5ASR3d61
AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
v.
.145 ACRES, MORE OR LESS, OF LAND AND
RIGHT-OF-WAY TO THE LAND IN SQUARE 28, UNIT D, IN THE VILLAGE OF TAFUNA, COUNTY
OF TUALAUTA, WESTERN DISTRICT, ISLAND OF TUTUILA, AMERICAN SAMOA,
NEIL ANNANDALE, and DOES I-X,
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Cross-Claimants,
v.
AMERICAN SAMOA POWER AUTHORITY, and
FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION, Cross-Defendants.
High Court of American Samoa
Trial Division
CA
No. 36-95
March
14, 2001
[1] The tort of
trespass to land is the unlawful interference with its possession.
[2] The only
intent needed to be proven in order to establish the tort of trespass is the
intent to enter another’s land, regardless of the actor’s motivation.
[3] In a civil
trespass case, the claimant must establish (1) unlawful interference with the possession of property, (2) which
is the result of intentional,
reckless, negligent or ultrahazardous activities, (3) where plaintiff
attempted to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred,
and (4) the entry of some other person or thing.
[4] Where employees of construction company, while on
contract with public utility, entered private landowner’s property; destroyed a
cement wall, chain-link fence, mango tree, plants and shrubs; and dug a trench
in the ground without first obtaining easement or making arrangements to obtain
one, such conduct constituted a trespass.
[5] As a
general rule, the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for harm
resulting from that contractor’s acts or omissions.
[6] If an employer
employs an independent contractor to do work, which he knows or has reason to
know will likely involve a trespass upon the land of another, he is liable for
harm resulting to others from such trespass.
[7] The court
will construe pleadings and their amendments liberally, in order to do
substantial justice, even if the pleadings occasionally do not strictly comply
with formal requirements.
[8] In the
absence of any apparent or declared reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure
deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.,
–leave to amend a complaint should, as the rules require, be freely given.
[9] Where
defendant/cross-claimant had not moved to amend cross-claim, but simply added
extraneous language to his trial memorandum, despite having more than five
years time to so move, court would not accept implicit “amendment” of cross-claim
because of the undue delay, prejudice resulting to other parties.
[10] A minimum
requirement for a party’s amendment of pleadings is that it submit a motion for
leave to amend under T.C.R.C.P. 15 (a).
[11]
Compensatory damages are designed to compensate for actual injury or loss, and
punitive damages are awarded as punishment or deterrence for particularly
egregious conduct.
[12] In
trespass actions, compensatory damages are to be measured by (1) diminution in
value, i.e., difference between market value of land before and after the harm,
or cost of restoration when appropriate, (2) loss of use of the land, and (3)
discomfort and annoyance to the occupant of the land.
[13] In
trespass actions, proof of pecuniary loss is required.
[14] In trespass
actions, where substantial actual damages are not susceptible to precise proof,
the damage entitlement is limited to nominal damages.
[15] Where plaintiff in trespass action had testified
that defendants had destroyed plants, fences and walls on his land, but had
failed to present any evidence regarding the market value of such items, court
would not award compensatory damages.
[16] Although
plaintiffs are normal required to prove the market value of items destroyed by
a trespass, a “restoration cost exception” exists where the landscaping and
vegetation destroyed have intrinsic value to the landowner and are located on a
homesite or recreational lot. In such
cases, intrinsic value is assumed, and evidentiary support is not required.
[17] In trespass actions, restoration cost damages may exceed the
diminution in market value of the real property on which the vegetation grew.
[18] Where property and vegetation
damaged as result of trespass was on rental property, court refused to award
restoration cost damages.
[19] Punitive or exemplary damages
may be awarded whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, in order to
punish a wrongdoer as well as to deter other from similar future misconduct
which resulted in injury, loss or detriment to another.
[20] In order
to award punitive damages in a trespass action, the trespasser’s conduct must
have been wantonly reckless or malicious.
