7ASR3d155

AMERICAN

SAMOA GOVERNMENT, Plaintiff

 

v.

 

TOFOI

LAUMATIA, Defendant

 

High

Court of American Samoa

Trial

Division

 

CR

No. 19-03

 

August

22, 2003

 

 

[1] In

determining whether a criminal defendant was, for Miranda purposes, in a

custodial situation when he or she gave a statement, the inquiry is whether

there was a formal arrest or restraint on the person’s freedom of movement to

the degree associated with a formal arrest.

 

[2] The initial

determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating

officers or the person being questioned. 

The relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position

would have understood his situation.

 

[3] Miranda

warnings are not required when a suspect, not under arrest, voluntarily agrees

to accompany police to the station and is released after a brief interview—even

though the questioning took place in a coercive atmosphere.

 

[4] Custody

does not result simply because an individual is questioned in the “coercive

environment” of the station house.

 

Before

KRUSE, Chief Justice, MAMEA, Associate Judge, and TAPOPO, Associate Judge.

 

Counsel: For Plaintiff, Marcellus

T. Uiagalelei, Asst. Attorney General

 For Defendant, Bentley C. Adams III, Asst.

Public Defender

 

ORDER

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Early in the course of a police investigation into allegations of prostitution activity

at the defendant’s place of employment, Detective Romeo Tiumalu and others

visited the defendant’s work place on February 14, 2003.  After finding the defendant there, officer

Tiumalu requested her to accompany him to the police station for questioning.  The defendant complied and rode to the

central station in Fagatogo with the officers in a police vehicle.  At the station, she was questioned by

Detective Lima Togia, however, she was not given any Miranda warnings

before being questioned.  Officer Togia

explained the omission in terms of their thinking at the time that warnings

were not necessary since they were simply looking for information to aid them

in their investigation; that the defendant was not a suspect at the time; and

that the defendant had earlier indicated to the officers that she knew nothing

of any prostitution activity at her work place.[1]  Officer Togia further explained that even

though Detective Tiumalu was the lead investigator in the case, it was decided

that Togia would undertake the interview since he was familiar to the

defendant, having visited the defendant’s place of employment, a night club and

bar, on a number of previous occasions under other circumstances.  On those previous occasions, he had engaged

the defendant in conversation.

 

Three months after she was questioned by the police, the defendant found

herself charged with one count of promoting prostitution, a crime under

A.S.C.A. § 46.3706.  She now moves to

suppress the oral statements she gave to the police on February 14, 2003,

contending, among other things, that the statements were made while she was in

a custodial situation and that the police’s failure to advise her of her Miranda

rights bars the admission of those statements.

[1-2] The central question before us

is whether the defendant was, for Miranda purposes, in a custodial

situation when she gave the statements. In this regard, “the ultimate inquiry

is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of

movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”  California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,

1125 (1983) (per curiam) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495

(1977) (per curiam)).  Moreover, “the

initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the

interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating

officers or the person being questioned.” 

Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per

curiam).  Consequently, “the only

relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have

understood his situation.”  Id. at

324 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)).

 

[3] The facts before us are not

unlike those reviewed in Beheler where it was held that Miranda

warnings are not required when a suspect, not under arrest, voluntarily agrees

to accompany police to the station and is released after a brief interview even

though the questioning took place in a coercive atmosphere.  See Beheler, 463 U.S. at

1121-22.  At the same time, custody does

not result simply because an individual is questioned in the “coercive

environment” of the station house.  Oregon

v. Mathiason, 425 U.S. 429, 495 (1977).

[4] Here, the target of the investigation

was the defendant’s employer.  If

anything then, and from the stance of the reasonable person, the station house

would be the more neutral setting and the less coercive environment, rather

than the defendant’s place of employment. 

Moreover, the evidence showed that the interview was brief—the defendant

told the officers that she knew nothing about any prostitution at her place of

employment—and it was conducted by an officer familiar to the defendant.  After the interview, officer Togia gave the

defendant his card and asked her to contact him again if she came into any

information; she left thereafter.

We find nothing in the evidence that warrants a finding of custody.  We find nothing in the evidence that suggests

police excessiveness.  As we have said

before on a number of occasions, “the exclusionary rule came about as a

prophylactic measure against police excessiveness.”  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656

(1961).  “The rule has not, however,

evolved into some sort of predisposition against anything involving police

action and we refuse to draw inferences where there are none to be drawn.”  Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17

A.S.R.2d 145, 148 (Trial Div. 1990).

We conclude that the defendant was not in a custodial situation at the time she

spoke to the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were not necessary

at the time.  Consequently, her rights

were not violated in the officers’ failure to administer the Miranda

warnings at the time.

The motion to suppress is denied.

It is so ordered.

 

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