5ASR3d24
AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT, Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID GALUMALEMAGA, Defendant.
High Court of American Samoa
Trial Division
CR No. 98-00
February 14, 2001
[1] Although self-incriminating statements of a suspect under
interrogation without a prior Miranda warning are subject to the
exclusionary rule, the suspect must be in custody and subject to official
interrogation.
[2] On-the-scene
questioning by police officers to determine whether a crime has been committed
or is in progress, as distinguishable from custodial interrogation, does not
require Miranda warnings.
[3] General
test for determining whether there has been custodial interrogation—whether
reasonable person would have believed he could not leave freely—has been held
inapplicable in prison setting where question is whether, during interrogation,
inmate was subjected to more than usual restraint on prisoner’s liberty to
depart.
[4] On-the-scene investigative questioning in prison
setting does not require Miranda warnings.
[5] Defendant
returning from unsupervised work release was subjected to routine search on
prison grounds which revealed contraband in his shoe. Without threats, deceptions, intimidations,
or Miranda warnings, officer
conducting search began on-the-scene questioning and defendant immediately
answered. Defendant’s right against
self-incrimination was not violated and statements to officer are admissible.
[6] In
determining whether person has right against unreasonable search and seizure,
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy standard is clearly restricted when person
asserting expectation is incarcerated or in custody.
[7] Inmate returning from work release has no reasonable
expectation of privacy and, therefore, no right under Rev. Const. of Am. Samoa,
Art. I, Sec. 5, regarding routine patdown and shoe-search procedures, which
only pose minimal degree of intrusion upon privacy.
Before KRUSE, Chief Justice, and ATIULAGI, Associate
Judge.
Counsel: For
Plaintiff, John W. Cassell, Assistant Attorney General
For Defendant, Bentley C. Adams III, Assistant
Public Defender
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS
The defendant David Galumalemaga (“Galumalemaga”) is
charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance under A.S.C.A. §§
13.1022 and 13.1006. Just after midnight
on the morning of August 30, 2000, Galumalemaga returned from work release to
the Correctional Facility in Tafuna, where he was serving detention as a
probation condition. He encountered PSO
Pasi Sua`ava (“PSO Sua`ava”), the guard on duty at the time. Siaosi Aiono, the watch commander, ordered
PSO Sua`ava to conduct a routine search of Galumalemaga, including a search of
Galumalemaga’s shoes. Inside the flap of
one shoe, PSO Sua`ava spotted what appeared to be three cigarettes of
marijuana. Without giving Galumalemaga
the Miranda warnings, PSO Sua`ava asked him “What is this?” and
Galumalemaga replied, “Give me a chance.”
On December 11, 2000, Galumalemaga submitted a motion in
limine to suppress “any and all statements of any nature obtained from
defendant by government agents,” as well as a motion to suppress the contraband
marijuana seized by PSO Sua`ava on August 30, 2000. We discuss our denial of these motions as
follows.
I. Motion to Suppress Statement
Galumalemaga claims that his statement to PSO Sua`ava
was made while in custody, during an interrogation, without consultation with
known appointed counsel, and without adequate advisement of his rights. Because he was not administered the Miranda
warnings, and did not have the opportunity to waive them, Galumalemaga argues
that the statement was illegally obtained in violation of his Fourth, Fifth or
Sixth Amendment Rights of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Article I, Sections
5 and 6 of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa, and therefore must be
suppressed.
[1] As well established by Miranda v. Arizona,
self-incriminating statements given by a suspect during custodial interrogation
without a prior warning are in violation of constitutionally protected rights,
and are subject to the exclusionary rule.
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). However, in order to trigger Miranda,
an individual must be in custody, and must be subject to official
interrogation. A statement made by a
person who was not in a custodial situation is not subject to suppression on Miranda
grounds. Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Fealofa`i,
24 A.S.R.2d 10, 11-12 (Trial Div. 1993).
In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court stated, “[f]idelity to the
doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only
in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the decision
are implicated.” 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984). The first issue, then, is whether Galumalemaga
was subject to the sort of coercive conditions contemplated by Miranda.
Custodial interrogation has been taken to mean
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444. The intent inspiring the Miranda
requirement is to protect individuals subjected to inquisition in a
“police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445, which is said
to generate “inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not
otherwise do so freely.” Id. at
467.
[2] Custodial interrogation is distinguishable from
on-the-scene questioning, which does not require Miranda warnings. The Court stated that the required warnings
“[are] not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in
investigating crime.” Miranda,
384 U.S. at 477-78. It further clarified
that “[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as to the facts surrounding a crime or
other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not
affected by our holding.” Id. In Lowe v. United States, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that such questions, posed during the fact-finding
process, enable officers “to determine whether a crime has been committed or is
in progress.” 407 F.2d 1391, 1393-94
(9th Cir. 1969).
