AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT § 2 – SEPARATION OF POWERS

Administrative board, given statutory authority to advise agency and to perform such duties as governor assigns, had no authority to issue binding personnel decisions absent explicit grant, especially when Code sets forth hiring and termination procedures that do not involve board. Banks v. American Samoa Gov’t, 4 A.S.R.2d 113.

As adequate safeguards exist to inform the Director of Administrative Services of the natural “termination” of insurance policies by expiration of the policy period, the legislature did not intend the statute requiring an insurer to notify the Director at least ten days prior to “cancellation” of a policy to apply to “terminations.” A.S.C.A. § 22.2013. Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.

Under statute providing that blank forms for petitions required of candidates for elective office should be distributed by election officer, and also providing that eligibility of candidates should be determined after they had filed the required petitions, election officer had no authority to withhold blank forms from a prospective candidate whom he did not did not believe to be eligible for election. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0301(b),(d). Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d 81.

Under territorial immigration statute, the immigration board determines only whether an alien is deportable; the decision actually to deport a deportable alien is within the discretion of the attorney general. A.S.C.A. § 41.0616. Leti v. Immigration Board, 8 A.S.R.2d 107.

Order of deportation must be made by the Attorney General. A.S.C.A. § 41.0616. Rakhshan v. Immigration Board, 15 A.S.R.2d 29.

The Attorney General’s Office may not simultaneously act as both counsel and legal advisor to a government agency. A.S.C.A. § 4.1034. Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.

The American Samoa Procurement Act of 1983, A.S.C.A. §§ 12.0201-.0219, carefully proscribes a system of government purchasing so as to ensure predictability and fairness, and the integrity of this system is disturbed when the Governor acts as chief procurement officer. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 10 (App. Div. 1998).

Where the Governor commingles the powers of separate offices, he exceeds the scope of his constitutional and legislatively granted powers, to the prejudice of substantial rights of an affected party, and a decision by the Governor acting as chief procurement officer to award a contract must be reversed. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 10 (App. Div. 1998).

§ 4 Powers and Proceedings of Administrative Agencies, Officers and Agents

§ 4(1) —General Provisions

Agency jurisdiction is generally the power granted to a particular department, board or commission of government to effectively administer the laws enacted by the Legislature under that agency’s authority. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

The Administrative Procedures Act of 1969 (A.S.C.A. § 4.1001 et seq) establishes the general procedures which all A.S.G. departments, boards, and commissions must follow when empowered to act as agencies with rule-making or contested case decision making authority. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

According to A.S.C.A. § 4.1032(5), administrative hearings are conducted by a “hearings officer”, otherwise known as an “administrative law judge”. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

The Administrative Procedures Act affords an aggrieved party the right, upon exhausting the administrative decision making process, to limited judicial review of an agency’s final decision by the Appellate Division of the High Court. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Although the Legislature has the limited, constitutional authority to replace certain judicial proceedings with administrative contested case proceedings, it may not invest an administrative hearings officer with more than quasi-judicial authority. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

An A.L.J. cannot conduct an original contested case proceeding under the A.P.A. by conducting a “trial de novo” under judicial branch rules and procedures. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

A “trial de novo” can only be conducted by the A.L.J. where there was a prior administrative decision or hearing and the A.L.J. has been specifically authorized by constitutionally enacted legislation to conduct and decide a final administrative hearing on a contested case. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

If compatible with the rules and statutes creating or implementing the agency, the A.L.J. may, as allowed under § 4.0602(a) of the Act, hear and decide contested cases in original proceedings. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

If the Legislature has directed by statute the final agency decision-making power to be exercised only by a superior agency officer, such as its director, or by its governing board, commission or chief officer thereof, the A.L.J. is allowed only to hear and recommend a decision in a contested case with the agency director, board, etc. so that the agency head can make a final, informed, agency decision as mandated by law. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

The A.L.J. Act confers authority to the O.A.L.J. to conduct de novo hearings in those limited situations where the A.L.J. has been clearly designated by the Legislature as the final administrative agency decision maker. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

In contested matters brought before an agency having subject matter administrative jurisdiction over the dispute, where the Administrative Law Judge has not been designated by the Legislature as the final administrative agency decision maker, the A.L.J. functions as an agency hearings officer and conducts hearings under the A.P.A. or such special statutes or rules which apply to that particular agency. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 4(2) —Due Process

SEE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7(1) – DUE PROCESS

Argument that license was “revoked” without procedural due process was unfounded where evidence shows license was never granted. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

In order to have a cognizable claim for deprivation of procedural due process, one must first possess a “liberty” or “property” interest in the government action complained of. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Procedural due process requirements are not fixed, but vary with circumstances and particular demands of the case; however, some sort of notice and hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Notice and hearing afforded to satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

To satisfy requirement of procedural due process, opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, but need not always be granted prior to the initial deprivation of property. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Ordinarily, due process is satisfied by proceedings less than a full evidentiary hearing prior to adverse administrative action, and the sufficiency of such proceedings is to be determined in light of 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and 3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would impose. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Procedural due process is satisfied by piecemeal proceedings wherein parties were advised of the required showing, the proofs were considered promptly by the regulating agency, parties were advised of the agency’s findings of insufficiency, parties submitted further proofs, agency considered proofs and again advised parties that such proof was insufficient, agency did not issue a denial and remained open to further submission of proofs. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. V. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard are not triggered until adverse administrative action constituting a “final” deprivation of property has taken place. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Recurring and intentionally dilatory tactics by agency may constitute “final” action sufficient to trigger due process requirements of notice and hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

The expected benefit of a license which issues subject to articulated standards of qualification is a property interest giving rise to due process protection, although not to the full range of pre-deprivation procedural protections applicable to entitlements that are less contingent than the expectation of a license. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Because in most cases licensing will be a straightforward process, quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing in all licensing proceedings would needlessly increase government expenditures and such hearings are required only where the proposed action on a license application will be final. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2., A.S.C.A. § 31.1508. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Both the territorial Administrative Procedure Act and the Department of Public Safety’s Standard Operating Procedure, a statement of internal management not defined as an administrative rule under the APA, afford a person under investigation the basic due-process rights of notice of the hearing, including a concise statement of allegations, and a right to a hearing at which there is an opportunity to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved, and conduct cross-examination. A.S.C.A §§ 4.1025, 4.1026; SOP §§ 4.1.3, 4.1.4. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 50.

As long as the claimant has notice and an opportunity to be heard, the claimant has been afforded adequate procedural due process. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where employee was not given advance notice of the charges against him such that he could gather evidence and solicit witness testimony to present defense, such procedure did not substantially comport with the requirements of procedural due process. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, hearings are to be conducted under minimal due process requirements and relaxed rules of procedure and evidence, which are set forth in A.S.C.A. §§ 4.2025-4.1037. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 4(3) —Rules and Regulations

Administrative code provision purporting to free territorial utility from liability for any damages attributable to the presence of the utility’s property on consumer’s premises, was inconsistent with statute providing that utility could be sued, especially in light of public policy that provisions purporting to absolve the drafting party from liability for its own negligence should be strictly construed. A.S.A.C. § 12.0207(b). Fa’avae v. American Samoa Power Authority, 5 A.S.R.2d 53.

Administrative rule allowing rejection of bids on account of ambiguities in the solicitation, if construed to allow rejection of a bid which was clearly the low one on account of an ambiguity in the solicitation that had been cured by the bids themselves, would violate competitive bidding statute prohibiting changes prejudicial to fair competition. A.S.A.C. § 10.0232; A.S.C.A. § 12.0211. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

ASG regulations which set out those situations in which non-competitive procedures are applicable do not supersede the mandatory statutory requirement relating to the utilization of an applicant supply-file system for the hiring and promotion of government employees. A.S.C.A. §§ 7.0204(b), 7.0205(b), 7.0206; A.S.A.C. § 4.0303(b). Leiato v. Personnel Advisory Board, 21 A.S.R.2d 25.

Existing coastal management rules and regulations were not nullified by the Development Planning Office’s failure to formally promulgate new, statutorily required rules for administering the American Samoa Coastal Management Program. A.S.C.A. § 24.0506(a)-(b); A.S.A.C. §§ 26.0201 et seq. Le Vaomatua v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 11.

An administrative rule adopted pursuant to the rulemaking process in the Administrative Procedure Act has the force and effect of law. A.S.C.A. §§ 1.0201(3), 4.1001-4.1010. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.

The Department of Public Safety’s rules governing early release programs are “rules” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), and, therefore, must comport with the rulemaking procedures of the APA. A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.

Rulemaking under the APA requires several steps, including giving meaningful advance notice of the terms or substance of the proposed action; providing interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit “data, views, and arguments, orally or in writing;” filing the rule with the Secretary of American Samoa, with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and with the Secretary of the Senate; and making the rule available for public inspection. A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1004, 4.1005, 4.1008, 4.1010, 4.1020(a). A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.

Rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act requires several procedural steps, including: 1) the rule-making agency must give at least 20 days notice of adoption, amendment, or repeal of any non-emergency rule, A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1004 and 4.1010, which must include statutorily required information, and be mailed to interested persons or publicized in all ASG operated broadcasting media, A.S.C.A. § 4.1004; 2) the agency must give all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit “data, views, and arguments, orally or in writing,” either at a public or other suitable means, and consider those submissions before the rule is adopted, amended, or repealed, A.S.C.A. § 4.1005; 3) the agency must file the rule with the Secretary of American Samoa, and with the Clerk of the House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Senate of the Legislature, A.S.C.A. § 4.1008 (the rule become effective 20 days after the filing is complete, or later if required by statute or rule, A.S.C.A. § 4.1009(c)(1)); and 4) the agency must make the rule available for public inspection. A.S.C.A. § 4.1020(a). Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

Except as to any person who has actual knowledge of a rule, no agency rule is valid or effective until the public inspection requirement, A.S.C.A. § 4.1020(a), has been met. Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

The court will accept an agency’s letter and printed rule as demonstrating substantial compliance with all applicable procedures, including a public hearing and public inspection, except the requisite filing. Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

Despite procedural deficiencies, administrative rules are valid and enforceable against persons who have actual knowledge of the rules. A.S.C.A. § 1009(b). Congressional Church of Jesus in Samoa v. A.S.G., 31 A.S.R.2d 122.

When a plaintiff files a tort claim with the Attorney General at any time within the two-year period provided by § 43.1204, the running of the two-year period is stayed and the statute is tolled for such time as the Attorney General takes to act upon the claim or until such time as the claim is denied by default. Bradcock v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 42 (App. Div. 1997).

Administrative rules must not only be consistent with the statute under which they are promulgated, but also within the scope of the legislative delegation. Lauvao v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 224 (Land & Titles Div. 1997).

The administrative rules contained in Title 10, Chapter 2 of the American Samoa Administrative Code were promulgated by the Chief Procurement Officer pursuant to statutory authority so as to advance a particular government purpose: to maximize integrity in the procurement of construction, goods, and services. See A.S.C.A. § 12.0214; A.S.C.A. § 10.0202. A.S.C.A. § 10.0292(h)(2)(B) does not regulate government employee ethics outside the context of procurement. Lauvao v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 224 (Land & Titles Div. 1997).

A quasi-judicial proceeding where a panel appointed by the governor reviews the decision of an administrative agency is governed by criteria of fair play under the Administrative Procedures Act, A.S.C.A. §4.1044, and is not governed by the standards of law, procedural rules, and evidentiary rules reserved for appellate review of judicial decisions. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 1 (App. Div. 1998).

An administrative rule adopted under the Administrative Procedures Act, A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1001-.1044 has the full force and effect of law. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 10 (App. Div. 1998).

A.S.C.A. § 4.0607, which requires a “trial de novo” in all proceedings before the A.L.J. is limited in application to sections 1-5 of the Administrative Law Judge Act. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 4(4) —Agency Interpretation of Rules & Regulations

Considerable deference is given to administrative decisions involving an agency’s construction of its governing statute and regulations only where the interpretation is consistent with the statutory mandate and does not frustrate legislative policy; administrative rules cannot supersede existing statutory authority where they directly conflict. Reid v. Tuipine, 4 A.S.R.3d 9 (App. Div. 2000).

