5ASR3d242

Series: 5ASR3d | Year: () | 5ASR3d242
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LILA PEFU POMARE, KAISARA PEFU,

and ASAUA FUIMAONO, Plaintiffs,

 

v.

 

ANISI PEFU and OTHERS, Defendants.

 

High Court of American Samoa

Land and Titles Division

 

LT No. 18-00

 

September 20, 2001


 

 

[1] Where

individual relocated to Hawaii, such action constituted a voluntarily

abandonment of his authority to act, under power of attorney, for person

residing in American Samoa.  Such

abandonment effectively terminated the power of attorney and such authority

could not be restored without execution of new power of attorney.

 

[2] An agent

who abandons the principle or his duties as an agent has terminated the agency

relationship.

 

[3] Mental

capacity to contract is presumed until it is proven by a preponderance of

evidence that actual unsoundness of mind existed at the time of contractual

act.

 

[4] In

determining mental capacity to contract, the legal standard is whether the

person fully understood the nature, purpose, and effect of the particular

transaction.

 

[5] As a

general rule, the making of a contractual transaction is presumed free of undue

influence until it is established by a preponderance of evidence that unfair

persuasion was actually exerted.

 

[6] A presumption

of undue influence arises when the parties to an improvident transaction have a

confidential or fiduciary relationship.

 

[7] Once the presumption of undue influence arises, it

can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.

 

[8] The legal standard for determining whether undue

influence was exerted is whether the questioned act was done by a person who

had lost his free will and would not have entered the transaction but for

another imposing compulsion.

 

[9] The

parent-child relationship can constitute the type of confidential relationship

necessary to show undue influence.

 

[10] The remedy

to cure the unjust consequences of undue influence is to undo the transactions.

 

[11] Where one

co-tenant conveys title to part of the co-owned land without authorization of

the other co-tenants, title to tract conveyed may still inure to the grantee of

the unauthorized conveyance where the tract is partitioned to the grantor in

subsequent proceedings and if recognition of the prior conveyance can be done without

prejudice to the other co-tenants.

 

[12] Where portion of property had

been previously transferred, without recording, to third-party, and subsequent

transferals of property were rescinded, court nonetheless found it equitable to

relocate portion of property previously transferred due to construction that

had already taken place on land.

 

Before RICHMOND, Associate Justice, and LOGOAI, Chief

Associate Judge.

 

Counsel: For Plaintiffs,

Asaua Fuimaono

 For Defendants,

S. Salanoa Aumoeualogo

 

OPINION

AND ORDER

 

On November 20, 2000,

plaintiffs Lila Pefu Pomare (“Lila”), Kaisara Pefu (“Kaisara”), and Asaua

Fuimaono (“Asaua”) filed this action to enjoin defendant Anisi Pefu (“Anisi”)

from completing the construction of a new building until the court can determine

the parties’ rights in the underlying land. The complaint also seeks to void a

trust agreement, executed by Pefu Fania (“Pefu”), which provides Anisi with

control over the land; to require Anisi to restore about $18,000 of Pefu’s

funds; to judicially recognize a deed of a portion of the land by Pefu to

Asaua; and to divide the rest of the land among Pefu’s four children.

 

Pefu’s four children

include two sons, Kaisara and Anisi, and two daughters, Lila and Rasela Pefu

(“Rasela”).  Asaua and Pefu also have a

blood relationship—a brother of Pefu’s mother is Asaua’s grandfather.

 

A hearing was scheduled on December 7, 2000, on the

Court’s order to Anisi to show cause why he should not be preliminarily

enjoined pending the Court’s final decision in the action from further

construction of the building, exercising ownership rights in the land,

expending funds from sales of the land, and evicting Lila or her siblings from

Pefu’s present house on the land and the land. The hearing was postponed

several times—to permit Anisi further time to obtain counsel, afford his

counsel time to prepare, and accommodate hearing schedules—and was held on

February 9, 2001, with the parties and their counsel present. During this

interim, we enjoined Anisi from engaging in further construction of the

building.

 

We heard testimony and received other evidence on

February 9 and 12, March 12, and May 22, 2001. In the process, we invoked

T.C.R.C.P. 65 and consolidated the hearing on the preliminary injunction

application with the trial on the merits.

