5ASR3d91
FONOTAGA SEVA`AETASI, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN SAMOA POWER AUTHORITY, Defendant.
High Court of
American Samoa
Trial Division
CA No. 123-00
May 14, 2001
[1] The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies when an accident’s nature is
such that past experience has shown that it probably resulted from someone’s
negligence and that the defendant is probably responsible.
[2] The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur applies to an accident only under the following conditions:
(1) it ordinarily does not occur without someone’s negligence, (2) it was
caused by an agency or instrumentality within defendant’s exclusive control,
and 3) it was not due to a voluntary action by the plaintiff.
[3] The doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, when applicable, merely establishes a permissive
inference of negligence that the fact finder is not required to adopt.
[4] Evidence was insufficient to sustain inference of
negligence on the part of power company where house fire started from
electrical panel located on opposite side of wall where meter was located and
electricity had been recently re-connected by utility. There was nothing particularly involved, or
untoward, in the utility employee’s disconnecting and reconnecting power supply
which would suggest negligence.
[5] Power company has no duty to insure that load bearing
appliances and circuit breakers on premises are turned off prior to
reconnection of power supply. It is the
responsibility of utility consumers to ensure that their safety switches,
circuit breakers, wiring, and all other components of their respective
electrical systems are adequately designed, sized, and put in place.
Before KRUSE,
Chief Justice, and ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.
Counsel: For
Plaintiff, William H. Reardon
For
Defendant, Roy J.D. Hall, Jr.
Decision and Order
Plaintiff Fonotaga Seva`aetasi’s (“Seva`aetasi”) home and its contents were
destroyed by a fire that broke out shortly after the defendant American Samoa
Power Authority (“ASPA”) had reconnected electrical supply to the
premises. ASPA had previously
disconnected Seva’aetasi’s power because of delinquent utility bills. Seva’aetasi sued, claiming ASPA’s
negligence as the proximate cause of her loss.
Seva`aetasi’s negligence claim is twofold. She argues that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in her case. She reasons that her home’s electrical system
had been operational problem free for many years until ASPA shut down the power
and then reconnected supply. She
contends that these surrounding circumstances coupled with the occurrence of
the fire shortly after reconnection, must point to some sort of negligence on
ASPA’s part. “Homes do not ordinarily
burn down without someone’s negligence.”
(Pl.’s Summation 2.)
Seva`aetasi’s second theory of negligence is based on the
claim that ASPA had a duty of care to ensure that all the “breakers were off”
before reconnecting power. Id.
1. Res Ipsa
Loquitur
[1-3] The doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies “when the accident’s nature is such that past experience
has shown that it probably resulted from someone’s negligence and that the
defendant is probably responsible.” Lang
v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 24 A.S.R.2d 59, 61 (Trial Div.
1993). Specifically, the doctrine
“applies to an accident only under the following conditions: (1) it ordinarily
does not occur without someone’s negligence, (2) it was caused by an agency or
instrumentality within defendant’s exclusive control, and 3) it was not due to
a voluntary action by the plaintiff.” Id. In the final analysis, however, res
ipsa loquitur, as the Appellate
Division explained:
[I]s no more
than one form of circumstantial evidence… .
The inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances is left
to the jury. They are permitted, but
not compelled, to find it.
In other
words, the doctrine, when applicable, merely establishes a
permissive inference of negligence which the fact finder is not required to
adopt.
Iosia v. Nat’l Pac. Ins. Ltd., 20 A.S.R.2d 123,
124-125 (App. Div. 1992) (quoting W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts § 40 (5th
ed. 1984)).
[4] In the matter at bar, we find the evidence
insufficient to sustain the inference of negligence sought by Seva`aetasi. First, while the evidence suggests that the
fire had started at that part of the house locating the electrical panel, with
ASPA’S meter on the opposite exterior side of the wall, the evidence also
showed that there was nothing particularly involved or untoward with the
disconnection and reconnection of electrical power supply by ASPA’s
employee. The connection/ reconnection
process simply entailed the removal of the meter (essentially a large male
plug) from its outside wall mounted casing (a female receptacle); the
attachment of plastic clips over two of the meter’s prongs to break the flow of
current when reinserted back into the casing; and then reversal of this process
to reestablish electrical flow back into the premises. ASPA’s employee did nothing out of the ordinary
with reconnection such as would demonstrate negligence.