[21] Although trespassing parties’ actions did not
appear to have based on any evil intent, they nonetheless were done with
reckless disregard for rights of private property owner, in violation of
written contract and public utilities’ rules, and despite repeated requests to
cease. Consequently, punitive damages
were warranted.
[22] In
trespass cases, damage awards must be trebled where the damage is to timber,
young tree growth, products of tree growth, or cultivated grounds without
lawful authority or permission.
[23] Attorney’s
fees are not ordinarily recoverable by a prevailing party, but may be awarded
when an opposing party has acted in bad faith, wantonly, oppressively or when
required by statute.
[24] Where
public agencies and their agents had acted oppressively and in wanton disregard
of the valid property claims of an individual citizen, court determined an
award of attorney’s fees to be proper.
OPINION
AND ORDER
Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice,
SAGAPOLUTELE, Associate Judge, and TAUANU`U, Temporary Associate Judge.
Counsel: For Plaintiff,
Fiti A. Sunia, Attorney General
For Defendant, Charles V. Alailima,
For Cross-Defendants, Roy J.D. Hall, Jr.
In 1995, plaintiff American Samoa Government (“ASG”)
initiated this action pursuant to A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001-.1036 to condemn
interests in land of defendant Neil Annandale (“Annandale”) in Tafuna for installations
connected with the public sewage collection system in this area. By this action, ASG sought to acquire a fee
simple interest in approximately 0.045 acre along the southern boundary of the
land (“Parcel A”) and a right-of-way in approximately 0.10 acre across the land
(“Parcel B”).
ASG declared the value of the interests to be
$4,000.00 for Parcel A and $50.00 for Parcel B, and deposited the total sum of
$4,050.00 in the Court registry, in accordance with A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001 and
43.1003. By this making this deposit,
ASG immediately acquired title to the interests desired, pursuant to A.S.C.A. §
43.1005. ASG also served Annandale with
process and, under A.S.C.A. § 43.1002, gained the right to possess and use
those interests.
When Annandale answered the complaint, he rejected the
amount of the compensation deposited. He
also counterclaimed against ASG and cross-claimed against defendants American
Samoa Power Authority (“ASPA”) and Fletcher Construction (“Fletcher”) for
damages based on trespass on Annandale’s land, allegedly beginning on or about
January 23, 1995, and destroying plants, fences and walls.
In view of Annandale’s objections to ASG’s estimated
values of the condemned interests in the land, determination of the
compensation amount was referred to arbitration, pursuant to A.S.C.A. §
43.1010. On August 19, 1996, the
arbitrators awarded $5,800.00 for Parcel A and $50.00 for Parcel B. Annandale accepted the award for Parcel A,
and on December 15, 1997, the Court’s partial judgment and order was entered
with respect to this parcel, confirming ASG’s title to Parcel A and requiring
ASG to pay $5,800.00 to Annandale for this parcel.
Annandale appealed the award for Parcel B. On May 19, 1997, the Appellate Division held
that the arbitrators failed to support the award for Parcel B with findings and
conclusions, and remanded this award to the same arbitrators for further
proceedings and a determination, based on written findings and conclusions, to
be submitted to this court. The Attorney
General has informed the Court that the arbitration award for the Parcel B was
made in December 2000, but the arbitrators have yet to publish their decisions.
Trial on the trespass claims
was held on July 10, 2000, and this opinion and order is limited to those
claims. The two issues before the Court
are (1) whether the actions by ASPA and Fletcher constitute trespass, and if
so, (2) whether and what damages ASPA and Fletcher owe to Annandale.
Discussion
I. Trespass
[1-2] This Court declared its
standard for trespass in Letuli v. Le`i:
The tort of trespass to land is the unlawful interference with its
possession. W. Prosser and W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 13, at 70 (5th
ed. 1984). It may be committed as the
result of an act which is intentional, reckless, or negligent, or as the result
of ultrahazardous activity. Gallin v. Poulou, 295 P.2d 958,
959-62 (Cal. App. 1956). The only intent
required is the intent to enter another’s land, regardless of the actor’s
motivation. Miller v. National broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr.