Administrative decisions involving the construction of an agency’s governing statute and regulations are given considerable deference where it appears that agency’s decision is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Tuilefano v. Attorney General, 4 A.S.R.3d 67 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 4(5) —Hearings and Adjudications

Notice and hearing afforded to satisfy procedural due process need not be full judicial hearing. Am. Sam. Const. art. I § 2. Ferstle v. American Samoa Gov’t, 7 A.S.R.2d 26.

Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to apply certain evidentiary presumptions was without merit, as in administrative proceedings the agency rather than the court is to weigh the evidence and find facts; evidentiary presumptions used to facilitate fact-finding should be applied at the agency level and not at the level of judicial review. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

In an administrative proceeding a fact need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt or even by clear and compelling evidence in order to be proved conclusively; the applicable standard is, rather, whether the fact appears from the evidence to be more probably true than not. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 18 A.S.R.2d 14.

Regarding proposed land transfers, for which the Land Commission must provide the government with recommendations, the Land Commission should hold public hearings and must give reasonable notice of its deliberations to interested persons, regardless of the forum selected to “study” proposed transactions. Vaimaona v. Tuitasi, 22 A.S.R.2d 1.

Plaintiffs carry a legal duty to file administrative claims within a reasonable time or they will be barred by the doctrine of laches. Bradcock v. American Samoa Gov’t, 28 A.S.R.2d 66.

The statute of limitations may begin to run before the filing of an administrative claim if the prospective plaintiff unreasonably delays the administrative filing. Bradcock v. American Samoa Gov’t, 28 A.S.R.2d 182.

A government tort administrative claim filed with the ASG Attorney General pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.1205 is deemed effectively denied if three months elapse after the filing of the claim with no reply by the Attorney General. Bradcock v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 42 (App. Div. 1997).

Under A.S.C.A. § 4.1041(b) a stay of an administrative decision may be issued on appropriate terms without an evidentiary hearing. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 1 (App. Div. 1998).

Judicial review of a procurement decision lies in the first instance before the Office of the Administrative Law Judge. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

Where complaint went beyond alleging of noncompliance with administrative regulations to state intentional racial discrimination, it did not belong at the administrative level. Purcell v. Seugogo, 6 A.S.R.3d 276 (Trial Div. 2002).

In aid of its jurisdiction, the Land and Titles Division of the High Court may invoke the procedural flexibility permitted by A.S.C.A. § 3.0242(b) where it finds it most consistent with natural justice and convenience to continue the case and remand it to the Land Commission. Anoa`i v. Lai, 6 A.S.R.3d 297 (Land & Titles Div. 2002).

§ 5 Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11(11) – ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY DECISIONS

§ 5(1) —Finality and Exhaustion

Approach to question whether administrative decision is final and therefore appealable is essentially pragmatic concern for just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. French v. Fa’alevao, 1 A.S.R.2d 44 (App. Div. 1980).

Where statute provided for appeal to board of registration from a denial of voter registration by election officer, and for judicial review of an adverse decision of the board of registration, court would not issue writ of mandamus to election officer ordering him to register prospective voter who had not yet appealed to board of registration. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0224, 6.0230. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 8 A.S.R.2d 81.

One who challenges the right of another person to be registered or to vote as a qualified elector must exhaust administrative remedies before submitting the matter to court. A.S.C.A. §§ 6.0230 et seq. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.

Court would not exercise its power to render a declaratory judgment where the party seeking the judgment had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.

Under statute requiring plaintiff to file an administrative claim before bringing action against the government, administrative claim by mother that she and her family had suffered damages adequately notified the government of the claims of her minor children, so that suit by minors should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A.S.C.A. § 43.1205(a). Utu v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 9 A.S.R.2d 88.

Requirement that a claimant against a government agency must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit comprises both waiveable and non-waiveable elements. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Laws prescribing detailed procedures for presenting claims to an agency, designed to give the agency a fair chance to review and respond to the claim before being hauled into court, may be waived by the agency. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Neither administrative agency nor court may dispense with requirements designed to ensure that case admits of judicial resolution: that there be a genuine dispute between the claimant and the agency on at least one specific and identifiable question of law and fact. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Jurisdictional requirement that an agency decision be final before claimant challenges it in court may not be waived. Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Insofar as territorial statute prescribing final decision by administrative agency as prerequisite to judicial review simply gave the agency the right to insist on exhaustion of its internal review procedures, it was waiveable by the agency, but insofar as it incorporated the rule that courts should decide real controversies it could not be waived. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Administrative agency decision to issue a new invitation for bids for fuel supply contract was a final decision rejecting bidder’s contention that it had a right to the contract as a result of being the low bidder in the original bidding procedure. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Whether an administrative agency decision was lawful and whether it was final are separate questions; a decision may be substantively illegal and yet be the real and settled position of the agency. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Administrative agency decision is final, for the limited purpose of giving rise to a justiciable controversy, even if there were procedural defects in the process by which it was made, provided that it is meant to reflect the settled position of the agency and leaves the parties genuinely adverse. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Decision by board of directors of administrative agency to reject bidder’s claim of entitlement to fuel supply contract was final and gave rise to a justiciable controversy, notwithstanding the absence of a quorum at the board meeting, where (1) agency’s chief executive officer implemented the decision by canceling the original award and issuing an invitation for new bids, and (2) in subsequent litigation, agency did not assert its continuing discretion to review the decision but instead sought a judicial order that the new bidding process go forward. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(a). Pago Petroleum Products, Inc., v. American Samoa Power Authority, 10 A.S.R.2d 75.

Where a statute or rule of common requires an administrative claim to be presented and prohibits suit until the claim has been rejected or a period for official action has expired, the cause of action does not accrue and the limitation period does not begin to run until the claim is rejected or the stated period expires. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnership, Ltd. (Mem), 14 A.S.R.2d 100.

Filing of the administrative claim required as a prerequisite to suit under the Government Tort Liability Act may toll the Act’s statute of limitations. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnership, Ltd. (Mem), 14 A.S.R.2d 100.

Cause of action accrues under the Government Tort Liability Act when the administrative remedies under the Act are exhausted, because plaintiff cannot seek judicial relief until then. Mataipule v. Tifaimoana Partnerships, Ltd., 16 A.S.R.2d 48.

An administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit against ASG under the Government Tort Liability Act. A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1201 et seq. Rakhshan v. American Samoa Gov’t, 20 A.S.R.2d 1.

Although a failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not absolutely preclude judicial action, such action is permissible only in exceptional circumstances, including the exception for violations of statutory or constitutional rights. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 50.

To file suit regarding disciplinary matters, a public employee need not await a final agency decision only if a preliminary agency decision clearly and unambiguously violates a statutory or constitutional right of the employee or if the prescribed administrative process is clearly inadequate to prevent irreparable injury. Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 21 A.S.R.2d 50.

The requirement of filing an administrative claim before filing suit under the Government Tort Liability Act is jurisdictional. A.S.C.A. § 43.1205. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22 A.S.R.2d 23.

Although based on the Federal Tort Liability Act, the territorial Government Tort Liability Act does not contain the former’s exception for third-party complaints from the requirement that an administrative-claim is a prerequisite to filing suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675; A.S.C.A. § 43.1205. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22 A.S.R.2d 23.

Though modeled on the Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended in 1966, the territorial Government Tort Liability Act does not contain the F.T.C.A.’s exception from the administrative-claim prerequisite for a cause of action asserted by third-party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); A.S.C.A. § 43.1205(a). Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 22 A.S.R.2d 88.

Being an extraordinary remedy, a preliminary injunction is granted only when clearly warranted and may be denied when administrative remedies have not been exhausted. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040. Le Vaomatua v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 11.

Although the Attorney General’s decision on an administrative claim is final and conclusively binding on all ASG officers, except when procured by fraud, his action cannot result in a waiver or estoppel preventing ASG from raising a jurisdictional issue at any stage of future litigation. A.S.C.A. § 43.1206. Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.

The sum-certain requirement for administrative claims filed against ASG is both statutorily and administratively an integral part of the jurisdictional administrative-claim process. A.S.C.A. § 43.1203(c); A.S.A.C. § 43.0103(a). Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 55.

When the issue of the alienation of a parcel of communal land was improperly referred to the Secretary of Samoan Affairs instead of being the subject of a Land Commission hearing, the action was dismissed as being prematurely before the court. Tuioti v. Fonoti, 24 A.S.R.2d 100.

A.S.A.C. § 26.0320(h) requires that “[w]ithin 10 days after receipt of the decision the applicant or any other interested party may file a written motion for reconsideration.” McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

When a statute prescribes administrative remedies, which must be exhausted before judicial review is allowed, these procedures are jurisdictional. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Judicial review is available to a person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Whether compelled by statute or exercised as a matter of judicial discretion, the long settled rule of judicial administration is that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy had been exhausted. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

When a statute prescribes administrative remedies, which must be exhausted before judicial review is allowed, these procedures are jurisdictional. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

The Zoning Board, and not this court, has the jurisdiction to decide the issues, at the administrative level, where court has already determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide these issues based on party’s failure to exhaust administrative remedy. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Filing a complaint before administrative remedies have been exhausted fails to invoke the court’s jurisdiction, but such a filing is sufficient to toll the statute, on the theory that filing an administrative claim constituted the beginning of an action. Randall v. American Samoa Gov’t, 28 A.S.R.2d 70.

Courts will not grant declaratory judgments until administrative remedies have been exhausted unless such administrative remedies are inadequate. Moetoto v. Tauileva, 28 A.S.R.2d 144.

It is appropriate to stay proceedings pending completion of the dispute resolution process before the Secretary of Samoan Affairs. Meredith v. Koko, 28 A.S.R.2d 149.

Where prior resort to a mandatory administrative procedure is a prerequisite to filing a claim in court, the running of the limitations period will be tolled during the administrative proceeding. Bradcock v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 42 (App. Div. 1997).

In most declaratory relief actions, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to judicial review. Tauia v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 1997).

Dismissal of government employment action without prejudice was proper where dispute had not undergone three-part administrative procedure. Tauia v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 1997).

Under three-part administrative procedure, government employee submits written grievance to supervisor, Director of Manpower Resources conducts an informal hearing and issues a “final decision,” after which employee may appeal to Personnel Advisory Board. Tauia v. American Samoa Gov’t, 1 A.S.R.3d 64 (Trial Div. 1997).

In order to obtain judicial review of an administrative decision, a potential plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies within the agency. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

The administrative remedies available to an individual aggrieved by a decision of the Zoning Board consist of an initial hearing and a procedure for reconsideration of the Board’s decision. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

The requirement that a litigant exhaust his or her administrative remedies before bringing suit is an intensely practical one which may be judicially excused when the purposes of the requirement would not be served by requiring adherence. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

Where administrative remedies had been exhausted by entity’s representative, not formally appearing on behalf of entity but appearing for himself, entity was nonetheless entitled to judicial review, as purposes behind exhaustion requirement were met—case was not premature, hearing and reconsideration had taken place, and Board had ample opportunity to review and reverse its decision. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

The court does not have jurisdiction to review a final order of the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) in the absence of a final decision by the Governor on the administrative appeal of the CPO’s decision. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

Where a party has exhausted all administrative remedies within an agency and is aggrieved by a final (or effectively dispositive) decision in a contested case, the party is entitled to judicial review as prescribed under A.S.C.A. § 4.1040 et seq. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

A party aggrieved by a preliminary, procedural or intermediate agency action or ruling need not exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing for judicial review if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

Under the broad legal themes of separation of powers, sovereign immunity, exhaustion of administrative remedies and judicial restraint, immediate review of an administrative decision will be denied where no grounds are demonstrated that remaining administrative remedies are inadequate. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

The administrative remedies available to an individual under A.S.C.A. § 4.1040, where the disputed procurement award could be adequately remedied by the Governor’s reversal and remand of that award at the conclusion of the administrative review proceedings, the court lacks judicial review jurisdiction, and also lacks the authority to exercise its ancillary powers to issue a stay. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

Where plaintiff properly files administrative claim with Attorney General’s office but said office fails to dispose of the claim within the prescribed 90 day time period, the claim is deemed denied and plaintiff has satisfied the prerequisite to exhaust administrative remedies. Afele-Fa`amuli v. Am. Samoa Cmty. Coll., 4 A.S.R.3d 219 (Trial Div. 2000).

