The laws of American Samoa do not grant ASG’s insurance commissioner absolute discretion to grant certificates of authority but rather constrain the commissioner to follow and enforce all insurance laws.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

The insurance commissioner does not have unbridled discretionary authority to issue certificates of authority.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 1(3)—Certificates to Transact Insurance

The insurance commissioner does not have unbridled discretionary authority to issue certificates of authority.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

All insurers must comply with the specifically delineated statutory requirements of A.S.C.A. § 29.0302.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 1(4)—Statutory Deposits

The insurance laws of American Samoa do not provide for transfer of ownership of insurer’s bonds or statutory deposits, save for transfers by an insurer to ASG’s Insurance Commissioner, and only then or the use and benefit of any person injured by the breach of the condition of any bond.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

The statutory deposit, required to be made by insurers under the AS.C.A. §29.0302, is not freely transferable, but is specifically committed to rendering legal obligations incurred by the principal.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

A deposit made by an insurance company as a condition of its right to do business constitutes a trust fund for the benefit of the insurer’s policyholders, and for the insurer’s creditors after the claims of policyholders are satisfied.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

A statutory deposit is essentially a trust for the insured; its establishment and maintenance must be directed towards ensuring that insurers perform their obligations.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

An insurer may assign its statutory deposit to another insurer, but it must first comply with the proper legal means for establishing a formal succession of interest.An assignee insurer is entitled to the statutory deposit of an assignor insurer only if the assignee insurer has assumed all obligations liabilities and assets of the assignor insurer, through corporate merger or other lawful means.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

The mere fact that a company has ceased to do business within the state does not warrant full withdrawal of the insurer’s bond.A statutory deposit may only be returned to an insurer when the insurance commissioner is satisfied that all obligations for which the deposit was made to secure have been paid or are extinguished.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

Where there is misappropriation by one party of another’s statutory insurance deposit, in order to make an illegitimate business seem legitimate, the court will apply principles of equity to prevent a withdrawal of the statutory deposit so long as innocent policyholders might be defrauded thereby.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

Interest earned on a statutory deposit belongs to the insurance company for whom the deposit is made.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

Where a bank holds a certificate of deposit assigned to ASG’s insurance commissioner for use as a statutory deposit in lieu of an insurer’s bond under A.S.C.A. § 29.0302(6), the bank is obligated to exercise reasonable care as bailee of the deposit, and must use it for its intended purpose.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

Bank holding a statutory insurance deposit held not liable to the owner insurance company for refusing to allow withdrawal of the funds where no formal evidence or documentation was proffered to bank regarding the planned purpose of the funds, ASG Attorney General informed bank his office was investigating a claim for those funds by a court appointed liquidator and insurance company was being investigated by FBI and AG requested bank not release funds.American Samoa Gov’t v. Amerika Samoa Bank, 4 A.S.R.3d 249 (Trial Div. 2000).

§ 1(5)—Orders of the Commissioner

RESERVED

§ 1(6)—Withdrawal from American Samoa

RESERVED

§ 1(7)—Agents & Brokers

RESERVED

§ 1(8)—Bailees as Insurers

It is a well-settled rule of law that an ordinary bailee is not an insurer of bailed property absent statute or express agreement but is liable only for loss resulting from his negligence in caring for and protecting the bailed property.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 18 A.S.R.2d 2.

A bailee for mutual purposes is under no legal obligation to insure.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 18 A.S.R.2d 2.

§ 2Policy as a Contract

§ 2(1)—Generally

Even if the “last injurious exposure” rule were not the law in American Samoa, employers and insurers may contractually adopt this rule, which places full liability on the insurer providing coverage at the time of the most recent injury causally related to the disability.Continental Insurance Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 15 A.S.R.2d 130.

Defendant could not unilaterally withhold a percentage of the commissions payable to plaintiff on his sales of insurance policies in order to recoup commissions defendant paid on lapsed or cancelled policies, where the contract did not so specify.Mauga v. Pioneer Pacific Financial Services, Inc., 16 A.S.R.2d 16

An insurance policy is a contract and the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts are applicable to insurance policies.If an insurance contract is unambiguous, the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions require that a court follow the prescriptions of the policy as written, and need look no further in resolving any disputes.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance, 26 A.S.R. 2d 23.