668, 676-77 (Cal. App. 1986). Trespass
may occur by causing the entry of some other person or thing. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §158 (a), at 277 (1965).
Letuli v. Le`i,
22 A.S.R.2d 77, 82 (Land & Titles Div. 1992).
[3] We read the rule applied in Letuli
to mean that in adjudging whether trespass has occurred in civil cases, the
claimant must establish (1) unlawful interference with the possession of
property, (2) which may be the result of intentional, reckless, negligent or
ultrahazardous activities, (3) where there existed an attempt to be at the
place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred, and (4) which may
consist of the entry of some other person or thing. We find that ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher did
trespass upon Annandale’s land based on these four criteria.
[4] On or about Monday, January
23, 1995, employees of Fletcher, while on contract with ASPA, entered
Annandale’s land and destroyed a cement wall, a chain-link fence, a mango tree,
plants and shrubs, and dug a trench in the ground. At the time, ASPA had not obtained an
easement from Annandale for use of his land, nor had Fletcher remedied this
oversight by making arrangements to obtain one.
Annandale appropriately and immediately notified ASPA
authorities through legal counsel, but none of these parties responded to his
appropriate protest against Fletcher’s invasion of Annandale’s land. Fletcher
thus engaged in repeated intentional acts consisting of unpermitted and
uninvited infringement upon, injury to, and invasion of Annandale’s land.
[5-6] ASG and ASPA are liable with
Fletcher for trespass as employers of that independent contractor. As a general rule, the employer of an
independent contractor is not liable for harm resulting from that contractor’s
acts or omissions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 409 (1965); Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 83. However, if an employer employs an
independent contractor to do work which he knows or has reason to know will
likely involve a trespass upon the land of another, he is liable for harm
resulting to others from such trespass.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1965). Here, ASPA hired Fletcher to institute an
underground sewer line, which work inherently implies effacement and
destruction of Annandale’s land. ASG and
ASPA had reason to know that Fletcher’s work would involve trespass; their duty
was to secure authorization for the intended work activity, so as to render the
encroachment and conversion of Annandale’s property lawful. The contract between ASPA and Fletcher, with
respect to the necessity and distribution of responsibility for obtaining
easements, confirms ASPA’s awareness of the potential for trespass and
consequent liability involved in contracting for sewer line placement. Because they did not obtain valid
authorization, ASG and ASPA are liable for harm resulting from their
independent contractor’s physical trespass.
ASG and ASPA claim that they acted with Annandale’s
consent to work on the property, and argue that they are thus not liable for
co-opting it. However, they have failed to convince the court that Annandale
consented to their doing work on the property.
In fact, Annandale’s subsequent complaints to ASPA indicate that he not
only lacked knowledge of the extent of the work, but also that he did not give
ASPA consent to perform it. In any case,
consent to enter and work on property does not justify total government taking.
This case involves forced preemption of private
property by a government entity. At the
time of the trespass, on January 23, 1995, ASPA rules specified that no
buildings, structures, or residences were to be built over public sewers. In invading and clearing Annandale’s land
without an easement or other proper authorization, making the land unfit for
any other use, ASPA embarked on an unauthorized taking. Such unilateral takings are regulated by
definitively proscribed legal standards for condemnation. A.S.C.A. §§
43.1001-.1036 detail procedures such as filing a comprehensive complaint with
the High Court and/or Attorney General, service of notice, and payment of
compensation for private property taken.
These procedures protect the property and personages of individual
citizens against cooption by arbitrary authority. Violation of these procedures by a government
entity is unlawful and unjust.
ASG and ASPA failed their duty to comply with the
procedures set forth in A.S.C.A. §§ 43.1001-.1036. ASPA did not request that ASG condemn
Annandale’s land until March 6, 1995, about six weeks after Fletcher entered
the land. ASG did not file a complaint
to condemn the land until March 14, 1995, almost two months after the
entry. We thus find that Fletcher, ASPA
and ASG engaged in intentional and unlawful interference with Annandale’s land
between January 23, 1995 and March 14, 1995.