Where party had moved for reconsideration or new trial before Administrative Law Judge and had also petitioned for judicial review, motion for new trial needed to be decided before judicial review could take place. Forsgren v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 13 (App. Div. 2001).

With the possible exception of conducting the final administrative hearing in the administrative rule procurement bid dispute process under A.S.C.A. § 4.0604(e), the Administrative Law Judge Act provides no constitutionally permissible authority for the Administrative Law Judge to conduct a “trial de novo” as an “appeal” from the final administrative decision of another agency of government. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Final agency decisions are subject to limited judicial review in most instances before the Appellate Division of the High Court under sections A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1040-4.1044 of the Administrative Procedures Act or as may be particularly provided in the enabling statutes of a particular agency. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 5(2) —Procedure

Appeals of Zoning Board decisions proceed in like manner to appeals under the Administrative Procedures Act, in that the administrative record must be submitted within 30 days and the court is confined to that record, though it may receive evidence to supplement the record. Ala`ilima v. Zoning Board, 25 A.S.R.2d 146.

Appeals to the High Court from the Zoning Board “may be taken in like manner to appeals under the Administrative Procedure Act. McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Within 30 days from the service of the petition for appellate review, an agency is to send the court the record of the proceedings in the matter under review. A.S.C.A. § 4.1042; A.C.R. 17(a). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Appellate review is confined to the record. On a party’s request, “the court shall receive briefs and hear oral argument”; and the court has the discretion to receive evidence to supplement the record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

When reviewing a decision of an administrative agency, the High Court may not consider evidence absent in the administrative record unless the evidence (a) is necessary and (b) supplements or explains the evidence contained in the administrative record. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete’e v. American Samoa Gov’t, 27 A.S.R.2d 80.

A.S.C.A. § 4.1044 provides for a remand where substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the arbitrators’ decision violates of applicable constitutional or statutory provisions, or if it is made upon unlawful procedure. American Samoa Gov’t v. Annandale, 1 A.S.R.3d 19 (App. Div. 1997).

In reviewing an arbitration award, the reviewing Court need not determine the applicable standard of review where it is apparent that the arbitrators failed to follow the specific statutory procedures. American Samoa Gov’t v. Annandale, 1 A.S.R.3d 19 (App. Div. 1997).

A.S.C.A. § 43.1010 requires that the arbitration award contain findings or conclusions of the panel; reflecting how the award was determined. American Samoa Gov’t v. Annandale, 1 A.S.R.3d 19 (App. Div. 1997).

Where an award does not contain specific, written findings or conclusions of the panel, but merely arrives at amount, the award should be remanded. American Samoa Gov’t v. Annandale, 1 A.S.R.3d 19 (App. Div. 1997).

To determine whether a given individual or organization has standing to seek judicial review of a final administrative decision, the petitioner must demonstrate that he, she or it has (a) suffered an “injury in fact” and (b) is arguably within the statute’s “zone of interests.” McGuire v. Zoning Board, 3 A.S.R.3d 15 (App. Div. 1999).

Under A.S.C.A. § 4.1041, reviewable agency decisions or rulings may be instituted by filing a petition in the appellate division within 30 days, but the mere filing of the petition does not automatically stay the administrative decision to be reviewed. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

Once a petition for review is filed, either the agency may grant, or the court may order, a stay on appropriate terms. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 3 A.S.R.3d 49 (App. Div. 1999).

When administrative law matter becomes ripe for review by denial of party’s motion for reconsideration or new trial, petitioner should thereafter file entire record of the administrative proceeding, including transcripts of hearings, within 30 days of request to proceed. Forsgren v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 13 (App. Div. 2001).

The Trial Division of the High Court is not bound by an erroneous salary calculation determined by the American Samoa Government Wage and Hour Board. Jiang v. Daewoosa Samoa, Ltd., 6 A.S.R.3d 91 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 5(3) —Scope of Review

Territorial workmen’s compensation statute, under which reviewing court could set aside decision of workmen’s compensation commission only if it was “not in accordance with the law,” precluded court from reversing a finding of fact by the commission for which there was substantial evidence in the record of the commission’s proceeding. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 105. 5

Court reviewing findings of fact by workmen’s compensation would not reverse a finding unless a reasonable person could not have concluded as the commission did from the evidence in the record. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 105.

Workmen’s compensation commission decision should be overturned on appeal only if it is not in accordance with the law. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.

Workmen’s compensation commission decision should be upheld by reviewing court if supported by substantial evidence, whether or not the court would have reached the same conclusion from the evidence as the commission did. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.

Court will not disturb workmen’s compensation commission decision if record contains evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that the injury and death were work-related and it does not appear that the commission arbitrarily and capriciously disregarded substantial evidence to the contrary. A.S.C.A. §§ 32.0642, 32.0652. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc., v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 7 A.S.R.2d 149.

Court should grant an interlocutory stay of an administrative board decision only if there is a substantial likelihood that the petitioner will prevail on the merits and the petitioner will be greatly or irreparably injured if the stay is not granted. Leti v. Immigration Board, 8 A.S.R.2d 107.

Decision of workmen’s compensation commission may be set aside only if the decision was not made in accordance with law. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Finding by workmen’s compensation commission that there was an “injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment” must be supported by substantial evidence. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Trial court correctly applied the substantial evidence standard where it upheld a workmen’s compensation commission decision “as long as reasonable people could differ on the facts presented to the Commission.” Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Substantial evidence test in judicial review of administrative decision is limited to whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached, and reviewing court may neither find its own facts nor substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Finding of fact based on no evidence is an error of law and thus a workmen’s compensation commission award which is not supported by any evidence will be reversed, but where the commission has statutory power to find the facts its findings must be affirmed even if the reviewing court believes the evidence points the other way. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Workmen’s compensation commission order should be set aside only if it was based on “whimsy evidence”; order should be affirmed if reasonable people might differ as to the weight of the evidence. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 8 A.S.R.2d 152.

Administrative body’s failure to act may be addressed through extraordinary writ proceedings. T.C.R.C.P. Rule 88. Siofele v. Hall, 12 A.S.R.2d 9.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s findings of fact and inferences derived therefrom are to be upheld by the High Court if supported by “substantial evidence,” using a reasonableness standard. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 15 A.S.R.2d 130.

That the evidence might also have supported a different conclusion is insufficient to warrant reversal of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s conclusions. Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 15 A.S.R.2d 130.

An interlocutory appeal of an agency action or ruling is available only if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy. A.S.C.A. § 4.1040(c). Sala v. American Samoa Gov’t, 20 A.S.R.2d 80.

A court gives considerable deference to administrative decisions involving an agency’s construction of its governing statute and regulations, unless the court deems the interpretation to be inconsistent with a statutory mandate or to frustrate legislative policy. National Pacific Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the American Samoa Gov’t’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 22 A.S.R.2d 15.

If a Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s statutory interpretation is permissible under the statutes and regulations, the court should defer to the Commission’s decision; but if that construction is inconsistent with a statutory mandate, frustrates legislative policy, or renders the statutes ineffective, the court must set aside the decision. A.S.C.A. § 32.0652(a). National Pacific Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the American Samoa Gov’t’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 22 A.S.R.2d 15.

If made upon unlawful procedure, a decision of the Immigration Board may be reversed, modified, or remanded for further proceedings by the Appellate Division of the High Court. A.S.C.A. § 41.0212(3). Farapo v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 136.

The fact that this court has held, on one occasion, that substantial compliance with statutory requirements was sufficient, should not yield an expectation that public officials will ordinarily receive judicial recognition of their faulty acts. Tuitasi v. Lauofo, 25 A.S.R.2d 57.

The court is not to reweigh the evidence on factual questions and is to give “appropriate weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge.” A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(b). McGuire v. Zoning Board, 26 A.S.R.2d 59.

Post hoc rationalizations for an agency decision, which are absent from the administrative record, are not admissible upon judicial review of the decision. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete’e v. American Samoa Gov’t, 27 A.S.R.2d 80.

Where evidence consists of affidavits from individuals who were neither employees of the administrative decisionmaking body nor involved in the administrative proceedings, and the affidavits do not purport to clarify or explain evidence from the existing record, the evidence is not supplemental to the administrative record and is not admissible upon judicial review of the decision. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043(a). Taufete’e v. American Samoa Gov’t, 27 A.S.R.2d 80.

Courts will not grant declaratory judgments until administrative remedies have been exhausted unless such administrative remedies are inadequate. Moetoto v. Tauileva, 28 A.S.R.2d 144.

A.S.C.A. § 4.1040 provides for appellate review of a final administrative decision in a “contested case.” In such cases, the Appellate Division may reverse or modify an agency decision if it is contrary to law or based on factual findings which are “clearly erroneous,” or if it is otherwise arbitrary, capricious or abusive of discretion. A.S.C.A. § 4.1043-44. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.

Certain administrative functions, such as the determination of whether an alien should be deported according to existing immigration and probably the determination of whether an alienation of land is improvident within the meaning of A.S.C.A. § 37.0203(c), are beyond the reach of any judicial review because they are committed to agency discretion by law. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.

An administrative decision does not concern a contested case under A.S.C.A § 4.1040 when a party was not represented at Land Commission hearings and could not contest the lease. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.

Appellate courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider issues that were not presented to the administrative agency. Pen v. Lavata`i, 30 A.S.R.2d 10.

There is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action, which can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the Fono intended to cut off review above the agency level. The court is not convinced that the Fono intended the Territorial Correctional Facility to conduct prison affairs beyond the purview of the High Court. A.S.G. v. Ki, 31 A.S.R.2d 118.

Under A.S.C.A. § 4.1044, the court may reverse, modify or remand the decision of an agency if substantial rights of a petitioner have been prejudiced by an agency’s improper or unlawful decision under this statute. Kruse v. Personnel Advisory Bd., 2 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 1998).

Under A.S.C.A. §§ 3.0208(c), 4.1040-.1044 and 10.0282, the court has authority to review administrative decisions in the procurement process; the review is confined to the record, and to questions of law, not fact. B.H.P. Petroleum South Pac., Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 2 A.S.R.3d 10 (App. Div. 1998).

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the High Court must, in most instances confine its review of administrative decisions to the record and decision as developed and issued by the agency. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the Court may not substitute its judgment on the weight of the facts for that of the agency and the Court is required to give appropriate weight to the agency’s experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

When reviewing an administrative decision, the High Court must first determine if substantial rights of the aggrieved party have been prejudiced by the agency’s decision, but even with such a finding, the Court may only reverse, modify or remand the agency’s decision if it finds the decision was unlawful, clearly erroneous, or arbitrary, capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Compensation orders issued by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are immediately reviewable through injunctive proceedings against the Commissioner brought before the Trial Division of the High Court. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Immigration Board decisions receive expedited limited judicial review under appeals before the Appellate Division of the High Court in which the Board is the named respondent. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

The effective scope of any legislative act is limited to the subject embraced in its title and matters properly connected thereto. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Co., Ltd., v. Comm’r, 5 A.S.R.3d 183 (Trial Div. 2001).

Review of a final administrative decision for errors of law is a matter ordinarily within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Appellate Division of the High Court. Jiang v. Daewoosa Samoa, Ltd., 6 A.S.R.3d 91 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 5(4) —Disposition

Court would not exercise its power to render a declaratory judgment where the only relief it could grant would require the court to assume a supervisory role over administrative processes. Election Office v. Tuika, 9 A.S.R.2d 1.

Chief election officer did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying petitioner’s eligibility for election where, although petitioner supplied all the information requested on candidacy forms, he refused reasonable requests by the chief election officer for further information relevant to his eligibility. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.