An insurance policy is a contract, and the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts are applicable to insurance policies.Plaza Department Store v. Duchnak, 26 A.S.R.2d 106.

An insurance policy is construed like other contracts.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 29.1533 requires insurance companies to include the conditions of insurance, as well as other pertinent information, in their insurance policies.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 2(2)—Documents Included in the Contract

Endorsements are forms added to basic policies to address a situation’s particular coverage needs.Endorsements become part of an insurance contract and must be construed with it.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance, 26 A.S.R.2d 23.

If there is a conflict between the terms of the endorsement and those in the body of the main policy, then the endorsement prevails, particularly when it favors the insured.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance, 26 A.S.R.2d 23.

An application or proposal for an insurance policy becomes a part of the contract if it is made a part thereof by the express terms of the policy.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

Even if a writing is not specifically referenced in another writing as being part of the contract, but the two were written as part of the same transaction, they should be read together as forming the contract.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 2(3)—Interpretation

Auto rental contract expressly prohibiting all drivers except the party signing the contract does not conclusively prove that other drivers are not covered by the owner’s omnibus insurance clause, since the facts may show that the owner gave implied permission regardless of the contractual prohibition. Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Where auto insurance policy excluded coverage for damages incurred while the vehicle was operated by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, but continued coverage provided on behalf of “any other person or party” who proves he did not consent to the vehicle being driven by the intoxicated driver, “any other person or party” refers to third party beneficiaries rather than the insured.Thompson v. National Pacific Insurance, 16 A.S.R.2d 114.

Words used in an exclusionary clause in an insurance policy are to be given the meaning that common speech imports.Thompson v. National Pacific Insurance, 20 A.S.R.2d 85.

When a party disputed an assertion that a written insurance contract was the product of mutual mistake and so did not reflect the actual terms of the policy, a factual dispute precluding summary judgment existed.American Samoa Power Authority v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 23 A.S.R.2d 100.

Once an insurance policy is found to be ambiguous, further inquiry is generally allowed by the court.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance, 26 A.S.R.2d 23.

An insurance policy is to be read from the viewpoint of a layperson.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 26 A.S.R.2d 99.

When a conflict exists between the endorsement and the body of a policy, the conflict is resolved in favor of the endorsement.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 26 A.S.R.2d 99.

A court cannot inquire into the intent of either party unless the policy is ambiguous.Asifoa v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 26 A.S.R.2d 99.

An insurance policy is a contract, and the same rules of construction applicable to other contracts are applicable to insurance policies.Plaza Department Store v. Duchnak, 26 A.S.R.2d 106.

A court may inquire into the circumstances surrounding an insurance policy if that policy is found to be ambiguous. Plaza Department Store v. Duchnak, 26 A.S.R.2d 106.

Contracts of insurance are, as a rule, construed in accordance with general principles of contractual construction.ASPA v. NPI, 31 A.S.R.2d 201.

Terms in an insurance contract are taken in their plain, ordinary and popular sense.ASPA v. NPI, 31 A.S.R.2d 201.

When the language of an insurance policy is plain and unambiguous, the court must refrain from application of rules of construction in order to find coverage for a risk of loss not intended or contemplated within the contract.ASPA v. NPI, 31 A.S.R.2d 201.

If the language of an insurance contract is plainly ambiguous on the issue of coverage, the court can consider parole evidence.ASPA v. NPI, 31 A.S.R.2d 201.

Statute requiring liability insurance for taxis is for protection of public and should be liberally construed.R.C.A.S. 25.20.Tung v. Ah Sam, 4 A.S.R. 764.

Ambiguous clause in motor vehicle liability must be construed in favor of insured.Tung v. Ah Sam, 4 A.S.R. 764.

§ 2(4)—Modification & Reformation

Reformation involves rewriting a contract in order to reflect the actual intent of both parties, and an insurance contract may be reformed after a loss has occurred.However, reformation is not appropriate to enforce terms to which the defendant never assented, but is used only to correct a mistake in writing to conform to the actual agreement of the parties.Plaza Department Store v. Duchnak, 26 A.S.R.2d 106.

