BORAL GAS OF AMERICAN

SAMOA, INC., Petitioner,

 

v.

 

FAAFETAI IAULUALO,

ACTING TREASURER

OF AMERICAN SAMOA,

Respondent.

 

High Court of American Samoa

Trial Division

 

CA No. 87-01

 

January 31, 2003

 

 

[1] A motion for

reconsideration or new trial should be based upon manifest error of law or

mistake of fact, and a judgment should not be set aside except for substantial

reasons.

 

[2] Where the

issue is one of statutory interpretation,

such is purely a question of law.

 

[3] In cases

where the language of Samoan Income Tax Act is ambiguous and conflicts with the

Internal Revenue Code, the Court must determine whether the Legislature intended to “de-link” the Samoan

Income Tax Act section.

 

[4] The Court

is free to interpret the laws of American Samoa differently than similarly

worded federal laws.

 

[5] In tax

deficiency proceedings, the High Court sits as a Tax Court.

 

[6] When the

High Court sits as a Tax Court, it follows the tax court rules and procedures

set forth in the Internal Revenue Code.

 

[7] Review of a

decision of the High Court, sitting as the Tax Court, shall be obtained by

filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the High Court within 90 days after

the decision is entered.

 

[8] Absent an express

rule to the contrary, a motion for reconsideration of a Tax Court decision

terminates the running of the ninety day limitations period within which to

file an appeal, and, in effect, restarts the clock for appealing if and when

the motion is denied.

 

Before

RICHMOND, Associate Justice, LOGOAI, Chief Associate Judge, and SAGAPOLUTELE,

Associate Judge.

 

Counsel:            For Petitioner, Daniel R. King

 For Respondent, Benton H. Walton IV, Asst.

Attorney General

 

ORDER

DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

FOR

RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL,

AND

GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL

 

Petitioner,

Boral Gas of American Samoa (“Boral”), brings this motion for reconsideration

or new trial with respect to the Court’s opinion and order of October 3, 2002,

granting partial summary judgment to the respondent, Faafetai Iaulualo

(“Iaulualo”), as the Acting Treasurer of American Samoa and Commissioner of

Internal Revenue under the Samoan Income Tax Act (“SITA”).  Our order held that Boral was liable for tax

deficiencies for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999.  For the reasons discussed below, we deny this

motion.

 

Boral also

requests, in the event of denial of its motion for reconsideration or new

trial, the Court to clarify whether the time of filing a notice of appeal is 90

days from entry of the judgment, excluding the time the motion for

reconsideration or new trial is pending, pursuant to SITA § 7483 or 10 days

from entry of the order denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial,

pursuant to A.S.C.A. § 43.0802.

 

Iaulualo also

brings a motion for reconsideration or new trial with respect to the Court’s

tentative award of litigation costs related to the summary judgment granted to

Boral for the tax years 1994 and 1996. 

For the reasons discussed below, we will grant this motion. 

 

I.  The Boral Motion

 

[1-2] A motion for

reconsideration or new trial “should be based upon manifest error of law or

mistake of fact, and a judgment should not be set aside except for substantial

reasons.”  Am. Samoa Gov’t v. S. Pac.

Island Airsystems, Inc., 28 A.S.R.2d 170, 171 (Trial Div. 1995).  We made clear in our order that there were no

genuine issues of any material facts. 

Boral does not dispute that. 

Instead, Boral urges us reconsider or to grant a new trial as to the

result reached.  As we stated, our

holding was “one of statutory

interpretation, which is purely a question of law.”  Boral Gas of Am. Samoa, Inc. v. Iaulualo,

6 A.S.R.3d 232, 237 (Trial Div. 2002)

(citing United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 859 F. Supp.

283, 286 (E.D. Mich. 1994)).  The

arguments Boral now advances are the same as the ones they advanced at the

summary judgment stage and present no substantial reasons to reverse our

opinion.    