 

Discussion

 

A. 

Land at Issue

 

The particular land at issue is a

portion of approximately 8.898 acres,

named “Mosooi,” located in the Village of Ili`ili, American Samoa.  The 8.898 acres was the subject of extensive litigation between Pefu, his

brother Sipili Atualevao (“Sipili”) and his nephew Atoa Atualevao (“Atoa”),

Sipili’s son.  The decisions in Fania

v. Sipili, 14 A.S.R.2d 70 (Land & Titles Div. 1990) and LT No. 38-91

(Land & Titles Div. Oct. 21, 1992) (order on application for partition),

are quite relevant to the present action. 

Thus, we take judicial notice of and begin by reviewing these past

actions.

 

B.  Previous

Litigation

 

We first summarize the findings in Fania, 14 A.S.R.2d 70.  Pefu began to clear a portion of the 8.898 acres

in the 1950s.  In the 1960s, Pefu

permitted Sipili to go on the land, and Sipili and Atoa cultivated the cleared

area.  During Pefu’s absence on a

missionary assignment to Swains Island from 1968 to 1973, Sipili and Atoa

extended the cleared area. After Pefu’s return, conflicts arose over claims to

the land but were temporarily resolved until Pefu initiated Fania in

1989.

 

Pefu surveyed 7.567 acres of the cleared land in 1975. Apparently,

however, Sipili and the family sa`o (“head chief”) prevailed on him not

to register the land.  Then, in 1979,

Sipili offered to register as his individually owned land his survey of 2.05

acres within the cleared land. Atoa objected, claiming that the land was

communal land of Pefu, Sipili, and himself. 

Upon mediation at the Office of the Secretary of Samoan Affairs, it was

agreed that Sipili would withdraw his registration offer, the land would be

registered in the names of Pefu, Sipili, and Atoa, and then equally divided

among the three of them.  This agreement

was not, however, carried out.

Next, in 1981, Atoa attempted to

register Pefu’s 1975 survey as his individually owned land. Sipili objected,

complaining of his son’s disobedience and claiming that he cleared the land

first.  Again, after mediation at Samoan

Affairs, the issue was settled by Atoa withdrawing his registration offer.  Then, in 1983, Sipili offered to register as

his individually owned land his survey of 8.67 acres of the cleared land. This

time Pefu objected, citing his many years of working the land.  He withdrew his objection, claiming that he

and Sipili settled their differences, but allowed the title to be registered in

Sipili’s name alone. In 1985, Sipili persuaded the Territorial Registrar to

amend the registration to show that he and Atoa owned the land in common by

misrepresenting that Atoa was an original co-applicant for the 1983

registration offer.

 

Pefu withdrew his objection to

Sipili’s registration offer in 1983 with Atoa’s assurance that the 8.67 acres

would be divided between Sipili, Atoa, and himself.  He was unaware of the amendment adding Atoa

as an owner with Sipili.  In fact, he

continued to have free access to the land, constructed a house there with Sipili

signing the building permit, and believed the three-way division of the land

was in process.  He did not discover the

actual status of the land until he learned that Atoa was selling parcels of the

land without his knowledge and consent. 

During a verbal altercation in 1989, Atoa told Pefu that Pefu had no

interest in the land.  Pefu then

commenced Fania, 14 A.S.R.2d 70.

 

The Trial Court in Fania found

that Sipili and Atoa fraudulently deprived Pefu of his title in the 8.67 acres

and imposed a constructive trust on the proceeds from sales of the land and on

the remaining acreage to correct the unjust enrichment resulting from the

fraud. 14 ASR 2d at 76-77.  The Court

also permanently enjoined further sales of the land without Pefu’s consent, and

directed the Territorial Registrar to reregister the title to the land in the

names of Pefu, Sipili, and Atoa as tenants in common to reflect their original

agreement on ownership.  Id.  The Appellate Division affirmed this

decision.  See generally Sipili

v. Fania, 17 A.S.R.2d 96 (App. Div. 1990).

