5ASR3d164
SIULEO POUESI, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN SAMOA GOVERNMENT,
AMERICAN SAMOA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, and DOES 1-10, inclusive,
Defendants.
High Court of American Samoa
Trial Division
CA No. 84-00
August 15, 2001
[1] A motion to
dismiss will be treated as a summary judgment motion when evidence extrinsic to
the complaint is presented to and is considered by the court.
[2] Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
[3] On a motion for summary judgment, the court must
view the pleadings and supporting papers in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.
[4] If the moving party on a motion for summary judgment
makes a prima facie showing that would entitle him or her to a directed verdict
if uncontroverted at trial, the burden then shifts to the adverse party, who
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
[5] Tort claims against the American Samoa Government
are subject to the Government Tort Liability Act, which states that such claims
shall be forever barred unless an action on it is begun within 2 years after
the claim accrues.
[6] In actions for conversion, the cause of action
accrues on the date of the conversion, regardless of when the plaintiff
discovers the conversion or whether he demanded the return of the property,
unless the case involves fraudulent concealment or other act of deceit designed
to hide the defendant’s actions from the plaintiff.
Before RICHMOND, Associate
Justice, and ATIULAGI, Associate Judge.*
Counsel: For Plaintiff, Katopau T, Ainu`u
For Defendants, Martin D. McCarthy, Asst.
Attorney General
ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANTS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
AND DISMISSING ACTION
On July 26, 2000, plaintiff Siuleo Pouesi (“Pouesi”)
brought this action against defendants American Samoa Government (“ASG”) and
American Samoa Environmental Protection Agency (“ASEPA”) to recover damages due
to the alleged conversion of a logo designed by Pouesi for ASEPA. On August 7, 2000, pursuant to T.C.R.C.P.
12(b)(6), ASG and ASEPA moved to dismiss Pouesi’s complaint for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted based on the tolling of the
relevant statute of limitations. Counsel
argued the motion on September 22, 2000.
On September 21, 2000, the day before the hearing on
the motion to dismiss, Pouesi filed a memorandum in opposition of the motion
and his affidavit stating additional facts.
On September 27, 2000, ASG and ASEPA filed a reply to the opposition
memorandum and their counsel’s affidavit, stating he was unaware of Pouesi’s opposition memorandum
and affidavit until after the hearing. Accordingly,
we have also considered the reply memorandum.
Standard of Review
[1] A motion to dismiss will be treated
as a summary judgment motion when evidence extrinsic to the complaint is
presented to and is considered by the court.
Samoana Fellowship, Inc. v. Am. Samoa Power Auth., 24
A.S.R.2d 71, 72 (Trial Div. 1993) (citing Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969
F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir.
1992)). Pouesi’s affidavit explicated
new facts as evidence of the chronology of events to sustain his claim. We considered the merit of the facts contained
in the affidavit and, therefore, must treat the motion to dismiss as a motion
for summary judgment.
[2-4] Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
T.C.R.C.P. 56(c). The Court must
view the pleadings and supporting papers in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Amerika Samoa Bank v, United
Parcel Serv., 25 A.S.R.2d 159, 161 (Trial Div. 1994); Ah Mai v. Am. Samoa Gov’t (Mem.),
11 A.S.R.2d 133, 136 (Trial Div. 1989).
If the moving party makes a prima facie case that would entitle movant
to a directed verdict if uncontroverted at trial, the burden shifts to the
adverse party, who must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” T.C.R.C.P.
56(e).
Facts
Pouesi designed a logo for ASEPA in 1986. A disagreement then ensued between him and
ASEPA as to payment for and use of the design. Though Pouesi alleges that ASO
and ASEPA made unkept promises concerning the disagreement and that he
occasionally threatened legal action, he did not initiate any formal claim
until the present one was filed. ASEPA apparently used the logo for over a
decade.
Some 13 years after providing the logo to ASEPA, in or
about February 1999, Pouesi claims to have first discovered that ASEPA sold
T-shirts and mugs printed with the logo he designed. On April 2, 1999, Pouesi submitted an administrative
claim to the Attorney General, a prerequisite under the Government Tort
Liability Act (“G.T.L.A.”), A.S.C.A. § 43.1205, to initiate tort actions
against ASG. On May 18 and 20, 1999, the
Attorney General advised Pouesi that his claim does not fall under the purview
of the G.T.L.A.
Discussion
ASG and ASEPA argue that the statute of limitations
has tolled for Pouesi’s claim against ASG and ASEPA for damages due to tortious
conversion of his logo design. This
argument is supported by statute and case law.
[5] Tort claims against ASG are subject
to the G.T.L.A., which states that such claims “shall be forever barred unless
an action on it is begun within 2 years after the claim accrues.” A.S.C.A. § 43.1204. Our most recent line of cases interpreting
the term “accrues” for purposes of A.S.C.A. § 43.1204 focuses on the
relationship between the accrual of a claim and the filing of the pre-requisite
administrative claim. See Bradcock v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 1
A.S.R.3d 42, 43 (App. Div. 1997) (applying tolling doctrine to the statute of
limitations, effectively adding a three-month period of administrative
processing to the two-year statute of limitations of G.T.L.A., thereby creating
a 27-month time period in which to file a tort action against ASG); Bradcock v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 28 A.S.R.2d 62, 64 (Trial Div.
1995); Randall v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 19 A.S.R.2d 111, 116 (Trial Div.
1991); Mataipule v. Tifaimoana, 16 A.S.R.2d 48, 50 (Trial Div.
1990) (claim under G.T.L.A. accrues for purposes of § 43.1204 when the
administrative claim is denied).
Thirteen years passed between Pouesi’s first dispute,
whereby he claims to have confronted ASEPA about its failure to pay for his
logo design, and his discovery and contest of ASEPA’s use of his design for
allegedly commercial purposes. This more
than surpasses the 27-month statute of limitations applicable to conversion
actions against ASG under Braddock, and so seems to bar Pouesi’s action.
Pouesi argues, however, that the statute of
limitations should be regarded as accruing from the time he discovered the
conversion by commercial use of the logo in February 1999. Such a ruling by the Court would render the
filing of this action well within the limitation period of 27 months.
[6] However, the majority common law is
definitive in holding that, in actions for conversion, the cause of action
accrues on the date of the conversion, regardless of when the plaintiff
discovers the conversion or whether he demanded the return of the property,
unless the case involves fraudulent concealment or other act of deceit designed
to hide the defendant’s actions from the plaintiff. Therrell v. Georgia Marbel Holdings Corp.,
960 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1992); Jackson v. Am. Credit Bureau, Inc.,
531 P.2d 932, 934 (Ariz. 1975); Small Business Admin. v. Echevarria,
864 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 1994); see generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 94
(1985); 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation
of Actions § 123 (1985).
There is neither allegations nor evidence of fraud in
this case. All events surrounding the disputed
acquisition of the logo by ASEPA, the terms of the acquisition, and failures of
ASEPA to pay began much longer than 27 months ago, in 1986.
The statute of limitations has
clearly transpired, barring Pouesi from bringing this claim for conversion. Therefore, this action will be summarily
dismissed.
Order
Summary judgment shall enter in favor of ASG and ASEPA
against Pouesi, and this action is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
* Temporary Associate Judge Tauanu`u Faisiota sat at the
hearing on this motion. However, he
resigned from the Court to take his seat in the Senate of the Legislature of
American Samoa before the Court completed deliberations on the matter at hand
for purposes of issuing this order.