Court could grant review by mandamus of chief election officer’s determination that petitioner was ineligible to run for elective office, where statutory scheme was silent as to appeals procedure and circumstances appeared to render any alternative review procedures inadequate. T.C.R.C.P. Rules 87, 88. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.

Court would not compel chief election officer to find the petitioner a bona fide resident where petitioner was not on the current voter registration lists, was not present in the territory during the period at issue, refused to supply additional information requested by the chief election officer, and was identified as a registered voter in another jurisdiction during the period at issue. Siofele v. Shimasaki, 9 A.S.R.2d 3.

The Workmen’s Compensation Commission’s decision that the hospital’s off-island medical-referral procedure does not apply to those covered by the workmen’s compensation statute is a permissible interpretation of applicable statutes and regulations, so the court will defer to that decision. A.S.C.A. § 11.0312. National Pacific Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of the American Samoa Gov’t’s Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 22 A.S.R.2d 15.

A preliminary injunction is unwarranted when an environmental organization fails to plead specific harm to itself or its members and when it did not seek a stop order from the territorial Development Planning Office. A.S.C.A. §§ 4.1040, 24.0505(c). Le Vaomatua v. American Samoa Gov’t, 23 A.S.R.2d 11.

Courts reviewing federal agency actions under the Administrative Procedures Act are limited to compelling agency actions or holding actions unlawful. Courts cannot grant monetary relief. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

In American Samoa, pecuniary relief is not available in judicial review of administrative proceedings. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

If a disappointed bidder wishes for monetary relief, the proper course of action is not through appellate review of administrative proceedings, but rather through such means as a trial de novo. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

§ 5(5) —Limitations on Review

Judicial review of administrative action is limited by the requirement that there be an actual, live controversy to adjudicate. Island’s Choice, Inc. v. American Samoa Gov’t, 5 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2001).

ADMIRALTY

§ 1 Jurisdiction and Procedure

2 In Personam and In Rem Actions

3 Preferred Ship Mortgages & Maritime Liens

4 Maritime Contracts

4(1) —General Provisions

4(2) —Leases

4(3) —Employment Contracts

4(4) —Carriage of Goods by Sea

5 Maritime Torts

5(1) —General Principles

5(2) —Negligence

5(3) —Unseaworthiness

5(4) —Maintenance & Cure

5(5) —Limits on Liability

5(6) —Damages

5(7) —Compensation & Recovery

§ 1 Jurisdiction and Procedure

SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1(6) – ADMIRALTY

Congress can vest admiralty jurisdiction in courts created by territorial legislature. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

Adoption of Federal Admiralty Rules which allow in rem jurisdiction does not extend jurisdiction of High Court absent legislative of constitutional grant of such jurisdiction. 11 A.S.C. § 801. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

Unless conferred by Constitution of American Samoa, admiralty jurisdiction in rem must be conferred on Trial Division by territorial legislature. Rev. Const. Am. Samoa, art. II, § 1; 5 A.S.C. §§ 1, 402, 801, 803; 11 A.S.C. § 2001. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

High Court could have in rem admiralty jurisdiction, if Fono, subject to veto by Secretary of Interior, as sub-sub-sub delegatee of Congressional power, chose to enact statutory authorization therefor. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

Statute authorizing High Court to issue all writs not inconsistent with law does not extend its jurisdiction to in rem admiralty proceedings. 5 A.S.C. § 403. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

High Court may exercise in personam jurisdiction over admiralty cases pursuant to legislative grant, and may, if due process allows, attach or execute upon vessel, as in any other case. 5 A.S.C. § 3; 11 A.S.C. §§ 6201–6220. Vessel Fijian Swift v. Trial Division, 4 A.S.R. 983.

Single ship refloating transaction does not constitute doing business within meaning of statute requiring permit. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Salvage Pacific, 1 A.S.R.2d 98 (Trial Div. 1983).

High Court of American Samoa has jurisdiction over in rem admiralty proceedings so long as American Samoa remains without the jurisdiction of a United States District Court; Court has corresponding discretion to transfer and receive causes to and from other courts of the United States the same as any federal court where to do so would join a timely complaint and a perfected service of process. Great American Ins. Co. v. Pacific Princess, 1 A.S.R.2d 64 (Trial Div. 1982).

Because the courts of American Samoa are not U.S. District Courts, they do not have the power implied by 46 U.S.C. § 185 to enjoin “all other claims and proceedings” against the owner of a ship. In re M/V Pearl, 2 A.S.R.2d 76 (App. Div. 1986).

Neither A.S.C.A. § 3.0208(a)(3) nor procedural rules can confer jurisdiction on the High Court to the full extent given a U.S. district court by 46 U.S.C. § 185. In re M/V Pearl, 2 A.S.R.2d 76 (App. Div. 1986).

When the Fono enacted A.S.C.A. §3.0208(a)(3) conferring admiralty jurisdiction on the High Court, it included within that jurisdiction the substantive principle of admiralty law limiting a ship owner’s liability to its interest in the vessel and its freight. In re M/V Pearl, 2 A.S.R.2d 76 (App. Div. 1986).

Neither the Fono nor the High Court can extend the jurisdiction of the High Court to encompass proceedings in other jurisdictions. In re M/V Pearl, 2 A.S.R.2d 76 (App. Div. 1986).

High Court of American Samoa is not a “district Court of the United States” within meaning of provision of the Ship Mortgage Act granting exclusive jurisdiction to preferred ship mortgages. 46 U.S.C. § 951. Star-Kist Samoa, Inc. v. The Conquest, 3 A.S.R.2d 25.

The High Court of American Samoa has in rem admiralty jurisdiction. A.S.C.A. § 3.0208(a)(3). Rainwater v. The Sea Encounter, 3 A.S.R.2d 87.

The High Court of American Samoa is not a court “of the states” within the meaning of the federal statute denying admiralty jurisdiction to state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Rainwater v. The Sea Encounter, 3 A.S.R.2d 87.

High Court, neither an article III district court nor a non-article III district court empowered under the “territorial exception,” has no jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage under federal ship mortgage act, enforcement of which is permissible only by “district courts of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Local statute granting admiralty jurisdiction to High Court allows Court to apply substantive principles of the maritime common law, even though Congress has never directly and specifically conferred admiralty jurisdiction upon High Court. A.S.C.A. § 3.0208(a)(3). Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

While High Court has no jurisdiction to foreclose mortgage under federal ship mortgage act, it had subject matter jurisdiction over mortgaged vessel situated in the territory and could determine validity of purported mortgage, and therefore properly placed the vessel in custodia legis upon default by mortgagor, thereby nullifying subsequent attempt by mortgagor to create second preferred ship mortgage. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Admiralty jurisdiction only exists over torts occurring in navigable waters and having a sufficient “martime flavor,” which is determined by reference to the parties, the sorts of vessels or other objects involved, the nature and cause of the injury, and the implications for traditional concepts of admiralty law. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.

American Samoa’s “coastal zone management area” is defined as including the entire island of Tutuila, along with all the other islands and all coastal waters and submerged lands for a distance of three nautical miles seaward. A.S.A.C. § 26.0207. Solomona v. Governor of American Samoa, 17 A.S.R.2d 186.

The High Court of American Samoa has no authority, statutory or otherwise, to order a stay of admiralty proceedings in a federal district court. Fa’atasiga v. M/V Ocean Pearl, 19 A.S.R.2d 59.

The High Court’s general admiralty jurisdiction includes limiting a shipowner’s liability to the value of the ship, although lacking the statutory power of federal district courts to enforce this principle by injunction, pending the outcome of the limitation proceeding. Fa’atasiga v. M/V Ocean Pearl, 19 A.S.R.2d 59.

The High Court refused to approve parties’ stipulation to lift a stay of an action in federal district court when no such stay was issued because of the lack of statutory authority to do so. Fa’atasiga v. M/V Ocean Pearl, 19 A.S.R.2d 59.

The High Court cannot enjoin proceedings in other jurisdictions in a limitation-of-liability proceeding, because the federal statute restricts jurisdiction to federal district courts and because neither the territorial legislature nor the court’s rules can extend the court’s jurisdiction to encompass proceedings in other jurisdictions. 46 U.S.C. §§ 145, 181 et seq.; T.C.R.C.P. Rule F(1). In re Complaint of Voyager, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 47.

The widely accepted rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which states that an action for recovery under a theory of strict products liability may be entertained by a court sitting in admiralty, is now accepted in American Samoa. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 23 A.S.R.2d 76.

Under the dead-ship doctrine, a vessel which has been permanently removed from navigation (and so is a “dead” ship) does not attract liens of a maritime nature, and any watercrafts deemed to be “dead” are outside a court’s admiralty jurisdiction. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 24 A.S.R.2d 152.

No maritime lien need be present for admiralty jurisdiction to attach in an action for partition, to try title, for possession of cargo, or by part owners attempting to secure the return of their vessel. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule D. Mobile Marine Limited v. Ninna Marianne, 27 A.S.R.2d 143.

The tort of conversion is a long-standing basis for admiralty jurisdiction. Mobile Marine Limited v. Ninna Marianne, 27 A.S.R.2d 143.

In addition to the power to exercise jurisdiction over the general maritime claims of unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, the High Court of American Samoa can exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s Jones Act claim. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Absent statutory authorization, the prevailing party in an admiralty case is generally not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

Absent statutory authorization, a prevailing party in an admiralty case is generally not entitled to an award of attorney fees. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 4 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 2000).

Where Court had both common law general jurisdiction and admiralty jurisdiction, action in rem against defendant vessel to enforce personal judgment could proceed under Supplemental Rule B or C of the Trial Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Hong v. Chung Yong # 21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197 (Trial Div. 2001).

Where Court had jurisdiction to proceed under Supplemental Rule B or C for Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Court’s discretion to proceed under Rule B did not defeat proper seizure of vessel and did not reflect judicial determination as to Rule C in rem claim or existence of maritime lien. Hong v. Chung Yong # 21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197 (Trial Div. 2001).

The Fono, in explicitly overruling Swift v. Trial Div., 4 A.S.R. 983 (App. Div. 1975), amended the High Court’s jurisdictional reach to include in rem admiralty and maritime suits. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

Congress, either deliberately or through benign neglect, has excluded American Samoa from participating equally and fully in the federal scheme of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

As a result of Congress’s exclusion of American Samoa from full participation in the federal scheme for admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, owners of vessels entering Pago Pago harbor have fewer substantive rights than in any other American harbor, and perhaps fewer rights than afforded by Commonwealths having free association compacts with the United States. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

The Constitution of the United States explicitly grants the federal judiciary the power over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

The High Court cannot issue an injunction pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 185 and halt proceedings in a federal district court of competent jurisdiction, even though it would promote judicial economy and overall convenience. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

The High Court cannot transfer civil actions to other district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), despite the statute’s explicit language that transfers are “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice.” Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

The procedures governing the arrest of a vessel are more relaxed than the procedural due process requirements normally required with other pre-judgment seizures of property, including effective notice, meaningful judicial review, and a right to a prompt hearing after the seizure. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 139 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 2 In Personam and In Rem Actions

SEE CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1 – JURISDICTION

While in rem and in personam claims may be joined, res judicata applies from an in personam action against a shipowner to an in rem action against his ship (and vice versa); thus, one may not sue twice on the legal fiction that a ship and her owner are two different parties. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 23 A.S.R.2d 156.

A Jones Act claim cannot be maintained in rem. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Attorney’s fees, in certain limited circumstances, may be awarded as an item of damages in an in rem action, but they are not properly included as custodia legis expenses. Sembawang Maritime Ltd. v. F/V Don Juan, 31 A.S.R.2d 193.

Although no affidavit accompanied complaint, as is required for a Rule B attachment, vessel was properly seized pursuant to a Rule C claim in rem and, therefore, was properly before Court for Rule B attachment purposes as well. Hong v. Chung Yong # 21, 5 A.S.R.3d 197 (Trial Div. 2001).