 

The Fania Trial Court left any division of the proceeds from the

land sales and of the remaining land to Pefu, Sipili, and Atoa.  However, they failed to amicably settle these

matters, and in 1991, Pefu commenced LT No. 39-91 to require partition of the

tenancy in common.  Lengthy efforts,

including those promoted by the Court, still did not result in voluntary

resolution of the issues.  Thus, by order

entered on October 21, 1997, the Court imposed a solution.  Under this order, Pefu was awarded 2.647

acres of the cleared land.  The full size

of the cleared land was 8.898 acres under the survey then before the

Court.  Sipili and Atoa were given the

remaining land as tenants in common, subject to existing encumbrances and other

rights of third parties.  In addition,

Sipili and Atoa were held jointly and severally liable to Pefu in the sum of

$18,032.80, plus 6% post-judgment interest, as Pefu’s share of the proceeds

from the prior land sales.  The parties

were also ordered to obtain at their own expense legal descriptions for

registration of their allotted parcels. 

The stage was then set for the current legal controversy.

 

C.  Current

Controversy

 

In the first place, lacking a complete legal description, Pefu has never

registered the 2.647 acres awarded to him. 

Likewise, Sipili and Atoa have not registered the portion awarded to

them as tenants in common. This lack of proper follow-up, for whatever reasons,

appears to be habitual of the parties to the present action as well as the

feuding relatives in the earlier actions.

 

On March 15, 1990, two days after the decision in Fania was

entered, Pefu executed an affidavit expressing his intent to convey to Asaua at

least a half-acre within the 8.67 acres. Pefu’s affidavit stated that he wanted

to reward Asaua for his financial and moral support and legal advice in winning

a share of the land.  Asaua is an

attorney.  He testified that, as Pefu’s

relative, he provided Pefu cash, food and other items from time to time, and

arranged for Pefu’s legal representation in the 1989 land case.  It is also stated in the affidavit that, in

the immediate presence of Asaua and Kaisara, Pefu had already pointed out the

location of the half-acre to be conveyed. 

Lila was aware of Pefu’s action, but she was in the nearby house at the

time and did not directly witness Pefu’s designation of land for Asaua.  Though Pefu’s 2.647 acres were still not

precisely defined, the identified half-acre was near the house where Pefu lived

and still lives and was well within the apparent location of Pefu’s 2.647

acres.  Asaua testified to this

demonstration.

 

According to Asaua, a half-acre was

surveyed in February 1991 pursuant to Pefu’s instructions.  On March 1, 1991, Pefu executed a deed

conveying the half-acre to Asaua.  Asaua

knew as an attorney, of course, that he could not register his title to the

half-acre until the title to Pefu’s 2.647 acres was registered as Pefu’s

individually owned land.  Asaua did not

vigorously pursue the registration issue until now.  He testified that he felt unwelcome at Pefu’s

house after Anisi, Pefu’s eldest son, returned to American Samoa in 1995.  He had, in 1994, prepared Pefu’s power of

attorney giving Kaisara authority to conclude the pending litigation and

perfect the title to Pefu’s 2.647 acres. 

Otherwise, however, he let the matter languish until the present

situation arose last year.

 

Anisi was a career soldier, having

enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1974 and retired in 1995.  He regularly provided support from his

military pay for his parents when both were living and then for his father

after his mother died.  It is evident

that upon his return in 1995, he took over care of Pefu’s personal needs,

though not by any means exclusive of the contributions of Kaisara and

particularly Lila.  Anisi did, however,

take control of Pefu’s affairs.  In

addition, friction developed between Anisi on one hand and Kaisara and Lila on

the other, and the alienation remains in the picture.

 

Anisi either was unaware of or

disregarded the power of attorney given to Kaisara.  He certainly knows of this document now and

testified that, not long after his return in 1995, Pefu told Anisi that he did

not trust Kaisara, feared that Kaisara would sell his 2.647 acres, and wanted

Anisi to handle all of his affairs.

 

[1-2] Kaisara claimed that he

wanted to avoid further confrontation with Anisi, and he moved to Hawaii, at

least in part for this reason, where he has lived since the mid-1990s.  By his relocation to Hawaii, Kaisara

voluntarily abandoned his authority to act for Pefu under the 1994 power of

attorney—having left on his own accord, Kaisara’s power of attorney was

effectively terminated and could not be restored without Pefu executing a new

power to him.  See Fletcher v. Matthew,

448 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Neb. 1989) (power of attorney creates an agency

relationship); Prezier v. Dudley, 314 P.2d 138, 144 (Cal. App. 1957) (an

agent who abandons the principle or his duties as an agent has terminated the

agency relationship); 3 AM. JUR 2D

Agency § 49 (2000) (an agent conducting himself in a manner incompatible

with his duties as an agent can be found to have willfully terminated the

agency relationship).