Clearly, their joint activity constitutes trespass.
II. Basis for Relief
We now turn to the issue of damages. Annandale’s original complaint, filed on
March 14, 1995, states a slightly different basis for relief than does his
trial memorandum, submitted on July 10, 2000.
Annandale’s counterclaim and cross-claim seek punitive and compensatory
damages for damage to his land. His
trial brief, however, seeks compensatory damages for indemnity or restitution
for “loss of plantings,” emotional distress, and attorney’s fees and costs, and
not merely for damages to property. A
threshold issue is thus whether the court may recognize the additional bases
for relief requested in the trial brief that were not mentioned in the
counterclaim or cross-claim. In legal
terms, the issue is whether the added terms of Annandale’s trial brief
constitute a valid amendment of his claims.
A. Amending
Pleadings
[7-8] T.C.R.C.P. 15(a) delineates
the parameters for amending or supplementing pleadings. It states:
A party may amend his pleadings as a
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires.
See also 6 Charles Alan Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1486 (2d ed.
1990). This Court construes pleadings
and their amendments liberally, in order to do “substantial justice,” even if
the pleadings occasionally do not strictly comply with formal
requirements. T.C.R.C.P. 8(f); see,
e.g., Dev. Bank v. Ilalio, 5 A.S.R.2d 110, 115-16 (Trial Div.
1987). We give wide latitude to parties
to amend material pleadings. See,
e.g., Thomsen v. Bank of Hawaii, 28 A.S.R.2d 86, 87 (Trial
Div. 1995). There are, however, certain
limitations to our vast discretion to freely give leave to amend
pleadings. In McKenzie v. Le`iato,
27 A.S.R.2d 53, 55 (Trial Div. 1994), we applied the U.S. Supreme Court ruling
in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 183 (1962), which requires that
a trial court give justifying reasons for denying an opportunity to amend a
complaint. Foman suggested
several viable factors for a trial court’s denial of a motion for leave to
amend:
In the absence of any apparent or declared
reason–such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment,
futility of amendment, etc.,–the leave sought should, as the rules require, be
‘freely given.’
Foman, 371 U.S. at 183. Annandale has not officially applied for
leave to amend or to supplement his complaint.
Instead, he has added extraneous language to his trial memorandum, and
left it to the discretion of this court to determine whether “justice so
requires” our recognizing the implicit amendment.
[9] The record shows that Annandale had
more than ample time to amend his counterclaim and cross-claim. The condemnation complaint was filed on March
14, 1995, and a partial judgment was entered on December 10, 1997, as to Parcel
A. More than two years then
passed, during which no pleading or action on the case was taken by either
party. On December 22, 1999, an order by
this court was entered declaring that the case was not diligently prosecuted,
and that the case would be dismissed with prejudice within 30 days unless good
cause was shown otherwise. Exactly 30
days later, the motion for hearing to set trial date was filed, and the trial
was held on July 10, 2000. Thus,
Annandale had a wide berth of time—more than five years—during which he might
have moved to amend or supplement his counterclaim and cross-claim, but did
not. Such undue delay precludes us from giving Annandale leave to amend his
pleadings.
Moreover, allowing such a last-minute amendment would
be prejudicial to the opposing parties.
One novel basis for relief slipped into a trial memorandum in the form
of seemingly innocuous, extraneous language. Because of the prejudice that
allowing such unstated ‘amendments’ would cause, we follow our ruling in McKenzie
and refuse to extend our obligation to liberally construe pleadings to avoid
injustice, towards refashioning a party’s theory of relief. McKenzie, 27 A.S.R.2d at 67.