 

Boral continues

to argue that A.S.C.A. § 11.0403 automatically incorporates any changes to the

Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) even if it would result in repealing an existing

SITA section.  It insists the only time

that § 11.0403 does not operate in that manner is when our Legislature uses

language that clearly “de-links” a SITA provision with its “mirror” IRC

provision.

 

[3] Though it would be

clearer if the Legislature were so explicit, it does not follow that the

absence of any “de-linking” language will subject a SITA section to automatic impermanence.  Instead, in cases where the language of SITA

is ambiguous and conflicts with the IRC, we must, and did, determine whether

the Legislature intended to “de-link” a SITA section.  For the reasons stated in our opinion, we

continue to believe they did so intend in this case (to de-link A.S.C.A.

11.0533 from IRC § 11(b)).

 

[4]

Holmes v. Dir. of Rev. & Tax., Gov’t of Guam,

827 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1987) does not support Boral’s position.  That case, like other cases interpreting

territorial mirror tax schemes, simply does what we did—provide the proper

statutory interpretation for ambiguous sections of a tax code.  See generally id.; Great Cruz Bay,

Inc. v. Wheatley, 495 F.2d 301 (3d Cir. 1974); Sayre & Company v.

Riddell, 395 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1968). 

Moreover, those cases involved the interpretation of federal law by

federal courts, as the U.S. Congress created the mirror tax codes for Guam, the

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands.  In this respect, while we may look to those

cases for guidance, we are free to interpret our own laws differently than

similarly worded federal laws.  See

Alamoana Recipe Inc. v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 24 A.S.R.2d 156, 157 (Trial Div.

1993); see also Wray v. Wray, 5 A.S.R. 2d 34, 45 (Trial Div. 1987).

 

II.  Time to Appeal

 

[5-6]

In tax deficiency proceedings, the “High Court sits as a Tax Court.”  Klauk v. Am. Samoa Gov’t, 13 A.S.R.2d

52, 55 n.2 (Trial Div. 1989); see A.S.C.A. § 11.0401.  In doing so, we follow the tax court rules

and procedures set forth in the IRC.  See

generally Stephens v. Coleman, 15 A.S.R.2d 87 (Trial Div. 1990) (applying

jurisdictional standards of IRC); Klauk, 13 A.S.R.2d. 52 (same);

A.S.C.A. § 11.0409.                          

 

[7-8]

Under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7483, “Review of a decision of the [High Court, sitting as

the] Tax Court shall be obtained by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of

the [High Court] within 90 days after the decision of the [High Court] is

entered.”  See A.S.C.A. § 11.0401

(substituting “High Court” for “District Court” and “Tax Court”).  Furthermore, “absent an express rule to the

contrary, a motion for reconsideration terminates the running of the ninety day

limitations period,” and, in effect, restarts the clock for appealing if and

when the motion is denied.  Nordvik v.

Comm’r I.R.S., 67 F.3d 1489, 1493 (9th Cir. 1995).  Therefore, notwithstanding the 10-day time

limit in A.S.C.A. § 43.0802, we are bound to apply in tax proceedings the time

limit of § 7483.  See Atuatasi v.

Moaali`itele, 8 A.S.R.2d 53, 59 n.2 (Trial Div. 1988) (noting that a later

statute [in this case SITA] governs the earlier [in this case A.S.C.A. §

43.0802]).[1]

 

III.  The Iaulualo Motion

 

During

the hearing on both pending motions, Boral acceded to Iaulualo’s position that

Boral is not entitled to litigation costs. 

Determination of litigation costs could involve further evidentiary

hearings on possibly complex issues, such as the exhaustion of administrative remedies,

contested amounts, and substantial justification of Iaulualo’s positions before

and during this action.  We will,

therefore, not belabor the issue and grant Iaulualo’s motion.

 

Order

 

1.  Boral’s motion for reconsideration or new trial

regarding the court’s decision on the tax years 1997, 1998 and 1999 is denied.

 

2.  Iaulualo’s motion for reconsideration or new

trial regarding litigation costs related to the tax years 1994 and 1996 is

granted.  Boral shall not recover

litigation costs for those tax years.

 

It is so

ordered.

 

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