 

Anisi also treated Lila at least

irreverently.  In 1994, Lila took Pefu to

the states for a visit lasting approximately a year.  Not long after she and Pefu returned, Anisi

compelled Lila to leave the home on the 2.647 acres where she was living with

him and Pefu.  Lila attributed Anisi’s

conduct to his disrespect of her religious practices, but he claimed that she

irresponsibly disregarded his instructions on housekeeping and Pefu’s personal

care.  There have been at least two other

occasions of similar sparring, the latest occurring last year.  Anisi also refused to participate in Lila’s

recent wedding.  She now lives with her

husband in another structure within the 2.647 acres.  During the trial, Anisi also falsely

intimated that Pefu was not Lila’s natural father.

 

We have no doubt that each of the

three siblings contributed to the estrangement between Anisi on one side and

Lila and Kaisara on the other.  However,

based on their demeanor throughout the trial, it is apparent that Anisi has a

strong adversarial attitude towards his sister and brother and was the

principal antagonist in causing the continuing rifts among them.

In this background of strained

relationships, the cause of the present litigation erupted in 2000.  Anisi started to construct a house apparently

within the half-acre that Pefu conveyed to Asaua in 1991.  Lila, Kaisara, and Asaua then learned of

other actions taken by Anisi.

 

First, on April 10, 1998, Pefu, as

grantor, and Anisi, as trustee, signed a trust agreement. Under this agreement,

title to the 2.647 acres, improvements on the land, and the furniture and

furnishings in Pefu’s home were transferred to Anisi.  Relevant to this action, Anisi, as trustee,

must pay any income derived from the trust to Pefu for life, and may apply the

principal of the trust as Anisi, in his discretion, deems necessary to provide

for Pefu’s support.  In essence, Anisi

was given full authority to enter transactions regarding the 2.647 acres within

the parameters of this direction for Pefu’s care.  Anisi testified that the attorney who

prepared the trust agreement explained in the Samoan language all the terms of

the agreement to Pefu, and that Pefu understood the terms.  Although, on May 28, 1998, the Attorney

General advised the Territorial Registrar to withhold registration of the trust

agreement until the 2.647 acres was registered, the trust agreement was

recorded on November 18, 1999.  We have

no evidence on the reason the Registrar disregarded the Attorney General’s

recommendation.

 

Second, on January 6, 2000, Pefu

signed a power of attorney giving Anisi broad authority to conduct Pefu’s

affairs, including transactions affecting the 2.647 acres. Anisi testified that

this power of attorney replaced one that Pefu gave him upon his return in 1995

so that Anisi rather than Kaisara would handle Pefu’s affairs.  Anisi testified that the second power of

attorney was necessary because the first one became wet and unreadable.

 

Third, on August 22, 2000, Pefu

signed a warranty deed conveying to Anisi 0.133 of an acre, ostensibly within

Pefu’s 2.647 acres.  The 0.133 of an acre

appears to be substantially within the one-half acre that Pefu deeded to Asaua in

1991.  Anisi testified that the house he

had under construction on the 0.133 of an acre would be Pefu’s new home for the

rest of his life.  Anisi claimed that he

made plans to build this house even before he retired, and that after returning

in 1995 he discussed his plans with Pefu, who then approved this project.

 

Lastly, Sipili or Atoa, or both of

them, paid to Anisi the $18,032.80 that the court required them to pay Pefu as

his share of the proceeds of sales of portions of the 8.898 acres prior to the

Court’s order of October 21, 1997.  There

is no evidence on whether or not the amount actually given to Anisi included

the amount of the 6% interest accruing after October 21, 1997.  Anisi testified that he spent $6,000 to

repair a vehicle Anisi owns but was imported for Pefu’s use, $6,000 to repair

Pefu’s house, and most of the balance on family affairs, emergencies, and

attorney’s fees. He did not recall if any amount remained unexpended.  Anisi claimed that Pefu wanted to buy a new

vehicle, but Anisi felt that other needs had priority.  Anisi denied contracting for the sale of any

portions of the 2.647 acres and receiving funds from any such transactions.