[3]
The general test for determining
whether custodial interrogation has occurred is whether a reasonable person would
have believed he could not leave freely.
United States v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1978). Such
a test has been held inapplicable in a prison setting, where prisoners may not,
by definition, leave freely, and where such a test would thus be tantamount to
a pragmatically untenable per se custody finding. See United States v. Conley, 779 F.2d
970, 973 (4th Cir. 1985). The Ninth
Circuit in Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978),
refined the dicta in the Supreme Court case of Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S, 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam)[1] to
create a standard for custody in prison situations according to the relative level
of “restriction” experienced by the prisoner.
Specifically, it applied the same four factors cited for the “free to
leave” test used in United States v. Curtis, 568 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir.
1978), for determining situations which would require Miranda warnings:
[T]he language used to summon the individual, the
physical surroundings of the interrogation, the extent to which he is
confronted with evidence of his guilt, and the additional pressure exerted to
detain him must be considered to determine whether a reasonable person would
believe there had been a restriction of his freedom over and above that in his
prisoner setting.
Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428 (emphasis added).
The Fourth Circuit in Conley interpreted the restriction as a
relative concept that “necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the
prisoner which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement.” Conley, 779 F.2d at 973 (citing Cervantes,
589 F.2d at 428). The question, then, is
whether during the interrogation, the inmate “was subjected to more than the
usual restraint on a prisoner’s liberty to depart.” Conley, 779 F.2d at 973.
[4] The Cervantes case concerned an on-scene
investigative situation very much resembling the current case before the Court.
A prisoner was being moved from one cell to another when his belongings were
searched and a small matchbox with a green odorless substance was found. An officer asked him, “What’s this?” to which
the prisoner replied, “That’s grass, man.”
The court held the statement admissible, ruling that in the prison
setting, on-the-scene investigative questioning does not reach the level of
restriction contemplated by the Miranda warnings. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that requiring Miranda
warnings to every prison investigation could “totally disrupt prison
administration,” and would illogically provide more protection to a prisoner
than a non-prisoner in on-the-scene investigative matters.[2] Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 427. We agree with, and follow, this rule and its
reasoning.
[5]
In the current case, Galumalemaga was
returning on his own from an unsupervised work release program and had just
entered prison grounds. He was subjected
to a routine search procedure that required his shoes to be taken off and
checked. The officer saw the three
cigarettes in the shoe before spontaneously asking Galumalemaga what they
were. Galumalemaga immediately answered
him. These circumstances are a
straightforward example of the in-prison, on-the-scene questioning considered
by the Ninth Circuit. Galumalemaga was
undergoing a routine search procedure; the search yielded questionable
artifacts; the officer queried him on-the-scene; Galumalemaga answered him
subject to none of the threats, deceptions, or intimidations that tend to
complicate Miranda custody questions.
We find no evidence of the coercive, police-dominated setting
contemplated by the Miranda decision, nor any basis for inferring
one. Even though Galumalemaga was in the
process of transitioning from the relative independence of work release to the
prison setting, at the time of his search, he was already in the Correctional
Facility, on which premises at least he is considered a full-fledged prison
inmate. We conclude that Galumalemaga’s
constitutional right against self-incrimination has not been violated and hold
that statements to PSO Sua`ava are admissible.
II. Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence
Galumalemaga argues that the contraband discovered in
his shoe during the August 30, 2000, search by PSO Sua`ava should be suppressed
because it was carried out in violation of his constitutional rights.
The first issue is whether Galumalemaga, an inmate
returning to the prison from work release, had a Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, as expressed in Article I, Section 5, of
the Revised Constitution of American Samoa.
This assures the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
656 (1961); Am. Samoa Gov’t v. Afamasaga, 17 A.S.R. 145, 148 (Trial Div.
1990). Prisoners are guaranteed this
right against unreasonable searches and seizures “at least to some minimal
extent.” Bonner v. Coughlin, 517
F.2d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1975).[3] However, this right has been limited for
prisoners,[4]
primarily as a “practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of ‘institutional
needs and objectives’ of prison facilities, . . . chief among which is internal
security.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at
524 n.4.