Reformation is an extraordinary remedy, and courts have in general exercised it with caution. However, courts have reformed insurance contracts in regard to the amount of coverage provided.Plaza Department Store v. Duchnak, 26 A.S.R.2d 106.

The proof to reform a policy on the ground of mutual mistake must be more then a mere preponderance of the evidence.At the same time, the mistake warranting reformation must be harbored by both parties, and not just one, and must be proven by more then a mere preponderance of evidence.ASPA v. NPI, 31 A.S.R.2d 201.

A court may reform an insurance contract upon proof of a mutual mistake, which is reciprocal and common to both parties.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 2(5)—Termination

“Cancellation” as used in insurance law usually refers to termination of a policy prior to the expiration of the policy period, while “termination” refers to the expiration of a policy by lapse of the policy period.A.S.C.A. § 22.2013.Pu`u v. Leupule, 12 A.S.R.2d 59.

As adequate safeguards exist to inform the Director of Administrative Services of the natural “termination” of insurance policies by expiration of the policy period, the legislature did not intend the statute requiring an insurer to notify the Director at least ten days prior to “cancellation” of a policy to apply to “terminations.”A.S.C.A. § 22.2013.Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.

§ 2(6)—Cancellation

Where a contract stated that plaintiff would receive commissions on insurance premiums collected via payroll deduction, defendant was liable for such commissions on premiums collected under a subsequent payroll deduction plan until he gave timely written notice of cancellation to plaintiff as required by the contract.Mauga v. Pioneer Pacific Financial Services, Inc., 16 A.S.R.2d 16

“Cancellation” of an insurance policy generally refers to conclusion of a policy prior to the expiration of the policy period, while “termination” refers to expiration of the policy by lapse of the policy period.A.S.C.A. § 22.2013.Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.As adequate safeguards exist to inform the Director of Administrative Services of the natural “termination” of insurance policies by expiration of the policy period, the legislature did not intend the statute requiring an insurer to notify the Director at least ten days prior to “cancellation” of a policy to apply to “terminations.”A.S.C.A. § 22.2013.Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.

§ 2(7)—Warranties

RESERVED

§ 2(8)—Misrepresentation

A statement is a misrepresentation acting to nullify an insurance policy only if it regards a fact material to be known for estimating the risk.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A representation relates to a fact actually material to the risk which the insurer is asked to assume.If the statement does not relate to a fact material to the risk it is not a “representation” within the sense that if it is false it affords the insurer a basis for avoiding the contract.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

As decedent represented that he did not have, or take medication for, medical condition other than hypertension for five years preceding date of application, and there is uncontested evidence that decedent in fact had knowledge of another medical condition and had been medicated for medical condition, decedent in fact misrepresented his medical condition when he applied for life insurance.Langkilde v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 198 (Trial Div. 2002).

Untrue statement regarding matter materially affecting health of life insurance applicant, made by one who knows statement is not true, allows insurer to avoid policy.Langkilde v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 198 (Trial Div. 2002).

If misrepresentation causes insurer to assume risk it otherwise would not have taken, or would not have taken at rate of premium charged, there is legal ground for avoidance.Langkilde v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 198 (Trial Div. 2002).

“Misrepresentation” in the insurance context is a statement or representation by omission, made by an insured, that is untrue; and is either made with intent to deceive or without knowing it to be true; that misleads or has tendency to mislead by causing reliance by insurer; and is material to the insured risk.Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 203 (Trial Div. 2002).

Decedent’s representation of good health was misrepresentation when decedent knew he was afflicted with diabetes for five years preceding application for insurance and was fully aware of condition at time of his application.Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 203 (Trial Div. 2002).

Untrue statement regarding matter materially affecting health of applicant for life insurance, made by one who knows statement is untrue, allows insurer to avoid policy.Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 203 (Trial Div. 2002).

If misrepresentation causes insurer to assume risk it otherwise would not have taken, or would not have taken at rate of premium charged, there is legal ground for avoidance.Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 203 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 2(9)—Applicable Law

Where insurance contract was initiated, signed, and enforceable in American Samoa, where insured lived in American Samoa, where claim originated in American Samoa, and where plaintiff sought to collect on claim in American Samoa, law of American Samoa law controlled the rights and duties of the parties.Suluai v. Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 203 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3Parties & Interests

§ 3(1)—General Provisions

RESERVED

§ 3(2)—Role & Authority of Agent

RESERVED

§ 3(3)—Insured’s Duties

§ 3(4)—Insurer’s Duties

§ 3(4)(a)—Generally

RESERVED

§ 3(4)(b)—Duty to Pay

There exists at common law a tort for bad faith delay in paying legitimate insurance claims.Paisano’s Corp. v. National Pac. Ins., 30 A.S.R.2d 139.