 

Pefu’s mental state when he entered

these recent contractual transactions is of serious concern.  Evidence is present that Pefu lacked the mental

capacity to contract or was unduly influenced, or both, when he signed the

trust agreement naming Anisi as trustee, made Anisi his attorney in fact, and

conveyed the 0.133 of an acre to Anisi.

 

D. 

Mental Incapacity to Contract

 

[3-4] Mental

capacity to contract is presumed until it is proven by a preponderance of

evidence that actual unsoundness of mind existed at the time of contractual

act. 53 AM.JUR.2D Mentally

Impaired Persons, § 5 at 161 (1996). 

The legal standard is whether the person fully understood the nature,

purpose, and effect of the particular transaction. Id. at 160.

 

Pefu is now about 88 years of

age.  When Fania was an active

action during 1989 and 1990, Pefu was apparently in reasonably good mental

health.  Asaua and Kaisara supported that

action and, based on age alone—then about 77 years—we do not doubt that Pefu

required some encouragement and assistance to pursue that action successfully.

However, Pefu testified during the trial in January 1990.  His signatures on documents in the Court’s Fania

file appear to be clear and firm. Nothing in the court records suggests

that Pefu’s mental condition had significantly deteriorated before or during

the course of the proceedings in Fania.

 

Similarly, the evidence does not show

any marked degeneration in Pefu’s mental faculties when he signed the affidavit

expressing his intent and reasons for conveying the one-half acre to Asaua in

1990 or when he signed the deed carrying out that intent in 1991.  Likewise, the evidence indicates that Pefu remained

mentally alert when he commenced LT No. 38-91 to partition the 8.898 acres

later in 1991.  It may be noteworthy that

while Pefu was present during the trial of LT No. 38-91 in October 1997, he did

not testify.  Anisi was then Pefu’s only

lay witness on personal and family matters. 

The decision not to have Pefu testify may have been solely trial

tactics.  On the other hand, it may

confirm other evidence of Pefu’s lessening acumen during the intervening and

subsequent years.

 

It is

noteworthy that Pefu’s signature has degenerated over time.  His signatures affixed to the power of

attorney to Kaisara in 1995, trust agreement in 1998, and especially to the

power of attorney and deed to Anisi in 2000, while legible, are visibly

shaky.  The gradual deterioration is

evident.

 

The testimonial evidence on Pefu’s mental state is

directly conflicting. Pefu’s children did agree that Pefu suffers from loss of

hearing. It appears that this condition started to develop many years ago.  At one time, Pefu used a hearing aid, but

apparently he has refused to use one for some years, perhaps since 1995 or

so.  Anisi and Rasela Pefu, another

sister, said that Pefu can read lips. 

Lila stated that Pefu does not understand what others are saying to him

unless the message is written and simple. 

In any event, the siblings usually communicate with Pefu by writing

notes, using sizeable printed letters.

 

Lila testified that beginning in 1995, Pefu became

very deaf and showed signs of senility that is characterized today by repeated

and random statements, misconception of communications, walking about

aimlessly, and similar inappropriate behavior. 

She also asserted that Anisi yells and swears at Pefu, and Pefu now

fears Anisi.  Anisi denied that Pefu

fears him and claimed he has always treated his father with utmost respect.

 

Anisi testified that he usually

communicates with Pefu by means of written notes that Pefu understands.  He also said that Pefu knows where he is when

they drive around the island, knows what he is eating, uses the bathroom

properly, though he takes about two hours to shower, can read Anisi’s lips, and

is otherwise aware of immediate circumstances. 

Anisi emphasized that he, not Lila, is constantly taking care of Pefu.  Lila pointed out, however, that after Anisi

returned in 1995, he was enrolled at the American Samoa Community College for

awhile, frequently played golf, and was off-island due to illness for about a

month, during which times she was Pefu’s primary caretaker.  She also pointed out that Anisi spends

considerable time in such activities as playing golf and bingo.  Lila insisted that Anisi prevents her from

helping more with Pefu’s care, and when she and Anisi are together, Anisi is

frequently contentious with her.