[10] A minimum requirement for a party’s amendment of pleadings
is that it submit a motion for leave to amend under T.C.R.C.P. 15 (a). The procedural requirement of filing a motion
for leave to amend enables the court to consider the justice of the
filing. It places the opposing party on
timely and proper notice of the new claim for relief, and more importantly,
enables that party to contest the claim in open court. The extraneous language included in
Annandale’s final memorandum constitutes a deviation from High Court Rules and
does not comport with the court’s standards of due process. We will not accept Annandale’s implicit
“amendment” of his counterclaim and cross-claim because of undue delay, and
because doing so would be unduly burdensome and prejudicial to ASG, ASPA, and
Fletcher.
Therefore, based on our
court rules and the relevant case law, we will not recognize the new claim for
compensatory relief stated in Annandale’s trial memorandum–specifically, the
claim for emotional loss. Referring back to Annandale’s original pleadings, and
considering that the condemnation and arbitration have taken since place to
account for lost value of the land itself, we consider Annandale’s claims to be
as follows: against ASPA and Fletcher for willful trespass and destruction of
property.
B. Compensatory
Damages
[11]
Annandale’s complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages, excluding just
compensation for the depreciated value of the land, which is accounted for in
the condemnation proceedings.
Compensatory damages are designed to compensate for actual injury or
loss, and punitive damages are awarded as punishment or deterrence for
particularly egregious conduct. Nappe
v. Anschelewitz, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (N.J. 1984). The issue is what compensation may be justly
afforded to Annandale for the destruction of the vegetation, fences and walls
on his property caused by the trespass.
[12-14] We have previously addressed the issue of compensation for
victims of past trespass for damages to land in Letuli in which we set
our standard for compensatory damages. Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at
85. Compensatory damages are to be
measured by (1) diminution in value, i.e., difference between market value of
land before and after the harm, or cost of restoration when appropriate, (2)
loss of use of the land, and (3) discomfort and annoyance to the occupant of
the land. Id.; see also Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 929(1)
(1965). If a severable thing attached to
the land is damaged, recovery of the loss in market value to the attachment is
an optional approach. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 929(2)
(1965). In any case, proof of pecuniary
loss is required. “In the absence of such proof, which can occur when
substantial actual damages are not susceptible to precise proof, the damage
entitlement is limited to nominal damages in a trivial amount.” Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 85; see also
Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 907 (1965).
[15] In the course of their trespass,
ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher destroyed plants, fences and walls on Annandale’s
land. However, no evidence was presented
regarding the market value of the damaged vegetation, fences, and walls. In the absence of such evidence, we must rule
according to our holding in Letuli, where no evidence was presented as
to the market value or other readily ascertainable pecuniary value, and where
we could not, therefore, award compensatory damages.
[16-17] As discussed in great detail in Dixon
v. City of Phoenix, case authority points to a restoration cost exception
to the market value measure of damages where landscaping and vegetation have
intrinsic value to the landowner. 845
P.2d 1107, 1116 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
Such intrinsic value is assumed, and does not require evidentiary
support, where the property damaged is a homesite or recreational lot. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 929 cmt. b (1965); Thatcher v. Lane Construction Co.,
254 N.E.2d 703, 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970); Rector, Etc. v. C.S. McCrossan,
235 N.W.2d 609, 610 (Minn. 1975); Denoyer v. Lamb, 490 N.E.2d
615, 618 (Ohio Ct. App.1984).
[I]n appropriate cases, a landowner whose vegetation has been destroyed
by a trespass may receive damages based on restoration costs. This is so even when the amount may exceed
the diminution in market value of the real property on which the vegetation
grew.
Dixon, 845 P.2d at 1117. Dixon also emphasized that only reasonable
costs of replacing destroyed vegetation may be recovered. Id.
[18] We do not
find sufficient indication, either by evidence or reason, of any intrinsic
value of the lost landscaping and vegetation.
The property in question was a rental property rather than a homesite or
recreational lot for which intrinsic meaning has been found in order to apply the
restoration cost standard for compensatory damages. See Thatcher, 254 N.E.2d at
708; Rector, 235 N.W.2d at 610; Denoyer, 490 N.E.2d at 618. The
“intrinsic meaning” of the vegetation and attachments to Annandale’s land must
be held to be, therefore, negligible.