The tort of bad faith delay in paying legitimate insurance claims is not preempted by A.S.C.A. § 29.1577 because the statute penalizing delay in paying insurance claims does not rest upon a showing of bad faith.Paisano’s Corp. v. National Pac. Ins., 30 A.S.R.2d 139.

Statute requiring insurance carrier to notify the director of administrative services of the “cancellation” of a policy did not require such notice when the policy expired because the term of coverage ran out and the policy was not renewed.A.S.C.A. § 22.2013.Pu`u v. Leupule, 12 A.S.R.2d 59.

A.S.C.A. § 29.1577 is a penalty statute, imposing a 12% mandatory penalty upon a dilatory insurer.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 29.1577 prescribes that an insurer pay a legitimate claim within the time specified in the policy.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 29.1577 provides that an insurer’s duty to pay is triggered only after an insured has made a demand to the insurer.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

Where insureds failed to submit a written demand, they were precluded from complaining that insurer was untimely in paying such unspecified claims.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 29.1577 is meant to provide a mandatory penalty against a late paying insurer, not to curtail an insurer’s right to seek court intervention in situations where a claim is reasonably disputed.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A tort cause of action exists in American Samoa for bad faith delay in paying insurance claims.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

To prevail on a bad faith claim, the insured must demonstrate: (1) the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy, and (2) the insured’s knowledge or reckless disregard for denying the claim.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

The tort of bad faith can only succeed upon a showing of the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

In determining whether an insurance company has acted in bad faith, the courts of American Samoa employ the two part test set forth in Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3(4)(c)—Good Faith Attempt to Resolve Dispute

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in every insurance contract includes a duty to effect reasonable settlement of a claim against the insured within its policy limits when there is a substantial likelihood of recovery in excess of those limits.Seumalo v. American International Underwriters, 2 A.S.R.2d 72 (Trial Div. 1985).

An insurer must resort to court action only after having made a good faith attempt to resolve a disputed claim.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

An insurer that fails to make a good faith attempt to resolve a disputed claim, and abuses the judicial process by filing an interpleader complaint to deliberately avoid payment of a legitimate claim will be found in violation of A.S.C.A. § 29.1577.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3(4)(d)—Duty to Act on Application

In appropriate circumstances, an insurer may be liable in tort for negligent failure to act on an application for insurance.Overland Olotoa, Inc. v. National Pacific Ins. Co., 1 A.S.R.2d 111 (Trial Div. 1983).

§ 3(5)—Subrogation

Under the collateral source rule, which applies to torts in admiralty and virtually all other tort cases, an injured party’s compensation from a source independent of the tortfeasor is not deducted from damages otherwise collectable from the tortfeasor.Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.

Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.American Samoa Power Auth. v. Deutz MWM Far East (PTE) Ltd., 7 A.S.R.3d 178 (Trial Div. 2003).

If a subrogee has paid an entire loss suffered by the insured, it is the only real party in interest and must sue in its own name.American Samoa Power Auth. v. Deutz MWM Far East (PTE) Ltd., 7 A.S.R.3d 178 (Trial Div. 2003).

If a subrogee has paid only part of a loss, both the insured and insurer have substantive rights against the tortfeasor which qualify them as real parties in interest.American Samoa Power Auth. v. Deutz MWM Far East (PTE) Ltd., 7 A.S.R.3d 178 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 3(6)—Beneficiaries

Where auto insurance policy excluded coverage for damages incurred while the vehicle was operated by a person under the influence, but continued coverage provided on behalf of third party beneficiaries who did not consent to the vehicle being driven by the intoxicated driver, defendant insurance company was granted summary judgment against plaintiff insured who had not consented to his intoxicated brother driving the vehicle, since the exception to the exclusionary clause did not apply where the indemnity and/or insurance was provided on behalf of the insured.Thompson v. National Pacific Insurance, 16 A.S.R.2d 114.