 

Rasela, Lila’s and Anisi’s sister, gave her opinion that Pefu needs close

attention and is forgetful due to his elderly age, but that he is still aware

of his surroundings, eats and bathes without much help, and responds

appropriately to written notes.  She

confirmed that Pefu also can read lips. 

She also indicated that Pefu did not attend the trial because he

experiences back pains if he sits too long and was not well in general.  To Rasela’s knowledge, Anisi has never

mistreated Pefu.  She believed that Pefu

trusts Anisi.

 

Beginning at least in 1995, Pefu has manifested signs

of progressive mental deterioration associated with old age, commonly referred

to as senile dementia when unsoundness of mind sets in. See 10 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 374-77 (1961).  The evidence does not, however, sufficiently

preponderate to establish that Pefu’s mental condition reached the stage of

actual incompetency at the time he favored Anisi with a power of attorney in

1995, the trusteeship in 1998, and a second power of attorney and the land deed

in 2000.  It appears that Pefu was fully

aware of and understood the nature and effect of those transactions.

 

E. 

Undue Influence

 

[5-8] As a general rule, the making of a

contractual transaction is presumed free of undue influence until it is

established by a preponderance of evidence that unfair persuasion was actually

exerted. 25 AM. JUR. 2D Duress

and Undue Influence § 38

(1996).  A presumption of undue influence

arises, however, when the parties to an improvident transaction have a

confidential or fiduciary relationship. Id.  Once interjected, the presumption can be

rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at § 40.  The legal standard is whether the questioned

act was done by a person who had lost his free will and would not have entered

the transaction but for another imposing compulsion.  Id. at § 30.

 

[9] The parent-child relationship can

constitute the type of confidential relationship necessary to show undue

influence.  Id. at § 38; 13 A.L.R.3d 381 (1998).  The situation in this case is fairly characterized

in this manner.  Clearly, Anisi returned

from military service bound and determined to take over his father Pefu’s

personal care and affairs, essentially to the exclusion of his siblings Lila

and Kaisara.  Undoubtedly, Anisi was

motivated by good intentions and had in mind Pefu’s best interests.  However, when Anisi unilaterally took on this

role in Pefu’s life, he necessarily assumed Pefu’s confidence and a mantle of

fidelity in the conduct of Pefu’s affairs.

 

Anisi systematically went about solidifying

his authority over Pefu and his affairs. 

The power of attorney in 1995, immediately substituting Anisi for

Kaisara as Pefu’s attorney in fact, the trust agreement in 1998 giving Anisi as

the trustee further authority over Pefu’s 2.67 acres and other property, and

the second power of attorney in 2000, ostensibly replacing the physically

spoiled first power of attorney, attest to his efforts.  Using his authority, Anisi then, also in

2000, obtained Pefu’s signature to the deed of 0.133 of an acre to Anisi

without any monetary consideration.

 

Under these circumstances, a presumption of undue influence unfolds with

respect to all four transactions, the two powers of attorney, trust agreement,

and land deed.  Even without the

presumption, however, it is readily apparent that Anisi used undue influence to

gain Pefu’s acquiescence to these transactions. 

Though we find that Pefu had not totally lost his mental competency at

the time of any of the four transactions, Pefu had clearly reached a stage of

mental and physical weakness due to his advancing age.  Pefu lacked independent advice and was

vulnerable to external pressures and unfair persuasion.  Anisi was singularly focused on controlling

Pefu’s life and used his domineering personality to secure his objectives.

 

[10] We hold that Pefu was unable to

resist Anisi’s oppressive insistence and entered the four transactions as a

result of Anisi’s undue influence.  The

remedy to cure the unjust consequences of undue influence is to undo the

transactions.  1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Contracts § 423 (9th ed. 1987).  We therefore rescind the four transactions,

the power of attorney in 1995, trust agreement entered on April 10, 1998,

second power of attorney granted on January 6, 2000, and the land deed executed

on August 22, 2000.

 

F. 

1991 Land Deed and Unfinished House

 

[11] Strictly, Pefu as a tenant in common

with Sipili and Atoa had no legal right, without the co-tenants’ consent, to

convey to Asaua any specific or distinct portion of the 8.67 acres in

1991.  20 Am.