There being no evidence as to (1) the intrinsic value
of the property or else the pecuniary worth of its diminution in value due to
trespass, (2) no issue as to the loss of the land itself (that being decided by
arbitration), and (3) no “satisfactory proof of consequential illness or significant
bodily or emotional injury” to merit compensation for emotional distress, our
award of compensatory damages for trespass upon Annadale’s land is limited to
the nominal amount of $1.00. See
Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86,
C. Punitive
Damages
[19-20] Punitive or exemplary damages may be
awarded whether or not compensatory damages are awarded, in order to punish a
wrongdoer as well as to deter other from similar future misconduct which
resulted in injury, loss or detriment to another. Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86; Nappe,
477 A.2d at 1232; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 and cmts. b & c (1965).
The punitive award is based on whether the trespasser’s conduct was
wantonly reckless or malicious. The
offender must have engaged in “intentional wrongdoing in the sense of an
‘evil-minded act’ or an act accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of
the rights of another.” Nappe,
477 A.2d at 1230.
[21] The actions of ASG, ASPA, and
Fletcher in trespassing upon Annandale’s land do not appear to have occurred
with any evil intent. However, their actions did occur with reckless disregard
for Annandale’s rights as a private property owner, and in violation of the
contract between ASPA and Fletcher and ASPA’s rules regarding obtaining
easements or condemnation before commencing work. The trespass continued despite repeated
written requests to cease. In Letuli, we awarded the plaintiff
$1,500.00 in punitive damages where the defendant bulldozed natural growth
trees on a 12-foot right of way in malicious retribution for the plaintiff’s
refusal to clear the property for the defendant’s ocean view. The factors we considered in that case were
“the character of the defendant’s act, the nature of the plaintiff’s harm, and
defendant’s responsible station in life.”
Letuli, 22 A.S.R.2d at 86.
In this case, the property in question involves more
or less 0.145 acres, the destruction of erected fences and shrubs, and
sloppiness in procuring the requisite consent, easement or condemnation action
before commencing sewer line work on private property. ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher trespassed upon the
property illegally for more than two months despite Annadale’s immediate and
repeated notice and protest. For
punishment of such wanton disregard of the rights of private property owners,
and for deterrence against ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher whose frequent
infrastructure work and abundant resources necessitate attention to detail and
care, we award Annadale $3,000.00 in punitive damages.
[22] Furthermore, A.S.C.A. § 43.5051 requires that damages be
trebled in trespass cases where the damage is to “timber, young tree growth, or
products of tree growth . . . , or cultivated grounds” without lawful authority
or permission. We thus award to Annandale
a total of $9,003.00 in compensatory and punitive damages.
D. Attorney’s
Fees and Costs
[23-24] Attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable by a
prevailing party, but may be awarded when an opposing party has acted in bad
faith, wantonly, oppressively or when a statute dictates. See Fiaui v. Faumuina, 27 A.S.R.2d 36,
42 (Trial Div. 1994); F.D. Rich Co.v. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1973). Annandale is deserving
of attorney’s fees in this case, where public agencies and their agents acted
oppressively and in wanton disregard of the valid property claims of an
individual citizen. Annandale is also
entitled to costs of suit. T.C.R.C.P.
54(d).
Order
1. There being no proof of compensatory damages,
ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher are jointly and severally liable for $1.00 in nominal damages
to Annandale for willful trespass to his land.
2. Due to their reckless indifference to
Annandale’s right to private property protected by the laws of American Samoa,
as well as the contract between ASPA and Fletcher and ASPA’s rules, ASG, ASPA,
and Fletcher are jointly and severally liable for $3,000.00 in punitive
damages.
3. Pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.5051, the total
amount of damages jointly and severally owed by ASG, ASPA, and Fletcher to
Annandale are tripled to the total amount of $9,0003.00.
4. ASG, ASPA and Fletcher are also jointly and severally
liable to pay to Annandale attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,500.00 plus his
actual costs of suit.
It is so ordered.
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