Moreover, the
evidence further revealed that ASPA’s employee had not put in a new or
different meter. Reconnection here
involved the very same meter that Sevaaetasi’s structure had operated with in
the past. This fact runs counter to
counsel’s opening submission that the fire must be attributable to a faulty
meter put in place by ASPA.[1]
A more
probable explanation of the fire may be drawn from the testimony of Mr. Fred
Niedo, an electrical engineer with the Department of Public Works. Mr. Niedo, who was called as plaintiff’s
expert witness, explained that the reconnection of power to premises with heavy
loads on, such as freezers, dryers, air conditioners, water heaters, etc., will
result in a heavy in-rush of current to the electrical system. This in-rush can result in an overload on the
system that can in turn generate sufficient heat to destroy the integrity of
the wiring insulation, and cause a fire.
However, Mr.
Niedo also went on to say that there are, with a properly designed and wired
electrical system, a “cascade” of safety features in place to meet
overload hazards. These include, a
properly fused main safety switch; properly sized wire from the main to the
panel board to carry overall load; and on the panel board itself, the right
size of fuse, wires, circuits breakers and other components designed or sized
to carry the individual loads and the overloads.
The
circumstances here suggest that the fire was due in part to a total failure of
the safety features that Mr. Hiedo had described as ordinarily expected. How an electrical system is designed and put
in place to incorporate these safety features, however, are matters within the
consumer’s control and not ASPA’s. This
point was underscored in the evidence showing that the burnt structure was
originally a family residence and its electrical system was presumably,
therefore, designed for residential purposes.
The premises’ electrical system was at some subsequent time
altered by Seva’aetasi’s former husband, Don Hardy, to accommodate a store and
business office. While this
reconstruction added accordingly to the burden of the electrical system, the
alterations to the system were undertaken without the prerequisite permits from
the building branch.
Additionally,
the fire would have escalated because of action unwittingly taken by a
Seva’aetasi family member who initially responded to the fire by throwing a
bucket of water at the apparent source of the fire, the panel. Mr. Niedo testified that throwing water on
the panel would result in a fire.
Clearly, res ipsa loquitur is inappropriate
under these circumstances.
2. Prerequisite Duty Of Care
[5] Lastly, Mr. Miedo also testified that the fire could
have been avoided if the various load bearing appliances or the various circuit
breakers in the premises had been turned off prior to reconnection. To this end, plaintiff’s counsel submits that
ASPA should have made sure that all the panel breakers were switched off prior
to reconnection. (P1.’s Summation
2.) Effectively, counsel is advocating
that ASPA had such a duty of care.
No authority
was cited for this proposition, and we fail to see a basis for this
contention. What, for instance, would be
the consequences of a general power outage, a not infrequent occurrence
on-island? The logical extension of this
sort of argument is the requirement that ASPA would have to go about ensuring
that the circuit breakers of every one of its customers are switched off before
it can safely restore electrical service without fear of liability. It takes little imagination to picture the
impracticality of such a state of affairs.
In our view, overload hazards are better met by maintaining the onus with
utility consumers to ensure that their safety switches, circuit breakers,
wiring, and all other components of their respective electrical systems are
adequately designed, sized, and put in place.[2]
We conclude
that Seva’aetasi has failed to prove actionable negligence on ASPA’s part. Judgment will accordingly enter in favor of
the defendant.
It is so
ordered.
[1] The meter, incidentally, mysteriously went
missing. The only evidence of the meter
at the scene shortly after the fire were the shattered remains of the meter’s
glass covering which were found inside the room housing the electrical panel.
[2] ASPA’s counsel points us to certain regulations, said
to have been duly promulgated under the Administrative Procedures Act, § 4.1001
et seq., (“APA”), purporting to limit ASPA’s liability. We were referred to an excerpt from Title 12
A.S.A.C.
The cited regulations, however,
were in fact promulgated in 1981 under the Governor’s rule making authority,
under Section 6, Article IV of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa and
not under the APA. See A.S.A.C. § 12.0103. These rules, which were promulgated
to, among other things, set up a separate utility entity, have been ostensibly
trumped by subsequent legislation enacted in 1982. See A.S.C.A. §§ 15.0101 et seq. This legislation actually
empowers the statutory entity ASPA to promulgate rules under APA. See A.S.C.A. § 15.0102(8).
At this time, we merely posit,
but do not address, the vitality of the regulations cited to us by counsel.