§ 3(7)—Insurable Interests

One has no insurable interest in property obtained by unenforceable contracts or illegal activity.YRT, Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 6 A.S.R.3d 108 (Trial Div. 2002).

To have the capacity to insure against property damage, the insured must have an insurable interest in the covered property.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

Without an insurable interest, a contract for property insurance will be considered void.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

An “insurable interest” is broadly defined in A.S.C.A. § 29.1522(a) as encompassing every interest in property, any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereto.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

An interest that is merely contingent or expectant in something, not founded upon an actual right to or in the thing, nor upon any valid contract for it, is not insurable.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

The legal status of an insured with respect to property is instructive as to whether or not that person has an insurable interest in the subject property; however, it is not conclusive.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

Generally speaking, a person has an insurable interest in property whenever he would profit by or gain some advantage by its continued existence and suffer some loss or disadvantage by its destruction.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

Interpreting American Samoa’s insurable interest statute in pecuniary terms is appropriate in the case of property insurance policies.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

An interest in a building solely because it housed a place of employment for one’s sponsored foreigners cannot be said to be a reasonable expectation of the pecuniary benefit derived from the continued existence of the subject of insurance.Such an interest is merely contingent, or expectant and not a sufficient interest to be insurable.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 3(8)—Transfer of Insured Property

RESERVED

§ 3(9)—Reinsurance

Under definition of “contract of reinsurance” in A.S.C.A. § 29.1590, T.C.R.C.P. 26(b)(2) allows discovery of existence and contents of insurance agreement between reinsurer and insurer.YHT, Inc. v. Oxford/Progressive Group, 5 A.S.R.3d 31 (Trial Div. 2001).

Reinsurance contract is made by original insurer for its own protection. It creates privity only between reinsurer and reinsured, and no rights accrue to original insured.YHT, Inc. v. Oxford/Progressive Group, 5 A.S.R.3d 31 (Trial Div. 2001).

§ 3(10)—Double Insurance

RESERVED

§ 3(11)—Stacking Benefits

RESERVED

§ 3(12)—Statutory Right to Sue

Territorial government which was required by law to pay for an accident victim’s medical expenses, and which had paid these expenses, was an “injured person” within the meaning of a statute allowing injured person to bring direct action against the insurer of a person alleged to have caused the accident.A.S.C.A. § 22.2018.American International Underwriters v. American Samoa Government, 3 A.S.R.2d 115.

Territorial statute which required the government to provide free medical services to all citizens, and which did not require citizens who had ability to pay their own medical expenses to reimburse the government, implicitly required that government’s claim for reimbursement from tortfeasor’s insurer should be subordinate to victim’s claim for pain and suffering.A.S.C.A. § 13.0601.American International Underwriters v. American Samoa Government, 3 A.S.R.2d 115.

Insurance company may be sued directly for the wrongful acts of its insured.A.S.C.A. § 22.2018Sataua v. Himphill, 5 A.S.R.2d 61.

On causes of action arising in American Samoa from any policy of liability insurance, a plaintiff may take direct action against an insurer regardless of whether the policy forbids such action, whether the insured is bankrupt, or whether the plaintiff is suing for personal injury or property damages.A.S.C.A. § 29.1537.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 15 A.S.R.2d 44.

Statute granting a right of direct action against an insurer even if a policy forbids such action must be liberally construed to enhance its public policy purpose of allowing direct actions on liability insurance policies.A.S.C.A. § 29.1537.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 15 A.S.R.2d 44.

Statutory right of direct action applies to any policy of liability insurance.A.S.C.A. § 29.1537.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 15 A.S.R.2d 44.

Plaintiff has a right of direct action against an insurance company.A.S.C.A. § 29.1537.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 18 A.S.R.2d 2.

The statutory right of direct action against an insurer on a liability-insurance policy does not apply to an insurance broker, which is typically an agent of the insured and is not an insurance company.Bryant v. Southwest Marine of Samoa, Inc., 23 A.S.R.2d 148.

In regards to subrogation, an insurance company must be joined as a necessary party plaintiff only if it has compensated an insured for his entire loss and if a danger exists that a defendant will face future lawsuits from the insurance company.T.C.R.C.P. 17(a), 19.Interocean Ships, Inc. v. Samoan Gases, 24 A.S.R.2d 108.