Where party filed objection to Court’s in rem jurisdiction, the Court would not view the objection as equivalent to an answer. To do so would violate Rule C(6) of the T.C.R.C.P. Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims, its meaning and purpose. Eurocompany S.P.A. v. Yurgrettansflot, 7 A.S.R.3d 76 (Trial Div. 2003).

In an in rem action, party’s motion to intervene is unnecessary where party has asserted ownership of the property at issue and the court has accepted the party’s ownership claim. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 80 (Trial Div. 2003).

While some courts allow the vessel itself to bring a counterclaim in an in rem action, American Samoa courts follow the approach permitting a claimant acting on behalf of the ship to counterclaim. Alves v. M/V Koorale, 7 A.S.R.3d 80 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 3 Preferred Ship Mortgages & Maritime Liens

SEE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 11 – MORTGAGES

Since there is no United States district court in Samoa this court may foreclose a preferred ship mortgage under 46 U.S.C. § 951. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 2 A.S.R.2d 40 (Trial Div. 1985).

Unification of common law and admiralty procedure was a factor court should consider in determining whether to apply prior rule that maritime liens could only be foreclosed in admiralty and ship mortgages could only be foreclosed in courts of common law or equity. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.

Although Ship Mortgage Act was inapplicable in High Court of American Samoa, its provisions could be applied by analogy by court in applying general law of admiralty. 46 U.S.C. §§ 911 et seq. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.

Under the general law of admiralty applicable in American Samoa, a ship mortgage, which complied with statutory requirements of a Preferred Ship Mortgage, created a maritime lien enforceable in admiralty, and its priority was the same as it would have been if foreclosed in federal district court. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.

To allow lienholder to obtain higher priority by foreclosing in jurisdiction that does not have a federal district court, where Congress apparently intended to create uniform set of priorities and parties contracted accordingly, would give rise to unjust enrichment. Security Pacific National Bank v. M/V Conquest, 4 A.S.R.2d 59.

One who furnishes goods or services to a vessel in custodia legis does not acquire a maritime lien against the vessel for the value of such goods or services. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Rule precluding creation of a maritime lien against a vessel in custodia legis does not apply to a vessel purportedly in judicial custody but neither actually nor constructively taken into marshal’s possession. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Courts sitting in admiralty must show special care for rights of seamen. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Judicial seizure of a vessel legally terminates voyage and discharges crew, thus precluding lien for wages for services rendered after seizure. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Where vessel undertook a single fishing voyage after seizure and under limited conditions approved by the court, and where vessel was already under arrest when crew was hired, vessel remained in custodia legis during voyage and crew members had no maritime lien for wages earned during the voyage. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Although no lien can attach to a vessel already in judicial custody, costs of services or property furnished by court authority to preserve and maintain the vessel for the common benefit of interested parties are “expenses of justice,” payable before all preexisting liens. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

Rule that liens do not accrue on behalf of those supplying goods and services to vessel in custodia legis may not apply to a vessel allowed to ply the harbors in furtherance of its trade without restriction. S.W. California Production Credit Association v. The Vessel Conquistador (Mem.), 11 A.S.R.2d 7.

Stipulated receivership order stating that vessel should be “deemed” in custodia legis, but purporting not to create any ranking or priority of liens other than that which would otherwise exist, would arguably preserve the rights of those who, in the absence of the order, would have obtained liens on the vessel during period of receivership. S.W. California Production Credit Association v. The Vessel Conquistador (Mem.), 11 A.S.R.2d 7.

It is not clear that court has the power to alter the rank or priority of liens by approving an ex parte stipulation to which the lienholders were not parties. S.W. California Production Credit Association v. The Vessel Conquistador (Mem.), 11 A.S.R.2d 7.

When a vessel is actually or constructively in the possession of the Court, liens do not ordinarily accrue in favor of crewmen or other suppliers of goods and services to the vessel. S.W. California Production Credit Association v. The Vessel Conquistador (Mem.), 11 A.S.R.2d 7.

For the purpose of foreclosing a ship’s preferred mortgage lien, the High Court is considered a “district court” and thus has jurisdiction to enforce such a lien. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31301(2)(E), 31325-26. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.

Upon judicial sale in a civil action in rem brought to enforce a preferred mortgage lien, the preferred mortgage lien has priority over all claims against the proceeds, except for (1) expenses and fees allowed by the court, (2) costs imposed by the court, and (3) preferred maritime liens, which include those for damages arising out of maritime tort. 46 U.S.C. §§ 31325, 31301(5)(B). United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.

Claims for costs incurred in securing vessel while it was in custodia legis prior to judicial sale are recoverable from the proceeds of the sale and have priority over the claims of the litigants. 46 U.S.C. § 31326. United Airlines Employee Credit Union v. M/V Sans End, 15 A.S.R.2d 95.

Wharfage charges can give rise to a maritime lien, though a lien does not arise against a vessel “withdrawn from navigation,” which includes an abandoned vessel. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc. v. M/V Kwang Myong #71, 23 A.S.R.2d 156.

Appropriate reasons to arrest a vessel include guaranteeing safe return of the vessel to the chosen forum and preventing defendants from retaining the proceeds earned by the sale of the cargo. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule D. Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 1.

Security for a vessel may be effectuated by a bond provided by the party designated to possess the vessel after its release, to be held by the court. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule E(5)(a). Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 1.

A maritime bond cannot exceed the total value of the vessel. T.C.R.C.P. Supp. Rule E(5)(a). Mobile Marine Ltd. v. Ninna Marianne, 28 A.S.R.2d 88.

When a vessel is seized and sold, the costs of holding the vessel in custodia legis are generally given priority over other claims. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.

Claims incurred while the vessel is in custodia legis must be proven and supported just as any other claim. Not only must the claims be equitable and reasonable, they must inure to the benefit of all claimants. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.

The forfeiture provision of A.S.C.A. § 28.1510 creates a defense for debtors in civil court, not third parties not in privity with the creditor. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.

A person furnishing goods or services to a vessel after its arrest (in custodia legis) does not acquire a maritime lien against the vessel for the value of those goods or services. Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.

Administrative expenses are recoverable when the expenditures inure to the benefit of all claimants, where they contribute to or create an available fund.Pacific N. Marine Fuels, Inc. v. M/V Clover #7, 30 A.S.R.2d 152.

Claims for costs incurred in securing a vessel while it is in custodia legis prior to judicial sale are recoverable from the proceeds of the sale and have priority over the litigants’ claims. The principal qualification is that the services or goods for which payment or reimbursement is sought must be necessary for the care and preservation of the vessel and be for the common benefit of all parties who have a claim to the vessel. Sembawang Maritime Ltd. v. F/V Don Juan, 31 A.S.R.2d 193.

Seamen’s liens for wages take priority over all preferred liens except for expenses of justice while the vessel is in custodia legis. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

Party was not an “innocent lienholder” and should have known the applicable law even if industry practice was contrary to the law. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

§ 4 Maritime Contracts

SEE CONTRACTS

§ 4(1) —General Provisions

RESERVED

§ 4(2) —Leases

No writing is necessary to establish valid contract for lease of vessel. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Lessors recognize lease as valid by delivering ship to possession of lessees. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Lessees recognize lease as valid by accepting possession, and such delivery waives alleged condition precedent to execution of lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Agreement by lessee to indemnify owner of ship for loss of ship in consideration of owner’s withdrawing petition for injunction was supplementary agreement to original lease and not new lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Change in lease agreement which would require lessee to procure insurance for leased vessel is modification of original terms and, if without consideration, is invalid, and failure of lessee to procure insurance, even though marine insurance is available, is not breach of contract. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Repudiation of a contract must be unequivocal and absolute, and petition for injunction by lessor to prevent ship from going out to sea before insurance is procured is not such repudiation. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Lessor is under no obligation to accept surrender of lease from lessee, and where lessor refuses to take back leased ship, lessee is still obligated under lease. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Lessors suing for back rent are not entitled to recover for rent accruing after date petition was filed. Steffany v. Scanlan, 3 A.S.R. 456.

Finding of trial court that signature of one of owners of vessel on lease agreement was not necessary to valid lease was not in error. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Evidence supports conclusion that parties did not intend signature of one of owners to be condition precedent to execution of valid lease. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Change of possession of ship is equivalent of delivery, executing lease agreement. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Where lessor acquiesces in lessee’s possession of ship for period of months, he waives possible condition precedent in lease, which was not complied with. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Agreement by lessee to indemnify lessor for loss of ship in consideration for lessor’s withdrawal of repudiation does not constitute new lease since it does not contain all terms necessary to lease but is supplementary agreement. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Modification of lease to strike condition that insurance should be acquired for vessel by lessees only if available in American Samoa was invalid since there was no consideration for such modification. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Where lessor brings an injunction suit to regain possession of ship, and then withdraws suit in consideration for lessee’s promise of indemnification if ship should be lost, this is not repudiation of lease agreement where lessee does not treat it as such and continues to possess ship. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Attempted surrender of lease does not release lessee from obligations unless it is accepted by the lessor. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Circumstantial evidence concerning failure of lessee’s business may be weighed by court in considering validity of attempted surrender lease. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Law providing that lease of land in writing constitutes tenancy at will is not applicable to ships nor interest therein. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

§ 4(3) —Employment Contracts

Outfitting of vessel for profit-making voyage that was undertaken after seizure of vessel and that would not recognizably enhance its value was not “expense of justice,” and crewmembers had no prior claim for wages earned during voyage. Gray, Cary, Ames & Frye v. HGN Corp., 6 A.S.R.2d 64.

The terms of a seaman’s contract were adjudicated as being those contained in his payroll form when the contract reflected the parties’ negotiations by telephone and when the claimed parol variation would be essentially gratuitous on the captain’s part. Zuguin v. M/V Captain M.J. Souza, 23 A.S.R.2d 7.

When a seaman had worked to prepare a vessel for an upcoming voyage before leaving the vessel, he was entitled to compensation on a quantum meruit basis. Zuguin v. M/V Captain M.J. Souza, 23 A.S.R.2d 7.

U.S. law requires that, in certain circumstances, seamen be given written fishing agreements, specifying the period of the agreement, the amount of their compensation, and any other agreed upon terms. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

A seaman retained in violation of the law requiring a written fishing agreement is entitled to compensation for services rendered at the agreed upon rate, or the highest rate of wages at the port in which he was engaged, whichever is higher. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

Even where a written fishing agreement does not exist, the Seaman Protection and Relief Act does not enable a seaman to accept 95% of his agreed upon wages and then, years later, seek to retroactively void his unwritten agreement and claim significantly higher statutory wages. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

The “highest rate of wages” language contained in § 11107 of the Seaman Protection and Relief Act entitles an aggrieved seaman to the highest rate of wages paid a comparable seaman, not any seaman. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

All deckhands are not per se comparable, however, a seaman only need make a prima facie showing of comparability in order to make out a § 11107 claim. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

Where other vessels in same fleet functioned essentially the same, where all vessels in fleet maintained contact with each other and functioned as a group, where crewmembers often serve on different vessels throughout fleet, and where authority of fish captain was consistent throughout fleet it was appropriate to compare wages of crewmembers throughout fleet for purposes of damages under the Seaman Protection and Relief Act. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

A ship’s master, or anyone possessing the ship’s master’s responsibilities, may not recover penalty wages under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 because such individual is charged with the responsibility of securing written fishing agreements with the seamen. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

Although case involved many fishermen who had been originally “engaged” to fish in Croatia, they were subsequently hired on a trip-to-trip basis, originating and concluding in the western Pacific, and had been promised wages consistent with those of the western Pacific tuna fishing industry. Their recovery was therefore not limited to the wages of the highest paid comparable seaman engaged in Croatia, but could be based on wages made by other seaman in same fleet. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

When a seaman performs work for a vessel in reasonable anticipation of a prospective fishing trip, that seaman is entitled to be compensated for his services on a quantum meruit basis. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

It is a common understanding in the fishing industry that a fishing trip is only completed when the catch has been off-loaded to the cannery and the vessel has been cleaned. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

The fundamental purpose of Seaman Protection and Relief Act is not to penalize, but rather to compensate seamen for their wages when a company fails to provide its crew with written fishing agreements. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Kassandra Z, 3 A.S.R.3d 163 (Trial Div. 1999).

