7ASR3d80
JOAO ALVES, Plaintiff,
v.
M/V KOORALE, her engines, tackle, bunkers,
appurtenances in rem, Defendant.
______________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-in-Intervention,
M/V KOORALE, O.N. 545564, her engines, tackle, bunkers, appurtenances,
etc., in rem, Defendant.
High Court of American Samoa
Trial
Division
CA
No. 32-02
March
13, 2003
[1] In an in rem action, party’s
motion to intervene is unnecessary where party has asserted ownership of the
property at issue and the court has accepted the party’s ownership claim.
[2] While some courts allow the
vessel itself to bring a counterclaim in an in rem action, American
Samoa courts follow the approach permitting a claimant acting on behalf of the
ship to counterclaim.
[3] When the owner asserts his claim
to the ship and assumes the responsibility of the lawsuit by defending it and
putting up a security, for all intents and purposes, he has officially
intervened in the suit.
[4] Counterclaims that arise after the initial pleadings are considered “after acquired” and
can only be asserted by leave of court in exercise of its discretion.
[5] Court will exercise its discretion and allow after-acquired
counterclaims where claims are properly asserted as counterclaims and where
permitting claims would be in the interest of judicial economy and fairness to
avoid multiple litigations.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, MAMEA,
Associate Judge, and TUPUIVAO, Associate Judge.
Counsel:
For Plaintiff, William H.
Reardon
For
Plaintiff-in-Intervention, Barry I. Rose
For
Defendants, Roy, J.D. Hall, Jr. and Mark
F. Ude
ORDER
ON MOTION TO AMEND
PLEADINGS
AND INTERVENE
We are presented with yet another
pre-trial motion in the case of the M/V Koorale. The owner of the boat, M & F Fishing,
Inc. (“M & F Fishing”),
having already entered an appearance on behalf of the Koorale as its claimant,
now seeks to intervene in the case and assert two counterclaims against the
plaintiff. Additionally, the defendant in
rem, the M/V Koorale, has moved to amend its answer and assert the same two
counterclaims against the plaintiff. The
odd posture of the motions—that the owner, already involved in the litigation,
is seeking to officially intervene and that the vessel is seeking to assert a
counterclaim—is due to the legal fiction consequent to an admiralty suit in rem
and the fact that the plaintiff has chosen to pursue a separate in personam action
against the owner in a California Federal District Court.
[1] M & F Fishing’s motion to intervene is
unnecessary, yet understandable. Not
having been sued in personam
in this particular suit, M & F Fishing is seeking to litigate all relevant
claims in one proceeding instead of having to file a separate suit. Of course, not having been sued in
personam, M & F Fishing seems to think it must first intervene. It is our opinion, however, that having
already accepted M & F Fishing’s claim of ownership, we have implicitly
allowed it to intervene in the suit: “the claimant is really an actor in the
litigation, an intervener who comes and asks for his property[.]” See
J.K. Welding Co. v. Gotham
Marine Corporation, 47
F.2d 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (emphasis added).
[2-3] Some courts indulge the legal
fiction of in rem by accepting
the notion that the vessel itself can bring a counterclaim. See,
e.g., Titan Nav., Inc. v. Timsco,
Inc., 808 F.2d 400, 401 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the plaintiff “and
its vessels counterclaimed”). Other
courts simply make the jump that the claimant, acting on behalf of the ship, is
allowed to counterclaim. See, e.g.,
Incas and Monterey Printing v. M/V Sang Jin, 747 F.2d 959, 960 (5th
Cir. 1984); Wallin v. Keegan,
426 F.2d 1313, 1313-14 (5th Cir. 1970).
Because we consider it awkward to allow a “thing” to counterclaim, we
prefer to shed our veil of ignorance and take the second approach. In our view, when the owner asserts his claim
to the ship and assumes the responsibility of the lawsuit by defending it and
putting up a security, for all intents and purposes, he has officially
intervened in the suit.[1]
[4]
We turn then to the vessel’s motion to amend its answer to include two
counterclaims; wrongful arrest and negligence of the substitute custodian. As stated, because of the unique posture of
this case, the owner, acting on behalf of the vessel—but not the vessel
itself—should be allowed to bring any counterclaims in the form of an amended
answer. The two counterclaims, having
matured after the initial pleadings, are
considered “after acquired.” See T.C.R.C.P. 13(e); 6 Charles
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1428 (2d ed. 1990). The only question for us to resolve is
whether to exercise our discretion and allow the counterclaims asserted.
See id. (after-acquired
counterclaims can be asserted only by leave of court in exercise of its discretion).
[5] Such claims have been properly asserted as
counterclaims before. See
State Bank & Trust v. Boat D.J. Griffin, 731 F. Supp.
770, 773-75 (E.D. La. 1990) (wrongful seizure); New River Yachting Ctr., Inc. v. M/V Little Eagle II, 401
F. Supp 132, 133 (S.C. Fla. 1975) (negligence of substitute custodian).[2] Additionally, it is in the interest of
judicial economy and fairness to avoid multiple litigations. Therefore, we exercise our discretion and
allow the amendments.
It is so ordered.
[1] The necessity of
such a holding seems to be limited to the unique situations where, as here,
there is no claim in personam and thus no other avenue for the
defendant/claimant/owner to assert a counterclaim.
[2] Plaintiff’s reliance on Incas, 747 F.2d 958, is misplaced. In that case, the court only dealt with
whether the counterclaim of wrongful arrest was “compulsory” for purposes of
Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule E(7). Outside of the context of Rule E(7), we
consider that, at the very least, such a counterclaim is permissive. See
State Bank & Trust, 731
F. Supp. at 775.