§ 4Coverage

§ 4(1)—Policy Terms & Limitations

Damages resulting from auto accident were limited to the maximum insurance coverage under defendant’s policy where the evidence showed that some pain and suffering resulted from plaintiff’s delay in acting on and following up medical recommendations, and her loss of earnings resulted from an unrelated medical condition rather than from the injuries caused by the accident.To`omalatai v. Moliga, 15 A.S.R.2d 77.

§ 4(2)—Proof of Loss

RESERVED

§ 4(3)—Measure of Recovery

If a total loss occurs under a valued policy, the stated value of the policy is conclusive, and the insured is entitled to such full value.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A building need not be totally annihilated before constituting a total loss.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

The question of the existence of total loss is a question of fact.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

§ 4(4)—Exclusions & Exceptions

RESERVED

§ 4(5)—Public Policy Prevents Recovery

Public policy dictates that if an insured sets fire to his property, either intentionally or willfully, he shall be denied the right to collect from his fire insurance.YHT Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 7 A.S.R.3d 150 (Trial Div. 2003).

The majority rule places the burden on the insurer to prove a claim that an insured set fire to his property by a preponderance of the evidence.YHT Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 7 A.S.R.3d 150 (Trial Div. 2003).

There are three common elements to an insurer’s defense that an insured set fire to his own property: (1) incendiary fire, (2) motive on the part of the insured to destroy the property, and (3) opportunity on the part of the insured to set the fire or to procure the setting of the fire by another.YHT Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 7 A.S.R.3d 150 (Trial Div. 2003).

In a case where an insured seeks to prevent recovery of insurance funds due to suspected arson, an insured may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove that the insured was involved because direct evidence of arson is often elusive.YHT Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 7 A.S.R.3d 150 (Trial Div. 2003).

In order to preclude an insured from recovering due to a fire it set, an insurer need only show that the insured had the opportunity to procure the setting of the fire, or in the case of a corporate insured, that the fire can be traced to any of its corporate officers.YHT Inc. v. Progressive Ins. Co., 7 A.S.R.3d 150 (Trial Div. 2003).

§ 5Automobile Insurance

§ 5(1)—General Provisions

Licensing of a car requires proof of liability insurance, and only licensed cars may be driven on public highways, so that use of public highways is effectively conditioned on maintenance of insurance.A.S.C.A. §§ 22.1001, 22.1002.Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.

Inclusion of one’s name on an automobile’s registration is not conclusive evidence of ownership of the vehicle.Pen v. Pen, 30 A.S.R.2d 119.

§ 5(2)—Liability

SEE TORTS § 8(3) – COMPULSORY INSURANCE ACT

Compulsory liability insurance statute defines “accident” to include battery when victim did not invite or provoke aggression and owner of vehicle did not consent to nor authorize assault.R.C.A.S. 25.2003(b)3.Tung v. Ah Sam, 4 A.S.R. 764.

Statute requiring the owner of a vehicle to purchase and maintain liability insurance for losses inflicted by any person using his vehicle, and related statutes forbidding the operation of uninsured vehicles on the public highway and giving an injured person the right to bring direct action against the insurer, were intended to ensure recovery in tort for victims injured by drivers who could not afford to pay damages.A.S.C.A. §§ 22.1001, 22.2002-03.Foma’i v. Samana, 4 A.S.R.2d 102.

Rental company that allowed its automobile to be operated on the highway without insurance required by law was liable for damages suffered by person injured by negligent driver of company’s automobile, up to the amount that would have been covered by insurance if the rental company had not breached its statutory duty to provide insurance.A.S.C.A. §§ 22.1001, 22.2002-03.Foma’i v. Samana, 4 A.S.R.2d 102.

Legislature designed the compulsory insurance statute to facilitate compensation of, and afford a realistic remedy for, victims of negligence.A.S.C.A. § 22.2001 et seq.Pu`u v. Lepule, 8 A.S.R.2d 68.

A vehicle owner’s policy of liability insurance must insure the person named therein and any other person who uses the vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of the named insured.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003.Maifea v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 27 A.S.R.2d 104.