As a general principle of maritime law, a seaman who falls ill or is injured during a voyage is entitled to maintenance, cure, and wages for the remainder of the voyage. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 4 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 2000).

Under 46 U.S.C. § 11107, when read in light of the larger statutory scheme, the Seamen Protection and Relief Act, and together with 46 U.S.C. § 10601, ships’ masters are not entitled to statutory wages. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 4 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 2000).

Under 46 U.S.C. § 10601 and § 11107, a seaman’s statutory wage claim gives rise to a maritime lien having priority over a preferred ship mortgage lien. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 4 A.S.R.3d 225 (Trial Div. 2000).

The purpose of the portion of statutory wages awarded under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 that is more than what the seaman would have received had his fishing agreement been valid is designed to punish ship owners who illegally engage seamen. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Historically, the purpose of the requirement of a written shipping articles agreement under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 was to protect seamen from exploitation and mistreatment, while its modern purpose is to avoid disputes about wages and other terms and conditions of employment. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Statutory wages awarded under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 are not punitive damages since the statute merely substitutes for an oral fishing agreement and calls for the rate of wages that are to be paid. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Statutory wages awarded under 46 U.S.C. § 11107 give rise to preferred maritime liens that are recoverable in rem and are granted the highest priority after in custodia legis costs. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

In contrast to 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g), 46 U.S.C. § 11107 has no language limiting recovery of penalty wages only as against the vessel’s master or owner and therefore permits recovery in rem against the sale proceeds of a fishing vessel. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Operation of 46 U.S.C. § 11107 is automatic, rendering oral agreements between a crew and the employer void and awarding statutory wages, regardless of whether the employer made partial payment of wages on the agreements’ terms. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

A wronged seaman is entitled to recover the higher of either the wages he orally agreed to, or the higher rate of wages that could be earned by a seaman at the port of hire who has the same rating (rank, job classification, duties and ability) as the complainant. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

A court examines the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a seaman has demonstrated that he or she is comparable to another seaman for purposes of 46 U.S.C. § 11107. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

The trial court’s finding that crew members, other than ordinary deckhands, were “interchangeable” with crew members of other ships and fleets without reference to their rank, job classification, duties and abilities was clearly erroneous in light of the crew’s burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence and the lack of facts that would support such a finding. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

§ 4(4) —Carriage of Goods by Sea

Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a carrier has an affirmative duty to properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

The plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for breach, and does so by establishing that the goods were damaged while in the carrier’s custody or by establishing that the goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition but were found to be damaged upon receipt. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a carrier’s liability is limited to $500 per item, unless the shipper chooses to declare a higher value. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

The carrier bears the initial burden of offering prima facie evidence of adequate notice of the limit of liability, which is satisfied by showing that the bill of lading advised the shipper of the liability limitation and of the options for increasing that amount, and including such language in the bill of lading puts the shipper on constructive notice of the liability limitation; actual notice is not required. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

Although a shipper is unaware of the bill of lading and so does not have even constructive notice of his options for coverage, he is nevertheless bound by its terms where he has instructed a car dealership to deliver a car on his behalf. That authorization creates a legal agency relationship between the shipper and the dealership, and the latter, authorized to deliver goods of another to a common carrier for transportation, may be treated as having authority to stipulate for and accept the terms of the contract of carriage, and the owner will be presumed to have full knowledge of the contract and will accordingly be bound by its terms. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

In the ordinary course of events it is not necessary for the shipper to sign a bill of lading, and he may be bound by its terms and conditions even though he has not signed it. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

Where the plaintiff offers evidence giving some credence to his claim of damages, the claim is not frivolous, and an award of attorney’s fees to the defendant would not be appropriate. Salofa v. South Seas Steamship, Inc., 3 A.S.R.3d 130 (Trial Div. 1999).

§ 4(5) —Remedies & Damages

Punitive damages cannot be recovered against a vessel. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

The doctrine of quantum meruit awards a plaintiff an amount equal to the value of the benefit he has provided to protect against the unjust enrichment of the beneficiary. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Under quantum meruit, crew entitled to the value of the benefit they conferred upon their vessel and its owners where crew was instrumental in keeping the vessel in working order even though the imminent voyage never materialized because the vessel maintained a higher price upon judicial sale than would have been realized if the vessel were run-down. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

Calculation of crew’s recovery in quantum meruit for maintaining a vessel before a voyage that never occurs is the actual value of the benefit conferred, not the hypothetical benefit that might have accrued had the ship taken the voyage. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

American Samoa law allows in rem recovery against a vessel of a quantum meruit award. TCW Special Credits v. F/V Cassandra Z, 7 A.S.R.3d 3 (App. Div. 2003).

§ 5 Maritime Torts

SEE TORTS

§ 5(1) —General Principles

A structure may be a vessel or other appropriate maritime object for the purpose of some admiralty rules but not for others. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.

In admiralty, the defendant has the burden of proving the degree of fault of settling third-parties not present before the court; once the exact percentages of fault are established, liability and assessed damages are calculated on a pro rata basis. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.

The equitable alter ego doctrine is applicable in admiralty but will only disregard a corporate entity upon a proper factual showing. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 145.

In the absence of any even minimally probative evidence tending to show that a defendant bore some quantifiable measure of responsibility, the court will decline to arbitrarily guess what that percentage may be. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

§ 5(2) —Negligence

Having been made applicable by statute to actions for personal injury or property damage and so being compatible with the legislature’s will, comparative negligence is properly incorporated into admiralty. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 23 A.S.R.2d 76.

Rejecting “expert user,” assumption of risk, and contributory negligence defenses as barring recovery, American Samoa adopts the comparative-negligence approach in admiralty. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 23 A.S.R.2d 76.

In determining proximate cause for tort cases in admiralty, American Samoa adopts the approach of weighing all of plaintiff’s conduct, defendant’s liability, and all other factors causing the loss or injury. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 23 A.S.R.2d 76.

In admiralty it is well settled that fishing vessel owners and commercial fishermen may recover for lost fishing profits under the general maritime law of negligence. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

Where a plaintiff pleads both Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, a showing of negligence also establishes unseaworthiness. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

There are two elements which a plaintiff must prove in a Jones Act negligence claim: (1) that there was a negligent act by the defendant, and (2) that there is a but-for causal connection between the act and the injury. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The Jones Act is to be liberally construed in favor of plaintiffs. The “slight negligence” necessary to support an action under FELA or the Jones Act is defined as a failure to exercise great care, and that burden of proof is much less than the burden required to sustain recovery in ordinary negligence actions. Evidence of even slight negligence is sufficient to find liability under the Jones Act. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The plaintiff’s burden to prove the but-for causation element of a Jones Act negligence claim is minimal. If the employer’s negligent act or omission played any part, however slight, in bringing about the injury, the employer is liable. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

A plaintiff, injured from disentangling a net from a vessel’s propeller, establishes but-for causation, in that but-for the negligent entanglement of the net in the vessel’s propeller, and the plaintiff’s cutting of the net away, the plaintiff would not have received his injuries. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The assumption of risk defense is not a defense to either an unseaworthiness claim or a Jones Act claim. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The doctrine that a defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him applies to Jones Act claims. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

A claim of unseaworthiness lies against a vessel’s owner. A Jones Act negligence claim, on the other hand, lies against a seaman’s employer. A seaman’s employer is vicariously liable for the negligence of the vessel’s captain and any other employee. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

A Jones Act claim cannot be maintained in rem. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Pre-judgment interest is not allowed on either Jones Act or unseaworthiness claims. However, post-judgment interest under the Jones Act is allowed from the date of a court’s final decree. Interest may also be awarded in general maritime cases at the court’s discretion. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

When a moving vessel strikes an anchored vessel, a presumption of negligence on the part of the moving vessel arises. This presumption is even stronger where the moving vessel lurches onto the shore and strikes a dry-docked vessel. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

Persons engaged in the business of navigation are bound to see that the vessel is seaworthy, well manned, and equipped for the business in which it is engaged, and whenever a collision ensues from the defective condition or unfitness of the colliding vessel for the voyage, the vessel and the owner are liable. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

Where a company is aware that fraying is going to occur in a vessel’s throttle cables, resulting in navigational difficulties and possible collisions, the failure to take steps to prevent such an occurrence may be grossly negligent, reckless or willful. However, in order to so find, the court requires evidence of the standard of care in the industry, the number of accidents that occur in the same type of situation, the cost of replacement of faulty parts, etc. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

The duty of care that employers owe to seamen under the Jones Act is identical to the duty of care that employers owe to employees under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. Sections 51 et seq. The duty of care employers owe under the FELA is not merely a duty to exercise reasonable care, as in the typical negligence suit, but is rather a duty to exercise “great care”. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.

Determinations of negligence in admiralty cases are findings of fact which will be given application unless clearly erroneous. In general, fact finding does not require mathematical certainty. Factfinders, whether jurors or judges are supposed to reach their conclusions on the basis of common sense, common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which inferences can fairly be drawn. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.

Since the question of but-for causation under the Jones Act is a question of fact, a factfinder’s conclusions with respect to causation must stand unless clearly erroneous. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.

The foreseeability question restricts the imposition of liability to cases in which the injuries to the plaintiff are the natural and reasonably predictable consequences of a negligent action, or in the case of an unseaworthiness claim, of a ship’s unseaworthiness. It is clearly foreseeable that a crewmember must repair a vessel when it is damaged to the point of being dead in the water. Volunteering to assist in such repairs is a normal response to the stimulus of a dangerous situation. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.

The Jones Act provides a cause of action to seamen for personal injuries sustained in the course of their employment. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

In order for an individual to be considered a “seaman” under the Jones Act, (1) the individual’s duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission; and (2) the individual must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in nature and duration. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

All circumstances of an individual’s employment must be weighed to determine whether he/she has a sufficient relationship to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where vessel had remained in dry dock and tied up at port for at least three years, individuals who had repaired vessel in attempt to ready it for navigation were considered “land-based” employees, not seamen, and were not entitled to relief under the Jones Act. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where port engineer had no authority to hire crewmembers, his statement that Plaintiffs were “crewmembers’ carried no weight in determining seaman status. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

Where workers possessed expectations of becoming seamen in the future, such expectation was insufficient to raise workers to seamen status in present. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

Requirement that employee’s work be done at sea is first basic principle of being a seaman. Estate of Young v. M/V Diana Lynn, 1 A.S.R.3d 154 (Trial Div. 1997).