[6]
The existence of a Fourth Amendment
right is determined by whether the person claiming it has a “justifiable,” or
“reasonable,” or a “legitimate expectation” of privacy with respect to the
place searched and/or the item seized, as measured by his or her subjective
expectation. Hudson, 468 U.S. at
525; Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967). This standard is limited by what
“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525 (citing Katz,
389 U.S. at 360, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). The reasonable expectation standard is thus
clearly restricted when the individual asserting the expectation is
incarcerated or in custody. United
States v. Savage, 482 F.2d
1371, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1973) (applying Katz). In a prison setting, the
test of reasonableness requires a balancing test between the need for the
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979).
[7]
PSO Sua`ava has testified that prison
procedures required him to check all inmates returning to the prison in a
routine manner for drugs, weapons, or tools that might be used to escape. Such a policy is obviously necessary and
reasonable, given the pragmatic concerns of prison security. The evidence indicates that Galumalemaga was
returning from work release, where he was unsupervised and in constant contact
with unincarcerated persons.[5] Galumalemaga had every reason to expect that
his shoe would be searched, not only because he was returning from work release
to the highly supervised life of the prison, but also because such searches
were routine procedure, routinely performed.
Further, the search entailed no threat, nor intimidation, nor body
cavity exposure, but merely a patdown and peering into Galumalemaga’s shoe, and
posed a minimal degree of intrusion upon his privacy. Therefore, we conclude that, as an inmate
returning from work release, Galumalemaga has no reasonable expectation of
privacy, and therefore no Section 5 right, regarding routine pat-down and shoe
search procedures.[6]
Galumalemaga’s constitutional rights under Article I,
Sections 5 and 6, of the Revised Constitution of American Samoa were not violated
by PSO Sua`ava’s search and questioning on August 30, 2000. The motions to suppress defendant’s statement
and the evidence obtained during the search are, therefore, denied.
It is so ordered.
**********
In Mathiason, the Supreme Court held that a suspect who
voluntarily comes to a police station is not “in custody” for Miranda purposes. The Court recognized that some coercive
element inevitably arises in any interview with police officers, which are
“part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be
charged with a crime.” The line between
custodial and non-custodial situations cannot, therefore, depend on the mere
presence of police officers in a confined setting, but rather on the “totality
of circumstances” involved. California
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), further cited Mathiason, in
its formulation of the test for custody in technically noncustodial situations:
“the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
The Ninth Circuit distinguished its ruling from that of the Supreme
Court in Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968). In Mathis, the Supreme Court ruled
that evidence obtained from a prisoner during a routine tax investigation was
illegal because the Internal Revenue agent had not administered the Miranda
rights. The Ninth Circuit pointed to the
difference between the tax investigation and on-the-scene questioning, as well
as to the pragmatic implications for prison administration of requiring
warnings before any and all types of questioning.
The Supreme Court in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984),
clearly states that “prisoners be accorded those rights not fundamentally
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of
incarceration.”
As reasoned in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962)
(citations omitted), and cited in United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796,
805 (6th Cir. 1975):
[T]o say that a public jail is
the equivalent of a man’s “house” or that it is a place where he can claim
constitutional immunity from search or seizure of his person, his papers, or
his effects, is at best a novel argument . . . . [W]ithout attempting either to
define or to predict the ultimate scope of Fourth Amendment protection, it is
obvious that a jail shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home,
automobile, an office, or a hotel room.
In prison, official surveillance has traditionally been the order of the
day.
See also Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
The Supreme Court stated: “Prisons, by definition, are places of
involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-social
criminal, and often violent, conduct.
Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform
their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of
self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way
that reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of
others. . . . Within this volatile ‘community,’ prison administrators are to
take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of not only the prison staffs and
administrative personnel, but also visitors.
They are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee
the safety of the inmates themselves. They must be ever alert to attempts to
introduce drugs and other contraband into the premises which, we can judicially
notice, is one of the most perplexing problems of prisons today; they must
prevent, so far as possible, the flow of illicit weapons into the prison.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526-27.
Relevant caselaw has variously held that bodily searches held incident
to routine prison security procedures are not violative of the Fourth Amendment
rights of inmates. In Daughtery v.
Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir.), the court held that the procedure
requiring rectal searches on release from court appearance are not violative of
the Fourth Amendment rights of inmates even in absence of a showing of special
cause justifying such searches, given necessary and reasonable nature of the
requirement in a maximum security institution, and given that the search was
performed by trained medical assistants.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979), it was held that
the practice of visual body-cavity searches of pretrial detainees following
contact visits were neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional, and could be
conducted on less than probable cause.
Finally, in United States v. Dawson, it was held that a prisoner
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his jail cell. 516 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1975) (using the
test in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 at 361 (1967)). All of these cases depended, more or less, on
the practical circumstances of insuring the safety and confinement of the
prison environment.