Compulsory Insurance Act limits recovery to victims who prove actionable fault on the part of a named insured or persons driving the insured vehicle with his express or implied permission.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003(2).Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

§ 5(3)—Permission by Owner

Owner’s implied permission to use his vehicle, which extends compulsory liability insurance coverage to a non-owner driver, may be inferred from a course of conduct or relationship between the vehicle owner and driver in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection under circumstances signifying consent.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003(2).Maulupe v. American International Underwriters, 12 A.S.R.2d 1.

Evidence must show owner’s permission, express or implied, in order for non-owner driver to be covered by owner’s compulsory vehicle liability insurance policy.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003(2).Maulupe v. American International Underwriters, 12 A.S.R.2d 1.

Plaintiff failed to show owner’s express or implied permission to employee living on premises to use vehicle where:employee had never before driven owner’s vehicles; her duties did not require driving; and she obtained vehicle key by breaking locks on home office door and key cabinet in owner’s absence.Maulupe v. American International Underwriters, 12 A.S.R.2d 1.

Compulsory Insurance Act requires auto insurance omnibus clause to insure the named insured and persons using the vehicle with his express or implied permission.A.S.C.A. § 22.2001.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Under initial permission rule, owner of a vehicle who permits it to be used by a first person is considered to have allowed that person’s permittees to use the vehicle, even if the owner tried to limit his consent to the first person.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Under initial permission rule, owner of a vehicle who permits it to be used by another is considered to have permitted any later use by that person short of theft or conversion, even if such use violates the scope of the use originally permitted by the owner.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Under strict rule, if the owner of a car expressly forbids his permittee to lend it to another, anyone driving the car in violation of such a prohibition is not covered by the omnibus insurance clause.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Whether a particular driver has the insured’s permission and is thus insured is a matter of fact to be proven on the evidence.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

Initial permission rule reflects a public policy of avoiding litigation of the details of factual issues concerning the terms and scope of permission granted by a named insured.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

American Samoa statutory scheme does not reflect public policy underlying initial permission rule; instead, it extends coverage only to express or implied permittees of the named insured, and does not deem permission to exist as a matter of law for all uses short of theft or conversion.Mauga v. National Pacific Insurance, 15 A.S.R.2d 35.

When a vehicle’s owner did not insure his car as required by law and the driver was using the car with his permission, the owner is liable to compensate the plaintiff for any losses up to the $10,000 insurance amount he had a duty to provide.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003.Vaiti v. So’oso’o, 19 A.S.R.2d 71.

The liability of an uninsured vehicle’s owner is secondary to that of a principal tortfeasor who was driving with the owner’s permission; while a plaintiff may collect from either defendant, the vehicle’s owner has a right of indemnity and subrogation against the driver.Vaiti v. So’oso’o, 19 A.S.R.2d 71.

Compulsory vehicle insurance covers the named insured, as well as any other person who uses the insured’s vehicle with his express or implied permission.A.S.C.A. § 22.2003(2).Leilua v. Ali’itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

Inferential in nature, implied permission for a vehicle’s use is usually shown by usage and practice of the parties over a sufficient period of time.Leilua v. Ali’itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

Although weaker evidence will support a finding of implied permission to use a vehicle if the drivers are blood relatives than if they were strangers or mere acquaintances, the mere existence of a close family relationship does not of itself establish permissive use.Leilua v. Ali’itaeao, 23 A.S.R.2d 97.

Where company policy gives only three persons permission to drive a company vehicle, and defendant is not one of those persons, defendant does not have “express” permission to drive the vehicle.Maifea v. National Pacific Insurance Co., 27 A.S.R.2d 104.

§ 5(4)—Uninsured & Underinsured Motorists

RESERVED

§ 6Liability Insurance

Insurance statute that specifically includes certain losses but does not comprehensively define “liability insurance” does not necessarily exclude all other losses.Holland v. Haleck’s Island Motors, 15 A.S.R.2d 44.

§ 7Property Insurance

Property insurance policies are indemnity policies that provide the insured with the right to be compensated to be made whole after a loss has been sustained.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

A.S.C.A. § 29.1539, requires that policies written on real property for fire insurance must be valued policies.Progressive Ins. Co, Ltd. v. S. Star Int’l, Inc., 6 A.S.R.3d 112 (Trial Div. 2002).

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