The Jones Act provides a remedy for seaman injured in the course of their employment as a result of their employer’s negligence. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The Jones Act made the Federal Employers’ Liability Act applicable to maritime law, thereby authorizing a right to recovery for seamen injured due to the negligence of their employer, its agents or employees. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Jones Act standard of negligence, a shipowner has an obligation to his seamen that is substantially greater than the obligation of an ordinary employer to employees. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Jones Act, a shipowner has an absolute, nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care in furnishing his seamen a reasonably safe place to work, a seaworthy ship and safe equipment. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Jones act, a shipowner-employer need not guarantee the safety of the vessel, but must take reasonable precautions to ensure it is safe. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

In order to prove negligence under the Jones Act, a plaintiff must prove actual or constructive knowledge, while the evidentiary showing necessary to establish unseaworthiness is predicated without regard to fault or the use of due care. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Jones Act, there is an absolute, nondelegable duty of the shipowner to maintain a reasonably safe vessel, extending to equipment and appliances used on the vessel. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A shipowner’s financial difficulties may provide an explanation, but do not establish a defense for a breach of the shipowner’s duty to maintain the ship and its equipment in reasonably safe and seaworthy condition. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A shipowner does not have a duty to supply the best, newest, or perfect tools, gear, or appliances, so long as the gear supplied was reasonably safe and suitable. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A shipowner is not required to provide an accident-proof ship nor the latest and best safety devices, but only to provide a safe place in which to work and safe and seaworthy appliances with which to do the work. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

If the safety equipment that would have prevented the injury or death were impossible to install, then of course a shipowner cannot be held to have breached its duty of reasonable care. However, the failure to provide reasonable and procurable safety equipment, if such failure proximately causes the injury, is grounds for a finding of negligence. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The standard of causation under the Jones Act is whether an employer’s negligence caused, in whole or in part, the seaman’s injury. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Liability under the Jones Act is found where the employer’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing injury or death. This “slight” standard of causation is often called “featherweight.” TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The right of a seaman to recover under the Jones Act, and his right to maintenance and cure under admiralty law, are independent and cumulative. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Where negligence is found against an employer by a plaintiff seaman under the Jones Act, it supplements but does not supplant further remedies for maintenance and cure. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The liability of a shipowner for maintenance and cure of a sick or injured seaman exists irrespective of fault or negligence on the part of the shipowner or his agents. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 5(3) —Unseaworthiness

Under general maritime law, an owner or operator of a vessel has an absolute duty to ensure that the vessel is seaworthy. This is a no-fault duty, and no showing of negligence or knowledge is required. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

A seaworthy vessel is one that is reasonably fit and suitable for its intended use. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

To prevail on a claim for unseaworthiness, a plaintiff must show both unseaworthiness and proximate causation. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The condition of seaworthiness is a relative one. A ship can be unseaworthy as to only one seaman. A condition of unseaworthiness can arise once the ship has set out to sea or from a transitory condition. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The factfinder determines the question of seaworthiness. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Where a plaintiff pleads both Jones Act negligence and unseaworthiness, a showing of negligence also establishes unseaworthiness. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The assumption of risk defense is not a defense to either an unseaworthiness claim or a Jones Act claim. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

In unseaworthiness cases, the plaintiff must not only establish cause in fact, but also proximate cause, i.e., that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness. The question of proximate cause examines whether a cause is so attenuated in time or space, or whether an act or actor has intervened in the causal chain, so as to relieve the defendant of liability. Clifton v. Voyager, 31 A.S.R.2d 12.

Under general maritime law, a shipowner is absolutely liable for injuries caused to a seaman if such were received as a result of the unseaworthiness of the ship or failure to supply and keep in order the appliances of the ship. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The shipowner’s liability for personal injuries under the doctrine of unseaworthiness is strict, absolute, and without fault. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A shipowner has the duty, owed to every seaman employed on board, to maintain a ship’s equipment in proper operating condition. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The failure of a piece of vessel equipment under proper and expected use is sufficient to establish unseaworthiness. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

To prevail on a claim of unseaworthiness. a plaintiff must show both unseaworthiness and proximate causation. The unseaworthy condition must have played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury, and the injury must be either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthy condition. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 5(4) —Maintenance & Cure

The duty of the shipowner to provide for the ill or injured seaman can be traced as far back as the Sea Codes of the Middle Ages. This right, to recover maintenance and cure without regard to fault, is among the most pervasive incidents of the responsibility anciently imposed upon a shipowner. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

Under general maritime law, a shipowner has an obligation to care for a seaman injured during the course of maritime employment. The obligation includes payment for any injury or illness, which manifests itself during employment, regardless of the source of the injury or whether it preexisted the journey. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

To be eligible to claim maintenance and cure against a shipowner, a seaman must be “in the service of his ship” at the time of the injury. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Under maintenance and cure a seaman is entitled to receive food and lodging of a kind and quality received aboard ship, as well as necessary medical services to the point of maximum cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The point of maximum cure is reached on the date that a seaman’s physician determines that further treatment is unlikely to result in the betterment of the seaman’s condition. This can include a determination that the incapacity is permanent. Doubts are to be resolved in the seaman’s favor. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

The court has discretion whether to award interest on unpaid maintenance and cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

In a normal case of unpaid maintenance and cure, pre-judgment interest is payable from the date the payment was initially due the plaintiff. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Attorney’s fees are allowed for a bad-faith refusal to pay maintenance and cure. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Maintenance and cure obligations arise when a seaman becomes disabled through no fault of his own while in service of the ship. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

The only requirement for eligibility under the theory of “maninenance and cure” is that the seaman be “in the service of his ship” at the time of the injury. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Some evidentiary proof must be offered regarding the seaman’s actual expenditures or actual liability incurred for maintenance and cure. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under “maintenance and cure”, a vessel’s owner is obliged to pay the medical expenses of the seaman until he reaches maximum recovery or until the disease or illness he suffers from is recognized as incurable. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A seaman’s recovery for medical expenses under “maintenance and cure” is limited to the amount actually expended or liability actually incurred. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Maximum cure is achieved when it is probable that further treatment will result in no betterment of the seaman’s condition. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A shipowner’s failure to meet his maintenance and cure obligation may result in liability for consequential and incidental damages, including attorney’s fees, where the employer is “willful and persistent” in his refusal to pay maintenance and cure. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A “maintenance and cure” claim may merit an award of punitive damages and attorney’s fees, where the shipowner: (1) is lax in investigating a claim; (2) terminates benefits in response to the seaman’s retention of counsel or refusal of a settlement offer; and (3) fails to reinstate benefits after diagnosis of an ailment previously not determined medically. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 5(5) —Limits on Liability

The “flotilla rule” governing limitation of liability for accidents involving more than a single vessel states that in “pure tort” cases, in which the parties have no legal relationship to one another, the owner’s liability cannot exceed the value of the “offending vessel,” while in “consensual” cases, in which the injured party has a contractual relationship to the vessel owner, liability is limited to all commonly owned vessels engaged in the single contractual enterprise. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.

The “consensual” rule of limitation of maritime liability applies where the injured party is an employee of the vessel owner. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.

A skiff aboard a fishing boat is not itself a “vessel” for limitation of liability purposes, and an owner seeking to limit his liability for injuries occurring on a skiff lashed to its mother ship would have to tender the aggregate value of both the ship and the skiff. In re M/V Tradition, 6 A.S.R.2d 99.

To prove that an injury was proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition, the unseaworthy condition must have played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury, and the injury must be either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthy condition. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

§ 5(6) —Damages

Lost future wages, also called impaired earning capacity, are determined by considering what the plaintiff’s income would probably have been, how long it would have lasted, and all the contingencies to which it was liable. To ascertain the amount of lost future wages to be awarded, the court must take four steps: (1) determine whether the worker’s earning capacity has been diminished; (2) determine the duration of the loss; (3) determine the value of the worker’s loss over this period; and (4) consider reducing the award to present value. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

A defendant has the burden of production and proof on the issue of reducing a plaintiff’s award for lost future wages, or impaired earning. Clifton v. Voyager, Inc., 29 A.S.R.2d 80.

Damages in vessel collision cases are estimated in the same manner as in other suits of like nature for injuries to personal property. The award should include all losses proximately resulting from the collision, the general rule being that the owner of the vessel is to be placed in the same position he would have occupied had the disaster not occurred. Although the injured party may be entitled to full indemnity, the respondents are not, as a rule, liable for such damages as might have been reasonably avoided by the exercise of ordinary skill and diligence, after the collision on the part of those in charge of the injured ship. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

Where repairs are practicable, the measure of damages is the cost of restoring the injured vessel to the condition in which it was at the time of the collision. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

The court is not required to assess damages with mathematical precision, though it must strive to be as accurate as possible. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

The court must sometimes make damage determinations in areas that require more than layman’s skill. In doing so, the court may make judgments on the veracity of experts’ statements, such as whether the expert inflated figures. Rizzo v. M/V Fotu O Samoa, 30 A.S.R.2d 131.

A threshold issue in determining damages is whether the injuries sustained by the seaman prevent the seaman from returning to a career in the fishing industry. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

A primary issue involved in computing the expected pay rate for lost earnings regards a seaman’s contention that, had he been able to remain in the fishing industry, he would have been elevated to the more profitable position on a vessel. This level of lost earnings will not be recoverable where that claim is entirely improbable. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

In rendering the true value of an award of damages, there exists a clear judicial policy based on fairness and practical logic, of taking present value and inflation into account. This may be done by judicial notice, considered adjudication, or later submission of evidence by the parties. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the Jones Act and the law of unseaworthiness, contributory negligence, however gross, does not bar recovery but only mitigates damages. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 5(7) —Compensation & Recovery

Under the collateral source rule, which applies to torts in admiralty and virtually all other tort cases, an injured party’s compensation from a source independent of the tortfeasor is not deducted from damages otherwise collectable from the tortfeasor. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.

A shipowner has a right of indemnity against a third party tortfeasor for maintenance and cure paid to an injured seaman to the extent occasioned by the third party tortfeasor’s fault. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

Admiralty law recognizes that even where a party to a lawsuit settles, it may still bring an indemnity action against a joint tort feasor. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

Even when defendant rejects plaintiff’s tender of defense of the personal injury and wrongful death claims, the failure to tender, alone, would not preclude an indemnity claim by plaintiff, if that claim still presented a valid theory of relief. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

The fact the crew themselves contributed to the injury does not preclude an indemnity claim, if they were liable as well. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

The general rule is against recovery of attorney’s fees as such, by a party which incurs them in enforcing a claim against another. It is equally well settled, however, that the reasonable expenses incurred by an indemnitee in defending a claim against him may be recovered of his indemnitor–and that these expenses include attorney’s fees. This exception applies equally to courts sitting in admiralty. However, the prevailing party in an admiralty case is generally not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, absent statutory authorization. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

In cases where contribution has been allowed for damages, both in admiralty and non-admiralty, courts have generally denied a right to contribution for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defense of the action brought by the injured party. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

The general rule is to award prejudgment interest, although this award always lies soundly within the court’s discretion. However, it is also true that when certain “peculiar” circumstances exist, the discretion to deny prejudgment interest is sustained. These peculiar circumstances have fallen into three categories: (1) “plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit,” (2) “the existence of a genuine dispute regarding ultimate liability or the complexity of the factual and legal issues to be resolved,” and (3) “judgment in an amount substantially less than that claimed. Interocean Ships v. Samoa Gases, 26 A.S.R.2d 28.

The court has wide discretion in allowance of various cost awards in admiralty. Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoa Gases, 27 A.S.R.2d 5.

A trial court’s allocation of percentages of fault is a finding of fact and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Under the primary duty rule, a seaman-employee may not recover from his employer for injuries caused by his own failure to perform a duty imposed on him by his employment. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Where an employee consciously assumes a duty toward a wrongdoer as a term of employment, failure of this duty results in a bar to any recovery under the Jones Act. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

Application of the primary duty rule is limited by three principles: First the “primary duty” rule will not bar a claim of injury arising from the breach of a duty that the plaintiff did not consciously assume as a term of his employment. Second, the rule does not, apply where a seaman is injured by a dangerous condition that he did not create and, in the proper exercise of his employment duties, could not have controlled or eliminated. Third, the rule applies only to a knowing violation of a duty consciously assumed as a term of employment. TCW Special Credits, Inc. v. F/V Cassandra Z, 5 A.S.R.3d 104 (Trial Div. 2001).

AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL

§ 1 Agency Relationship

1(1) —General Principles

1(2) —Creation

1(3) —Existence

1(4) —Termination

2 Authority of Agent

2(1) —General Provisions

2(2) —Express Authority

2(3) —Implied Authority

2(4) —Apparent Authority

3 Rights, Duties, and Liabilities

3(1) —Between Principal and Agent

3(2) —Between Principal and Third Person

3(3) —Between Principal and Independent Contractor

3(4) —Between Agent and Third Person

4 Powers of Attorney

§ 1 Agency Relationship

§ 1(1) —General Principles

RESERVED

§ 1(2) —Creation

Oral agreement by person who negotiated on behalf of purchaser that negotiator would guarantee payment from purchaser created an agency or surety relationship between purchaser and negotiator, and vendor could look to third party for payment. Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 31.

§ 1(3) —Existence

Court will not presume that agency exists from mere fact that person apparently is acting for another. Bank of American Samoa v. Brown, 2 A.S.R. 365.