Jur. 2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership §

107 (1995).  However, as an equitable

principle, title to a tract of land held jointly may still inure to the grantee

of such a conveyance in the event the tract is partitioned to the grantor in subsequent

proceedings and if recognition of the prior conveyance can be done without

prejudice to the other co-tenants.  See

Seavey v. Green, 1 P.2d 601, 603 (Or. 1931); Annotation, Grant of Part

of Cotenancy Land, Taken from Less Than All Cotenants, as Subject of Protection

through Partition, 77 A.L.R.2d 1376 (1961). 

If the half-acre conveyed to Asaua lies within the Pefu’s partitioned

2.647 acres, as appears to be the case, we do not find prejudice to Sipili and

Atoa or any other impediment to equitable recognition of the transfer in light

of the judicial partition in 1997.

 

[12] Anisi claims that he intends to

provide Pefu with a new home for remainder of Pefu’s life in the house under

construction within the rescinded deed of 0.133 of an acre unjustly transferred

to Anisi.  The unfinished house also

appears to be within the half acre deeded to Asaua on March 1, 1991.

Construction of the house is well along to completion, and under the

circumstances, it may be inappropriate and unnecessary to fully thwart Anisi’s

intent.  It appears that Asaua’s

half-acre can be resurveyed and relocated within Pefu’s 2.647 acres outside of

the new house site.  We will, therefore,

further enjoin the construction of the new house only long enough to complete

the survey work described below and determine the feasibility of mutually

accommodating both the new house site and the half-acre within Pefu’s 2.647

acres.

 

G.  Restitution

 

We are unable to satisfactorily ascertain, on the

basis of Anisi’s imprecise accounting, and lack of any other definitive

evidence, whether Anisi expended for his own devices some portions, and if so

how much, of the $18,032.80 paid to him by Sipili or Atoa as Pefu’s share of

the proceeds from previous sales of parcels within the 8.67 acres.  We are satisfied that Anisi spent some of the

funds for selfish ends.  However, it is

probably a practical impossibility at this juncture without any retained

records to order Anisi to provide an adequate accounting or any other means to

fix an amount of restitution for improper expenditures.

 

We will, therefore, only require

Anisi to obtain, at his expense, from L.P. French, the professional surveyor

who did the survey work prerequisite to the partitioning in LT No. 39-91, the

completed legal description necessary to record Pefu’s 2.647 acres as directed

by the court’s partition order of October 21, 1997.  The survey shall also depict the location of

the new house under construction and surrounding 0.133 of an acre, and the potential

relocation of the one-half of an acre conveyed to Asaua within the 2.647 acres

but outside of the 0.133 of an acre. 

This survey work must be done expeditiously.

 

Order

 

1. The power of attorney granted by Pefu to Kaisara in 1994 is terminated

 

2.  The power of attorney granted by Pefu to

Anisi in 1995, the trust agreement entered on April 10, 1998, under which Pefu

designated Anisi as trustee having management and control of Pefu’s 2.647 acres

and other property, the power of attorney granted by Pefu to Anisi on January

6, 2000, and the deed of August 22, 2000, under which Pefu gave 0.133 of an

acre within Pefu’s 2.647 acres to Anisi are rescinded.

 

3. 

Pefu’s deed a half-acre to Asaua, to the extent it is within Pefu’s

2.647 acres, is valid.

 

4.  Anisi shall, at his expense, employ professional

surveyor L.P. French to complete the previously undertaken survey work and

legal description necessary for recording with the Territorial Registrar of

Pefu’s 2.647 acres.  The completed survey

shall depict the location of the new house under construction and surrounding

0.133 of an acre, the location of the half-acre conveyed on March 1, 1991, by

Pefu to Asaua, and the potential location of the re­surveyed half-acre within

the 2.647 acres but outside of the 0.133 of an acre.  The survey shall be completed, paid for, and

filed with this court within 120 days of the entry of this order.  Upon receiving the completed survey, the

court will schedule a hearing to consider further appropriate orders in this

action.

 

5. The temporarily enjoined construction of the new house is now

permanently enjoined until further order of the court.

 

6.  The Clerk of the Court shall

cause this opinion and order to be served on the Territorial Registrar.

 

It is so ordered.

 


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