Agency relationship exists between owner of vehicle and one who drives the vehicle in furtherance of the owner’s interest or enterprise. Sataua v. Himphill, 5 A.S.R.2d 61.

Agency exists where a principal has the right to control the conduct of an agent, and the agent has power to affect the legal relations of the principal. On this basis, a seller named in an invoice is an agent for her or his principal. Joseph D. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Comm. Credit Corp. of American Samoa, 29 A.S.R.2d 121.

Whether a master/servant relationship has been established depends on a number of factors, the most important of which is the master’s right to control the physical conduct of the servant. Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

§ 1(4) —Termination

An agent who abandons the principle or his duties as an agent has terminated the agency relationship. Pomare v. Pefu, 5 A.S.R.3d 242 (Land & Titles Div. 2001).

§ 2 Authority of Agent

§ 2(1) —General Provisions

Agent may sign contract for principal whether or not principal is present, and alleged erroneous statement of trial court that principal was present was harmless error. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Even under Statute of Frauds, one partner may obligate partnership by signing contract, acting as agent for other partners. Scanlan v. Steffany, 3 A.S.R. 583.

Where bus driver’s supervisor submitted affidavit that any use of bus other than transporting children to school was outside the scope of driver’s employment, but there is evidence that passengers on school bus may have been government employees who had been working on the bus, whether driver was within scope of employment is a disputed material fact precluding summary judgment. Utu v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 9 A.S.R.2d 88.

When an agent settles a claim on behalf of its principal, which settlement is dependent upon facts known to be doubtful, the settlement is not voidable when the doubtful facts turn out to be incorrect. Kent Samoa Inc. v. Shimasaki, 29 A.S.R.2d 44.

Servants, in master/servant relationships, are also capable of appointing subservants, who act under the primary control of the servant but who create liabilities for both the servant and the master. Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

An agent’s knowledge will be imputed to the principal, when the matter is within the scope of the agent’s authority and with reference to matters over which the agent’s authority extends. American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 2(2) —Express/Actual Authority

An agent is not liable for lawful acts done within the scope of his authority for and on behalf of a disclosed principal, and the acts of investigating and terminating an employee are presumed to be acts done within the scope of authority granted by the employer; a principal is solely liable for acts of its agent committed in the course of or within the scope of the agent’s employment. Tuika v. American Samoa Dev. Corp., 3 A.S.R.3d 155 (Trial Div. 1999).

§ 2(3) —Implied Authority

Owner’s consent to another person’s use of a vehicle may be inferred from a past course of conduct or relationship between the parties. Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

When the driver of a vehicle is a member of the vehicle owner’s family or household, it is more likely that the driver has the owner’s implied consent to use the vehicle. Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

Principle that family relationship between driver and vehicle owner suggests owner’s implied consent does not apply to Samoan extended communal family. Toleafoa v. Sioka, 5 A.S.R.2d 18.

Implied permission to use a vehicle is inferred from past occasions of acquiescence or absence of objection in circumstances signifying consent on the part of the vehicle owner. Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

Evidence was contrary to a showing of acquiescence and passive consent by government to personal use of its vehicle by its employee, where written statement of policies forbade any after-hours or weekend use without specific prior approval of manager; the Governor himself had sent out a memorandum with respect to such use; and the employee’s manager had raised the Governor’s concerns at staff meetings and circulated the Governor’s memorandum to the staff. Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

Inferential in nature, implied permission for a vehicle’s use is usually shown by usage and practice of the parties over a sufficient period of time. Leilua v. Ali’itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

Although weaker evidence will support a finding of implied permission to use a vehicle if the drivers are blood relatives than if they were strangers or mere acquaintances, the mere existence of a close family relationship does not of itself establish permissive use. Leilua v. Ali’itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

An agent to whom the principal gives the appearance of authority may bind the principal regardless of whether actual authority exists. Kent Samoa Inc. v. Shimasaki, 29 A.S.R.2d 44.

Where person who effectuated transfer of assets of insurance company which had deposited trust funds was attorney for first corporation, and director, officer and attorney for second corporation, second corporation is deemed to have known of the nature of the transfer and, by virtue of its affirmative activity, knowledge and acquiescence, will be estopped in equity from claiming those funds. American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 2(4) —Apparent Authority

Although Legislature had enacted rules defining members who could contract on its behalf, where circumstances suggested that these “binding officers” were aware that Committee Chairman was contracting on Legislature’s behalf and did nothing to inform parties that their approvals were required, binding officers’ inaction and acquiescence to the Committee Chairman’s conduct caused Plaintiff to rely on agreement and Legislature would be estopped from disavowing contract and would instead be bound by contract under principles of agency law. Misipeka v. Legislature of American Samoa, 7 A.S.R.3d 96 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 3 Rights, Duties, and Liabilities

§ 3(1) —Between Principal and Agent

Agent of corporation, acting on behalf of corporation, is not personally liable for corporate debts. Jt. Holdings & Tr. Ltd. v. P. J. Brennan, Inc., of Samoa, 4 A.S.R. 812.

In determining whether a business entity believes in good faith that its claim is just for the purpose of determining whether the claim can be consideration for a settlement, the entity is chargeable with the knowledge of its agents who participated in the transactions giving rise to the claim. Development Bank v. Ilalio, 5 A.S.R.2d 110.

An agent is generally not a party to a contract made for a disclosed principal. Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 149.

An institutional party to litigation is chargeable with the knowledge, and responsible for the actions, of its agents who conduct the transactions that are the subject of the litigation. Bank of Hawaii v. Congregational Christian Church, 9 A.S.R.2d 100.

Government employee who, in the early hours of the morning and while in an intoxicated condition, went to his place of work and picked up his employer’s vehicle and then invited friends to go riding in the vehicle, was acting outside the scope of his employment; although he was to have used the vehicle later that day in his employment, his earlier personal use was unauthorized and contrary to written policies and directives governing private use of government vehicles, and he was clearly on a frolic of his own. Tauiliili v. American Samoa Government, 13 A.S.R.2d 61.

Where employee’s negligence was clearly related to her performance of her duties but was also clearly related to her agreement with the child’s parents, who had reason to know her strengths and weaknesses and the dangers of their entrustment to her of their child’s safety, the employer would be vicariously liable for the employee’s negligent performance of her duties and the parents would be liable for such negligence as was attributable to the private agreement. Saufo`i v. American Samoa Government, 14 A.S.R.2d 15.

Employer/bailee is also contractually liable for the negligence of his employees in executing the bailment, since he cannot receive money for performing a duty and at the same time escape liability for violating such duty by shifting the responsibility to an employee. Garcia v. Galea`i, 15 A.S.R.2d 14.

A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his principal to liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the other party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is not so authorized. Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

A servant is only bound to obey reasonable orders of the employer. Faumuina v. American Samoa Gov’t Emp. Ret. Fund, 1 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 1997).

§ 3(2) —Between Principal and Third Person

One who delegates his affairs to lawyers, accountants, and others, and who signs the documents his own agents have prepared for him, cannot escape liability to a third party by claiming that the documents are not binding on him because he did not read or understand them. Ralston Purina Co. v. The Louise V, 3 A.S.R.2d 48.

Under doctrine of respondeat superior, a bailee employer is vicariously liable for loss or injury with respect to the bailed property which results from the negligence or wrongful acts or omissions of his employees in executing the bailment within the course and scope of their employment. Garcia v. Galea`i, 15 A.S.R.2d 14.

When a servant steps outside of his employment to do some act for himself, not connected with the master’s business, the master is not vicariously liable if those acts cause tortious harm. Fa’aola v. Taumua, 27 A.S.R.2d 115.

A party who conducts a transaction with an agent is liable to a disclosed principal to the same extent as if the principal had conducted the transaction. Joseph D. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Comm. Credit Corp. of American Samoa, 29 A.S.R.2d 121.

The relationship of master and servant is a species of agency in which the principal may be liable for the torts of the agent. Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

Inherent in the power of agency, is the power of the agent to subject the principal to liability for unauthorized conduct. Poutoa v. American Samoa Gov’t, 31 A.S.R.2d 40.

A principal will be bound and liable for the acts of his agent performed with actual or apparent authority from the principal, and within the scope of the agent’s employment. Jiang v. Daewoosa Samoa, Ltd., 6 A.S.R.3d 138 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3(3) —Between Principal and Independent Contractor

SEE EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3 – INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS

SEE TORTS § 8 – VICARIOUS LIABILITY

A garageman who had possession of a vehicle in order to repair it and who was outside the direction or control of the owner was an “independent contractor” for whose negligence the owner could not be held liable under a theory of agency or master/servant liability. Sataua v. Himphill, 5 A.S.R.2d 61.

The employer of an independent contractor is generally not liable for physical harm done by the contractor or the contractor’s employees; however, an employer is liable when he knows or has reason to know that, in the ordinary course of doing the work in a usual or prescribed manner, the work is likely to result in trespass. Letuli v. Le’i, 22 A.S.R.2d 77.

As a general rule, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm resulting from that contractor’s acts or omissions. American Samoa Gov’t v. .145 Acres, 5 A.S.R.3d 61 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 3(4) —Between Agent and Third Person

SEE TORTS § 8 – VICARIOUS LIABILITY

When a seller conditions his agreement to sell goods on an agent’s proffer of his own creditworthiness on behalf of that agent’s principal, the agent becomes an accountable party to the sales contract. Ryan, Inc., v. Vaka, 5 A.S.R.2d 149.

A known agent is not liable for the debts of its disclosed principal. Korea Deep Sea Fisheries Assn. v. M/V Corona #1, 27 A.S.R.2d 53.

Under the partially disclosed principal theory of an agent’s liability to a third party for actions the agent has taken on behalf of a principal, the third party must establish that the third party was aware of the agency, was without knowledge of the principal’s identity, and had formed a valid contract with the agent. Korea Deep Sea Fisheries v. M/V Corona, 27 A.S.R.2d 155.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, one expressly promises to incur liability, regardless of his own fault, for the negligent or intentional conduct of his agents or employees. Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 4 Powers of Attorney

Where individual relocated to Hawaii, such action constituted a voluntarily abandonment of his authority to act, under power of attorney, for person residing in American Samoa. Such abandonment effectively terminated the power of attorney and such authority could not be restored without execution of new power of attorney. Pomare v. Pefu, 5 A.S.R.3d 242 (Land & Titles Div. 2001).

Combined Digest 2008 ed. (through 7 A.S.R.3d)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

4 Maritime Contracts

5 Maritime Torts

AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL

BANKRUPTCY

CIVIL PROCEDURE

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CONTRACTS

4(1) —General Principles

4(2) —Oral Modification

4(3) —Written Modification

4(4) —Ratification

5 Contract Interpretation

CORPORATION AND PARTNERSHIP

CRIMINAL LAW

ELECTIONS

3 Issues – Candidates

EMPLOYMENT LAW

EVIDENCE

8 Hearsay

FAMILY LAW

4 Legitimacy & Inheritance

IMMIGRATION

3 Exclusion

4 Deportation

INSURANCE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

LEGAL PROFESSION

MATAI TITLE DISPUTES

REAL PROPERTY

RELIGION

SAMOAN CUSTOMS

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

3 Election of Remedies Rule

4 Debtor Default

5 Repossession of Property

6 Creditor Sale

7 Garnishment of Funds

8 Guaranty

9 Third Party Debtor

10 Letter of Credit Transactions

11 Mortgages

12 Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits

13 Banking and Loans

14 National Credit Union Administration Board

TAXATION

2 Procedural Issues

9 Taxpayer Offenses

10 Deficiency Proceedings

11 Industrial Incentive Act

TORTS

14 Comparative & Contributory Negligence

15 Joint and Several Liability

21 Act of God

WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

5 Inheritance

9 Administration

10 Taxation

14 Wrongful Death

15 Power of Attorney

WORKER’S COMPENSATION

6 Employer Liability

8 Judicial Review

9 Beneficiaries

10 Costs in a Worker’s Compensation Proceeding

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

4 Maritime Contracts

5 Maritime Torts

AGENCY AND PRINCIPAL

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